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Purpose: The main aim of this study is to address the current gap in banking risk and 
efficiency literature by investigating risk and efficiency levels, identify risk and 
efficiency determinants. This thesis examines banking risk from one side and 
efficiency from another. The study also provides a comparative study between Islamic 
and conventional banking in an effort to provide clear, wide, understandable results.  
Methodology: The study’s methodology will be applied according to three main 
steps: first, estimating risk and efficiency levels. Second, investigating risk and 
efficiency determinants. And finally, identifying those potential variables affecting risk 
and efficiency through the SUR approach. Risk and efficiency levels are as follows; 
Risk figures by applying three potential risk indicators  and efficiency levels through 
The Data Enveloping Analysis (DEA) approach. The study will also apply the 
methodology in two different scenarios: first, with Islamic banks; and second, with 
conventional banks. This step is taken in order to present comparable results 
amongst the different banking systems, which would produce clearer, wider and 
more understandable findings. 
Sample: The study covers a sample of major banks in the MENA area for the period 
spanning 2006–2015. Countries included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, 
United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan.  
Results: After using two proxies to measure credit risk, the study has found that 
credit risk in Islamic and conventional banks is similar. A slight rise in loan loss 
reserve for conventional and a slight rise in non-performing loans in Islamic. The 
overall results show a similar credit risk levels in both Islamic and conventional 
banks in MENA. Insolvency risk was different, as Islamic banks reported higher risk 
levels compared to conventional banks. Z scores were higher in conventional banks 
indicating that insolvency risk in Islamic banks was higher. The study has found that 
efficiency levels in Islamic banks were also similar to efficiency levels in conventional 
banks. The Sharī‘ah’ compliance regulations did not affect the level of efficiency in 
Islamic banks performing in MENA. The study has investigated the impact of the 
global financial crisis on credit risk, insolvency risk and efficiency. The study found 
Islamic and conventional banks in MENA experienced an increase in credit risk. Both 
Islamic and conventional banks were less stable after the global financial with lower 
Z scores reported after the crisis. Banks in MENA were more efficient after the crisis. 
Efficiency scores were higher after the crisis compared to those reported before or 
during the crisis. 
 
Keywords 
Risk management, Conventional banks, Islamic banks, GCC, Mena, Bank efficiency, 
Bank performance, Islamic Sharī‘ah, Credit risk, Insolvency risk,, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan. 
GCC. MENA. 
 
بَا َوأََحلَّ  بَا الَ يَقُوُموَن ِإالَّ َكَما يَقُوُم الَِّذي يَتََخبَُّطهُ الشَّيَطاُن ِمَن الَمس ِ ذَِلَك بِأَنَُّهم قَالُوا إِنََّما البَيُع ِمثُل الر ِ }الَِّذيَن يَأُكلُوَن الر ِ
ُ ولَئَِك أَصَحاُب النَّاِر ُهم  َبا فََمن َجاَءهُ َموِعَظةٌ ِمن َرب ِِه فَانتََهى َفلَهُ َما َسلََف َوأَمُرهُ إِلى هللِا َوَمن عَ اَد فَأ َم الر ِ هللاُ البَيَع َوَحرَّ
اِلَحاِت َوأَقَاُموا  َدَقاِت َوهللاُ الَ يُِحبُّ ُكلَّ َكفَّاٍر أَثِيم * إِنَّ الَِّذيَن آمَ نُوا َوَعِملُوا الصَّ بَا َويُربي الصَّ فِيَها َخاِلُدوَن * يمَحُق هللاُ الر ِ
َكاةَ لَُهم أَجُرُهم ِعنَد َرب ِ ِهم َوالَ َخوٌف َعلَيِهم َوالَ ُهم يَحَزنُون *  يَا أَيَُّها الَِّذيَن آَمنُوا اتَّقُوا هللاَ َوذَُروا َما  الَةَ َوآتَُوا الزَّ الصَّ
بَا إِن ُكنتُم ُمؤِمنِين فَِإن لم تَفعَلُوا َفأذَنُوا بَِحرٍب ِمَن هللِا َوَرُسوِلِه َوإِن تُبتُم فَلَُكم رُ ُؤوُس أَمَواِلُكم الَ تَ ظِلُموَن َوالَ  بَِقَي ِمَن الر ِ
 تُظلَُمون *{
 .[البقرة: 275 - 279] 
 
Verse 275: Those who devour ‘Riba’ interest (usury) will not stand (on the Day 
of Resurrection) except like the standing of a person beaten by ‘Shaitan’ Satan 
leading him to insanity. That is because they say: “Trading is only like ‘Riba’,” 
where as Allah has permitted trading and forbidden ‘Riba’. So who-so-ever 
receives an admonition from his Lord and stops eating Riba, shall not 
be punished for the past; his case is for Allah (to judge); but whoever 
returns (to Riba), such are the dwellers of the Fire—– they will abide forever 
therein. 
Verse 276: Allah will destroy (deprive of blessings when taking Riba) Riba and 
will give 
increase for Sadaqat (deeds of charity, alms). And Allah likes not the 
disbelievers, sinners. 
Verse 277: Truly, those who believe, and do deeds of righteousness, and 
perform As-Salat (Iqamat-as-Salat) prayers, and give Zakat, they will have 
their reward with their Lord. On them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. 
Verse 278: O you who believe! Be afraid of Allah and give up what remains 
(due to you) from Riba (from now onwards) if you are (really) believers. 
Verse 279: And if you do not do it, then take a notice of war from Allah and His 
Messenger but if you repent, you shall have your capital sums. Deal not 
unjustly (by asking more than your capital sums), and you shall not be dealt 
with unjustly (by receiving less than your capital sums). 
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Sharī‘ah: Refers to the guidelines that regulate all operations 
according to the Qura’n and Sunnah. 
Mudārabah: An agreement between two individuals as one 
individual to provide finance and the other to provide 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Mushārakah: A financial method whereby all the partners share in 
equity as well as 
Management.  
 
Ribā: Equal to interest in the normal financial systems. 
Gharar: Doubt of outcome produced by unclear conditions in 
contracts of deferred 
Exchange. 
Sukuk Financial certificate in Islamic finance, similar to a 
bond in Western finance, with the accordance to 
Sharī‘ah law.  
Salam  The holder of a Salam certificate privileges 
commodities, products and services in a 
stated future date. 
Murābahah Sale at a specified profit margin.  
 
Islamic Windows Sharī‘ah’ Compliance products and services offered 
by Conventional banks 
Concept D fi tion 
1. Introduction 
Many different academics and policy makers have come to recognise the benefits 
associated with Sharī‘ah-compliant financial products, with the equity and risk-sharing 
aspects seen to balance out any misalignment between short-term demandable 
deposit contracts and long-term uncertainty in loan contracts. Furthermore, such 
Sharī‘ah-compliant products are recognised as appealing for different portions of the 
population that seek to acquire financial services that are in line with their beliefs.  
Although it remains that Sharī‘ah-compliant financial assets continue to make up only 
a small portion of worldwide banking assets (Financial Times, 2014). Islamic finance 
remains concentrated primarily in some oil-exporting countries, with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries, plus Malaysia and Iran, accounting for more than 80% 
of the industry assets, which we estimate will reach $2.1 trillion by the end of 2016. 
(S&P Global Ratings). 
In line with the above, this thesis draws a comparison between Islamic and 
conventional banks in terms of risk and efficiency, utilising a number of different factors 
constructed from income statement and balance sheet data, utilising a sample made 
up of ten countries offering both conventional and Islamic banking options. 
Furthermore, the performance of both types of banks are analysed and assessed 
across banking systems overall and the recent global financial crisis in particular. 
Therefore, this thesis provides insight into a subject of a considerable debate. 
Although the key aspects of Sharī‘ah-compliant financial services highlight clear 
differences in the business models adopted by conventional and Islamic banks, 
respectively, and further illustrate the greater stability and efficiency demonstrated by 
Islamic banks, it is argued that conventional banks might differ in their form but 
ultimately demonstrate comparability in substance, and also that Islamic banks cannot 
be viewed as more beneficial when considering stability and efficiency (Kuran, 2004). 
From a theoretical standpoint, Islamic finance is seen to vary significantly when 
compared with more conventional finance options. In particular, financial options that 
are Sharī‘ah-compliant do not permit the charging of interest, for example, with goods 
and services only permitted to carry a price, not to be open to speculation, and 
altogether prohibiting the financing of particular illicit activities. At the same time, 
however, finance in the Sharī‘ah-compliant domain depends on the concept of profit- 
and loss-sharing, meaning there is a need for all risk to be shared by all parties, with 
both the asset side and liability required to adhere in this regard, with the view that all 
transactions should be supported by a real economic transaction with a physical asset 
at its core. This implies clear differences when considering Islamic and conventional 
banks’ activity and funding structures. More realistically, however, scholars in the 
Islamic arena have devised products that are comparable to conventional banking 
products, although interest rate payments and discounts have been replaced with 
more contingent payment structures and fees.  
In this vein, as an example, it has been found by Chong & Liu (2009) that, in the 
specific context of Malaysia, only a small portion of Islamic bank financing is centred 
on the critical concept of profit-loss sharing, with Islamic deposits not seen to be 
interest-free, but rather similar to more conventional deposits, as established in the 
work of (Khan, 2010), which took a sample of large Islamic banks across a number of 
different countries. Furthermore, across Islamic banks, much popularity has been seen 
in lease-like products, with these seen to be linked to real-sector transactions. 
However, Islamic banks, along with their depositors, have been seen to take residual 
equity-style risks, with such actions having implications for the agency relationships 
on both sides of the balance sheet. In this regard, attention will be directed towards 
balance sheets, as well as testing whether or not the differences recognised in the 
business model can be seen to products results in terms of funding structure and 
income, in addition to intermediation efficiency.  
Importantly, theory is not able to provide sound predictions in terms of whether or not 
Islamic banks can be considered more stable or cost-effective than conventional 
banking institutions. In one way, it might be seen that depositors’ inclination to monitor 
and discipline banks could be improved through the equity-type nature of savings and 
investment deposits; on the other hand, deposits’ equity-type nature could be seen to 
affect the incentives of the banks to monitor and discipline lenders owing to the fact 
they do not face any immediate threats amongst depositors in regards withdrawal, 
although overall asset riskiness could be seen to increase.  
Moreover, restrictions implemented across Sharī‘ah products are recognised as able 
to increase asset concentration whilst also reducing the overall application of hedging 
instruments across banks. Ambiguity comparable in this regard can be seen to relate 
to Islamic banks’ efficiency. On the one hand, in Islamic banks, monitoring and 
screening could incur lower costs as a result of the lower agency problems; however, 
in contrast, Islamic banks are seen to be more complex, which could cause greater 
costs and lower efficiency amongst such institutions. Moreover, the older and more 
established a bank, the lower the cost structures, meaning Islamic banks might be 
seen to face higher costs.  
For the period spanning 2006–2015, a sample of conventional and Islamic banks were 
taken in an effort to evaluate whether or not there are clear and significant differences 
between Islamic and conventional banks in regards efficiency and risk. A sample of 
both types of bank across a number of countries was seen as viable in assisting for 
unobserved time-variant country-specific effects; this therefore provides clearer insight 
into any and all differences when drawing a contrast with banks from other countries.  
Although there is a significant volume of practitioner literature available in regards to 
Islamic finance, there is a lack of research in specific regards of Islamic banking. In 
this vein, it has been found by Cihak & Hesse (2010) that smaller Islamic banks 
demonstrate a greater degree of stability when compared with smaller conventional 
banks. Moreover, it has been established by Majid et al. (2010) that the relative 
efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks demonstrates much variation when a 
contrast is drawn across countries. Conversely, it is recognised by Baele et al. (2012) 
that there are lower defaults amongst Islamic loans than conventional loans even 
when drawing a contrast between the same borrower. On the other hand, it was stated 
in the work of Ongena & Sendeniz-Yuncu (2011) that Islamic banks operating in 
Turkey predominantly focus on young, multiple-bank, industry-focused and 
transparent organisations. Similarly, the study by Khan (2010a) determined that, on 
the deposit side, when taking a sample of banks operating in Pakistan, Islamic banks 
were seen to achieve significantly greater growth rates in deposits when compared 
with conventional banks, with the former even achieving growth during the recent 
financial crisis in regards higher deposit inflows.  
A number of authors have investigated and examined the relative efficiency of 
conventional and Islamic banks, as in the work of El-Gamal & Hulusi (2005) for Turkish 
banks and Srairi (2010) for banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council region. The 
apparent lack of academic work in the field of Islamic finance differs significantly when 
considering the fundamental importance and attention now directed towards Islamic 
banking in a number of Muslim regions in both Africa and Asia. Accordingly, in this 
thesis, there is the aim of providing a contribution to the volume of literature in this 
regard. In contrast to other works, emphasis in this thesis is directed towards a number 
of different elements along which theory states a clear difference between Islamic and 
conventional banking systems. In contrast to previous papers, much consideration 
centres on the careful control for omitted variable bias, with a clear prediction made in 
terms of the performance of Islamic banks throughout the recent financial crisis.  
When considering this attempt to explore Islamic banks at the bank level, two 
fundamental stipulations may be seen to apply: primarily, anecdotal evidence implies 
key differences across countries in regard the overall structure of Sharī‘ah-compliant 
products, with a number of banks seen to provide conventional products masked in 
Sharī‘ah-compliant packaging; this therefore suggests the need to ensure caution 
whenever interpreting Islamic banking the context of more conventional financial 
intermediation models. Moreover, there are a number of differences recognised across 
various Muslim countries in terms of what is recognised as Sharī‘ah-compliant; thus, 
a cross-country contrast and analysis poses issues.  
The financial crisis witnessed in recent years has not only caused concerns in terms 
of the suitable operation of conventional Western banking, but has further enhanced 
the emphasis placed on Islamic banking, with some stating that the latter type of bank 
is superior when facing a crisis (Hasan & Dridi, 2010).  
 
1.1. The Importance of Religion Overall and Islamic Finance in 
Particular 
In recent years, there has been much growth in Islamic finance, although this seems 
to remain concentrated in a select few regions. Throughout the past years, Islamic 
finance assets have been seen to grow at double-digit rates, increasing from an 
estimated USD 200 billion in 2003 through to USD 1.8 trillion by the end of 2013, as 
noted by Ernst & Young (2014), IFSB (2014) and Wyman (2009). Nonetheless, 
regardless of such growth, Islamic finance assets continue to be focused in GCC 
countries, as well as Malaysia and Iran, and are seen to represent less than 1% of 
global financial assets. 
The growth and development of Islamic Banking, specifically, was seen to 
demonstrate outperformance when contrasted alongside conventional banking 
throughout the past ten years. Thus, Islamic banking has increased its scope across 
a number of different countries, constituting 15% banking system assets share across 
ten different countries (Iran and Sudan with a comprehensive and mature Islamic 
financial sector, Bangladesh, Brunei, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen) (IFSB, 2014). Importantly, in consideration to global 
banking assets, Islamic banking is seen to represent roughly 1.25%. Furthermore, 
throughout the period of the recent global financial crisis, Islamic banks were 
recognised as less exposed to the toxic assets recognised as sullying the conventional 
banking world, but nonetheless were seen to suffer from second-round effects, most 
predominantly through the real estate slump. Capitalisation and asset quality continue 
to demonstrate better performance when compared with conventional banks, although 





Figure 1. Islamic Finance Assets 
Sources: IFSB Annual reports; Central Banks, IFSB; IFIS; Bloomberg; KFHR; and Ernst & Young. Kammer, et 
al.,(2015) Islamic Finance: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Options. Note: GCC= Gulf Cooperation 
Council; MENA= Middle East and North Africa; UAE= United Arab Emirates; UK= United Kingdom. 
 
Figure 2.Sukuk Market 
 Sources: IFSB, HSBC, Kuwait Finance House Research, and Zaywa. Kammer, et al.,(2015) Islamic Finance: 
Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Options. Note: MYR=Malaysian Ringgit; SAR= Saudi Arabian Riyal; USD= 
United States Dollars. 
 
Importantly, when considering Sukuk issuance, there has also been a dramatic 
increase. On a global scale, issuance has demonstrated much growth since 2006, 
although notably from a low level. In 2013, levels were seen to reach USD 120 billion, 
meaning by the end of 2013, outstanding Sukuk was seen to equate to USD 270 
billion, thereby representing 0.25% of global bond markets. Importantly, the 
concentration of issuance can be seen in GCC countries and Malaysia, although 
diversification is continuous with issuance seen in Africa, Europe and East Asia. 
Essentially, it is evenly divided between corporate Sukuk and sovereigns, with key 
domination witnessed in US dollars or Malaysian ringgits. In this vein, demand may be 
seen to be outweighing supply, which ultimately results in the majority of issuance 
demonstrating oversubscription, less liquidity with investors showing a preference for 
purchasing and holding, and lower yields. This can be particularly relevant to Islamic 
banks, which are seen to suffer from a lack of Sharī‘ah-compliant liquid assets.  
The significant growth witnessed ultimately highlights the demand demonstrated by 
Muslim populations, as well as the key economic growth in those regions where there 
is already an industry centred on Islamic finance. In this vein, such products are also 
at the focus of innovation in terms of corporate, consumer finance, trade and project 
elements, as well as improvements in the regulatory environment, strong interest in 
Sukuk issuance by those banks aiming to improve their capital bases in consideration 
to Basel III stipulations, and continuous diversification amongst Sukuk issuers seeking 
to garner savings within and from the Islamic world. Nonetheless, whether or not such 
development can be maintained in line with more recent oil price decreases remains 
to be seen when considering the fact that the industry remains focused on oil-exporting 
countries. Essentially, in this regard, there is the need to complete works and garner 
empirical evidence in line with oil prices being a determinant of IB diffusion, as 
recognised in the study of (Imam & Kpodar. 2010) Furthermore, a lack of liquidity 
alongside low yields could have an impact on the Sukuk market in terms of its long-
term growth and development.  
Islamic finance is recognised as having the potential to provide significant 
contributions and more comprehensive growth across the economy. Notable portions 
of the Muslim population are underservices when considering conventional finance, 
with only 1 in 4 individuals seen to have a bank account, whilst only 7 in every 100 
have access to more formal finance; this is contrasted alongside 2 out of 3 and 1 in 
11, respectively, across non-Muslim populations (Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper & Randall, 
2013). Furthermore, when considering risk-sharing and the notable link of credit to 
collateral, the various principles mean that IB is compatible and well aligned with SME 
and start-up financing, which therefore contributes to more inclusive and wide-ranging 
growth. At the same time, Sukuk is recognised as having demonstrated its value in the 
infrastructure finance field, which can also assist in supporting both economic growth 
and investment.   
In addition, it is recognised that Islamic finance is well positioned to help encourage 
financial and macroeconomic stability. Risk-sharing and asset-based financing 
principles can help to encourage better risk management not only by financial entities 
but also their customers, and can further steer away from credit booms. In this regard, 
IB may be seen to resemble the proposal outlined in the 1930s within the Chicago 
plan, which outlines the need to ensure the complete backing of bank loans, with more 
recent studies implying this could decrease the risk of bank runs and macroeconomic 
volatility (Benes & Kumhof, 2012; Wolf, 2014). In specific regards Islamic finance, a 
significant volume of bank deposits are provided on the basis of profit- and loss-
sharing Ali, 2011), meaning they are explicitly ‘bail-inable’ should there be any distress 
or uncertainty witnessed in the banking sector. Lastly, the ethical precepts 
underpinning Islamic finance provide, in essence, a fundamental foundation for 
significant levels of ethical conduct, consumer protection, and sound governance. 
Nonetheless, a notable degree of the potential in regards the industry is yet to be 
utilised, with empirical evidence garnered thus far still not validating whether or not IB 
has encouraged financial access and depth once consideration has been directed 
towards structural factors (Barajas, Ben Naceur & Massara, 2015). In addition, a 
number of questions remain in relation to the degree to which Islamic banks’ financing 
may be viewed as risk-sharing and whether or not PSIAs are absorbing loss in their 
entirety, suggesting that conventional and Islamic banks might be just as risk-exposed 
as one another (López-Mejía, Aljabrin, Awad, Norat & Song, 2014).  
Importantly, it is recognised that a number of fundamental constraints can be 
witnessed across Islamic finance that could ultimately hinder its development. Despite 
the fact that regulatory bodies and standards-setters in the industry have established 
principles and in-depth technical standards, there remains room for national authorities 
to implement such aspects with a greater focus on global conventional banking 
standards. Furthermore, the lack of academic efforts in the Sharī‘ah financing domain, 
combined with the slow rate of innovation, are critical considerations in the sector, with 
such challenges not only restricting its development but also potentially encouraging 
complexity in products and practices, which ultimately go hand-in-hand with risks 
(Kammer and Norat et al, 2015). 
 
1.2. Islamic Banking 
1.2.1. Business Model 
Islamic banks are recognised as encompassing significant differences when contrasted 
alongside conventional banking systems in regards contracts, finance models and investment 
modes. Such differences can have a notable influence on agency conflicts, corporate 
governance structures, and accountability as a whole (Abdelsalam et al. 2016). 
1.2.2. Finance Model 
Islamic banks are recognised as centred on a constrained3 model of finance, which restricts 
various activities and components, including Riba (usury), Gharar (excessive uncertainty) and 
Maysir (speculations), whilst emphasising profit, loss- and risk-sharing. The limitations 
inherent in the Islamic banking model suggest the presence of two agency cost directions. 
Primarily, depositors in such banks are seen to adopt the role of Investment Account Holders 
(IAHs), whilst, in reality, the managers of such banks maintain complete control over 
depositors’ funds and the investments of such. Importantly, amongst IAHs, there is a lack of 
Board representation, meaning the overall performance of the bank goes unsupervised. The 
lack of such representation creates a further financial burden, which is shouldered by the 
depositors. In contrast, however, the need for Islamic banking institutions to ensure alignment 
with Islamic principles suggests a potential decrease in agency costs through moral 
accountability limitations at the organisational level. Other studies carried out and documented 
in the literature suggest that corporate actors, i.e. managers, and their opportunistic behaviours 
may be somewhat restricted within a setting that actively pursues and adheres to moral values 
at the business level (Kaptein, 2011; Ha-Brookshire, 2015). Moreover, Islamic banks might 
also be forced to deal with an additional layer of governance, as outlined by the Shariah 
supervisory board4 (SSB). In this vein, the SSB oversees the compliance of Islamic banks with 
moral values, and accordingly approves and reports on such. Furthermore, Islamic 
accountability is a concept that is applied and extended across managers’ moral responsibility 
and that of Board members in Islamic banks, spanning far beyond the legal liability afforded 
in a conventional context (Beekun & Badawi, 2005; Belal et al., 2015). 
1.2.3. Governance Model 
An SSB is appointment by all banks operating in the Islamic domain, with the SSB functioning 
as an additional governance mechanism. The main aim of the SSB is centred on ensuring that 
the way in which Islamic banking institutions function is in line with the Shariah and its 
principles (Beekun & Badawi, 2005). The presence of such governance is recognised as also 
able to restrict opportunities for financial mistakes, which ultimately facilitates the moderation 
of higher agency costs across such banks (Mensah, 2014). In this regard, governance 
framework of Islamic banks has different actors involved, such as the Board of Directors, 
management and SSB, interact alongside the key stakeholders, whether creditors, depositors or 
shareholders. Furthermore, the effects associated with organisational religiosity on agency 
costs and Islamic banks’ reporting behaviours are also detailed (Abdelsalam et al. 2016). 
1.2.4. Accountability 
Islamic accountability, as a religious concept, further expands on and develops Islamic banks’ 
moral accountability across their main actors, i.e. Board of Directors, management, and 
members of the SSB, extending beyond legal liability. Such accountability encourages such 
actors to pursue the bank’s wider stakeholders’ best interests whilst also focusing on ensuring 
the values of investments made by depositors and shareholders (IAHs) are maximised and 
safeguarded (see Beekun & Badawi, 2005; Belal et al., 2015). Such actions satisfy the religious 
stipulations outlined by Amana (trust), which necessitates the actors of banking organisations 
to operate and function in line with Adl (justice)-based principles, as well as those underpinning 
Qist (balance) and Ihsaan (perfection) (Beekun & Badawi, 2005). Accordingly, there is the 
commonplace expectation that Islamic banks’ management, as actors in such religiously-
underpinned entities, conduct themselves in line with assigning the utmost of respect to ethical 
choices in terms of measuring and reporting on financial transactions. Otherwise stated, a more 
significant degree of moral accountability limitations imposed upon actors in Islamic banks 
should, in turn, result in lower agency costs across such organisations. This type and level of 
accountability is recognised as well-positioned in terms of decreasing if not altogether 
eradicating risk-taking behaviours whilst also mitigating earnings management practices. In 
this regard, a greater degree of transparency and openness is predicted to exist within the 
banking sector when contrasted alongside more conventional institutions (Abdelsalam et al. 
2016). 
This work seeks to fill the gap recognised between the three key strands associated with the 
main literature focused on risk and efficiency, i.e. that measuring these components, 
investigating the factors underpinning them, and examining the economic consequences 
stemming from the recent financial crisis in this regard.  
Islamic banking is recognised as significantly different when contrasted with 
conventional banking, with this seen to be the case for various reasons, as discussed 
above. In addition to such differences, however, there are also variations seen in 
regards the treasury, with Islamic banks known to be prohibited from almost all regions 
from implementing various forms of derivatives, including futures and forwards in the 

















Table 1. Balance sheet comparison between Islamic and Conventional banks 
 
Source; Kammer, et al.,(2015) Islamic Finance: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Options. Note: PSIA= 
profit-sharing investment account. 1/ Differences are in red. 
 
When considering the Islamic equivalent of bonds, namely Sukuk, these may be 
recognised as comparable to asset-backed securities. On the other hand, when 
reviewing conventional bonds, these are seen to be a promise to repay a loan, whilst 
Sukuk makes up partial ownership in receivables (Sukuk al Murabahah), a 
construction project (Istisna’), a lease (Ijārah), a joint partnership (Mudarabah or 
Musharakah), a deferred delivery of assets (Salam), or investment (Istithmar). In 
essence, overall, the principal amount is not usually guaranteed, with the return 
acknowledged as associated with underlying assets and the performance of such 
(Maziad & AlSaeed, 2015). In this way, asset-backed securities may be the form 
adopted in Sukuk, which could constitute the complete securitisation of underlying 
assets or which may otherwise be asset-based securities.  
From a practical perspective, it is common for Islamic finance to encompass 
transactions structured in such a way that reflects or replicates conventional finance 
in the sense of providing a periodic rate of return. In various Sukuk instruments, it is 
common for a predetermined rate of return to be paid to the investor, with such a rate 
centred on the underlying assets’ expected return, which collateralise the Sukuk. In 
specific consideration to debt-like financing, as demonstrated by Islamic banks, there 
is no interest; rather, periodic, predetermined payments are made by the debtor to the 
bank, in line with the profit to be expected stemming from the use of the underlying 
asset. This can result in slight variations in substance with conventional finance 
models, with some instances warranting a more complicated transactional layering 
with the inclusion of third parties. In some situations, these could generate various 
risks, including operational, that would ultimately require sound management (Beck, 
Demirgüҫ-Kunt & Merrouche, 2010; Čihák & Hesse, 2008; Chong & Liu, 2009; Ali, 
2011; Kammer and Norat et al., 2015). 
Importantly, Islamic banks are seen to be vulnerable to various risks that can cause 
obstacles for regulatory and legal models, as noted below:  
• Displaced commercial risk may be relevant when Islamic banks are competing 
with more traditional banking systems, with such competition meaning Islamic 
banks and their shareholders could be required to sacrifice some of their profit 
in order to avoid losses for investment account holders, for example. This can 
result in issues in the way in which Islamic banks build reserves against losses 
and the way in which they are treated when establishing regulatory capital.  
• Equity investment risk could be a problem owing to the banks’ assets 
comprising physical investments when returns are uncertain. In this regard, 
depositor flight could also surface should market interest rates increase beyond 
the rate of return able to be funding by the assets of the banks.  
• Shari’ah governance and compliance requirements could mean non-
compliance could induce trigger flight. 
• Operational and market risks might increase owing to the complexity of 
products and the lack of hedging tools. 
• The sale of debts and the charging of interest when default occurs could mean 
increased credit risk, as also demonstrated by non-performing loans and profit-
and-loss-sharing initiatives.  
• Shari’ah-compliant liquidity tools and infrastructure shortages could also mean 
liquidity risk is heightened.  
In regards IB’s individual characteristics, these have been considered through 
specialised Islamic standard-setting institutions, with conventional standards 
applicable across all banking systems, but with the incorporation of special standards 
for IB. The sector is known to encompass two individual standard setters, namely the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), 
established in 1990, for Shari’ah accounting and auditing standards, as well as the 
2002-established IFSB centred on regulatory and supervisory standards. Such bodies 
have devised a number of guidance notes and technical standards, working in 
alignment with the Basel Committee and comparable conventional standard-setting 
bodies so as to ensure consistency with and adherence to their standards. 
Nonetheless, it remains that the adoption of such standards across different countries 
is not uniform, with only 8 countries out of 29 examined seen to apply AAOIFI 
accounting standards (IMF) (Kammer and Norat et al., 2015). 
A survey was carried out in 2011 centred on models governing IB practice. The main 
findings are seen to be important when considering that the supervisory and regulatory 
models have not witnessed much change. All IMF members with a degree of IB 
presence were contacted, with 39 countries responding, with ten not considering IB. 
The key findings of the survey can be summed up as follows: 
• A   total of 72% of the respondents suggested that the regulatory and legal 
model acknowledges IB institutions, products and/or practices, with a total of 
76% of the respondents recognising IB as carried out individually and 55% 
holding the view that IB is carried out through a conventional bank.  
• A number of the respondents stated that all banks were required to adhere to 
a single integrated regulatory framework, with 3 recognising two separate 
independent regulatory frameworks, whilst 7 respondents made reference to 
the presence of a combined approach; notably a comparable regulatory model 
applicable to both conventional and Islamic banks, but with separate guidelines 
and regulations for areas specific to IB.  
• In specific regions, the Basel capital model is applicable across all banks, 
including IB, with other regions adopting regulatory capital adequacy 
requirements, which contain prescriptions that are commonly based on IFSB 
prudential standards and guided principles on the necessary adjustments to 
the Basel capital framework in mind of dealing with particular IB features. As 
such, there may be difficulties in drawing a contrast with capital ratio in line 
with Islamic banks of varying countries.   
 
 
Figure 3. Regulatory Frameworks 
Source: Kammer, et al.,(2015) Islamic Finance: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Options. 
 
• Two supervision models in regards IB are applied in jurisdictions where IB and 
conventional banks both operate, as shown in Figure 4. In the first model, 
conventional and Islamic banks are required to function in line with a single 
supervisory authority, whereas in the second model, there is the separation of 
Islamic and conventional banks within an individual supervisory authority.  
• Varying approaches are seen from one jurisdiction to the next in regards the 
nature and degree of data needing to be disclosed, as outlined by banks. In 
those with conventional and Islamic banking institutions, the disclosure 
requirements remain the same, whereas in other regions, financial statements 
pertaining to an IB cannot be made public unless this has been approved by 
the Shari’ah board.  
• When comparing jurisdictions in regards protection through deposit safety nets 
and investments with IBs, there is much heterogeneity witnessed. Protection 
varies from no coverage of investments and deposits through to complete 
protection. In some instances, there is a single-deposit protection facility 
whereas others have separate schemes for conventional and Islamic banks, 
respectively.  
• Practices differ from one country to the next. Importantly, the distress resolution 
process for Islamic banks does not differ when compared with that of 
conventional banking institutions. In relation to the enforcement and corrective 
actions and processes model, in most instances, there are no differences 
between the conventional and Islamic banking systems.  
 
Figure 4. Islamic Banks Examinations 
Source: Kammer, et al.,(2015) Islamic Finance: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Options. 
 
As is the case of conventional finance, the supervisory role of Islamic finance may be 
recognised in various ways, although the main emphasis is placed on ensuring the 
satisfaction of various aims and objectives. These might include the presence of a 
sound legal framework, sound accountability practices and a well-designed 
governance framework (Viñals et al., 2010). Nonetheless, in various jurisdictions, 
there appears to be a shortage of focused examination and licensing procedures for 
IB. Moreover, in Islamic banks, supervisors do not appear to be positioned to 
supervise both the mutual fund-type activities undertaken by IBs and the banking as 
a whole, which necessitates a cross-sectoral approach spanning banking, securities 
and insurance. Such complexities further highlight the value of national authorities 
adopting the Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regulation (banking segment); these 
will soon be issued by the IFSB and are known to be centred on the core principles of 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Also of value are FSIs (financial 
soundness indicators) for IBs, with the IFSB known to be auctioning various processes 
in order to devise and expand structural indicators for Islamic finance, in line with the 
FSIs of the IMF.  
One of the key obstacles is a sound, robust regulatory treatment of Islamic banks’ 
PSIA. Despite the fact that these accounts are seen to replicate the shares of a mutual 
fund, at least in functional terms, only a small number of countries facilitate some 
degree of pass-through of losses on the assets finances when calculating the CAR 
(capital adequacy ratio), which notably is seen to vary by as much as 70%. 
Furthermore, and somewhat as a result, the PSIAs have encouraged banks to ensure 
greater liquidity buffers and higher reserves. In the future, regulatory and supervisory 
authorities need to ensure PSIAs are not handled in the same way as pure deposit, 
but rather ensure the IFSB guidance is observed when setting the alpha factor so as 
to ensure their loss-absorbency feature is not undermined.  
Another key issue is recognised in regards IAHs sharing profits and shouldering 
losses, although there is a pronounced lack of shareholder rights, as noted by (López-
Mejía et al., 2014). Accordingly, it might not be possible for IAHs to secure complete 
disclosure in regards assets performance or in terms of the way in which PSIA is 
calculated in terms of the rate of return. Furthermore, whenever withdrawals are made, 
it might not be possible to recover contribution to buffers used in order to protect capital 
and smooth returns. In an effort to overcome this challenge, corporate governance 
could be improved, such as through requiring Board directors to be held accountable 
in regards the implementation of IAHs’ rights. In this regard, there is a need for 
complete transparency and disclosure to be recognised by supervisors in relation to 
assets, payouts and reserves performance.  
Another challenge facing IB is that of compliance with Shari’ah, with regulators not 
always having the ability to ensure banks are adopting sound practices. Furthermore, 
there are variations in the way in which Shari’ah may be interpreted, which can result 
in a lack of alignment between and across borders; this could have an impact on trust 
within the sector. It is therefore suggested that, at the bank level, an independent 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) be established for the completion of reviews. It is 
further noted that a centralised Board, in this regard, could be beneficial in terms of 
ensuring consistency in approaches. In addition, standardised approaches to policies 
could be implemented, with suitable accounting standards needing to be followed.   
Basel III application amongst Islamic banks is also recognised as posing a number of 
challenges, with Islamic banks already seen to be well-capitalised. One problem 
remains, however, with regards risk-weighted assets when considering variation 
across regions in the way in which PSIAs are treated, as included in capital, according 
to an alpha factor that differs from one region to the next. This highlights the value of 
efforts directed towards ensuring a greater degree of consistency in relation to the 
alpha factor where there is similarity in the levels of displaced commercial risk and 
RWAs.  
There is a tendency for high levels of liquidity to be witnessed amongst Islamic banks, 
although they are known to suffer from a shortage of well-developed markets for high-
quality liquid assets that are Shari’ah-compliant. Importantly, this then necessitates 
that a greater volume of cash needs to be held by Islamic banks, which in turn has an 
effect on their profitability, with the lack of such deposit insurance potentially 
heightening the need for there to be excess liquidity held, meaning greater run-off 
factors on deposits and PSIAs are demonstrated by Islamic banks, with the 
recommended run-off factors exceeded. Importantly, liquidity risk could be reduced 
through decreasing the length of financing maturity, with improved maturity aligned 
with their liabilities. To some degree, this issue could be minimised through improving 
the supply of tradable and well-rated Islamic securities.   
Risk-based supervision across Islamic banking remains under-developed in a number 
of countries, with the need in a number of instances to establish particular instruments 
required in order to ensure such supervision, as well as the methodologies to evaluate 
their unique risks and vulnerabilities. As an example, when evaluating asset quality, 
there are many differences, with vulnerability to market risk, greater operational risks 
and Shari’ah governance not consistently applied and present in the risk-based 
supervision methodologies. In this regard, there is a need for the application of rating 
methodologies and the IFSB standard on stress testing.  
Importantly, there are particular protection-related issues that could cause problems 
in the Islamic banking arena. As an example, some contracts, including Ijārah 
Muntahia Bittamlīk or ‘lease-to-purchase’, means consumers could be in an 
undesirable position. Those customers who demonstrate defaults prior to reaching the 
conclusion of their contract term could suffer equity losses, meaning they are unable 
to take advantage of capital gains when seeking to prepay a mortgage. The issues 
inherent in various Islamic bank contracts also mean that there are problems in 
consumers garnering complete understanding into the risks. Moreover, banks’ 
corporate structure can sometimes mean conflicts across group interests and in terms 
of the fiduciary responsibilities of the Islamic bank. Accordingly, it might not be possible 
for IAHs to achieve the best returns whilst also bearing loss risks. As such, there is a 
need for a consumer protection model to be devised and implemented with the aim of 
catering to the particular character of Islamic finance, ensuring strong supervision of 
parties’ financing, and improved financial literacy, along with improved insolvency and 
bankruptcy schemes (Lukonga, 2015; Kammer and Norat et al., 2015). 
 
1.3. Financial Crisis 
The factors underpinning the occurrence of the financial crisis are examined in regards 
worldwide structural imbalances (Jagannathan, Kapoor & Schaumburg, 2013), 
attention directed towards behavioural factors (Mortreul, 2010; Ashby, 2010; 
Moshirian, 2011), factors establishing the overall scale and severity (Claessens, Kose, 
2013; Stiglitz, 2010), regulatory considerations (Moshirian, 2011; Kane, 2012; 
Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014), and inadequacies in banking (Claessens, Demirguc-
Kunt & Moshirian, 2009; Jickling, 2009; Sakbani, 2010; Stiglitz, 2010; BIS, 2010b; 
Gonzalez-Paramo, 2011a, b; Vermorken, 2011; Firtescu, 2012; Cabal, 2013). 
Accordingly, much attention has been directed towards establishing the factors 
responsible for the financial crisis, despite the examination of credit risk management 
and changes being somewhat lacking, particularly in the context of its adoption in a 
certain region.  
A financial crisis may be defined as the economic situation associated with banking 
panic, which may be seen to encompass financial sector losses, significant production, 
and stresses induced on international markets, causing downfalls in the stock market, 
increases in currency, foreign loans, financial bubbles, and a significant downfall in 
economic activity, all of which is positioned to cause recession (Racickas, 
Vasiliauskaite, 2010). Importantly, at a particular level, crises may be seen as 
significant manifestations of the interactions between the real economy and the 
financial sector (Claessens, Kose, 2013). Prior to the 2008 crisis, crises were 
recognised as significant growth in the financial industry, when financial institutions’ 
sizes and the number of financial transactions carried out are seen to surpass what 
could feasibly be recognised as economically or socially optimal (Kapoor, 2010). 
However, there has been much change witnessed in the financial markets, as well as 
across markets and associated incentives: finance was recognised as centred on the 
short-term, which ultimately became destabilising, causing the scope and speed of 
contagion within the system to increase, a lesser degree of transparency in the 
financial system, and high uncovered leverage and opacity on an international scale, 
along with price inflation through low interest rates (Kapoor, 2010; Ashby, 2010). In 
this particular setting, market disturbances or shockwaves can cause a number of 
detrimental effects, including a stop in transactions, low levels of confidence, and 
cross-border effects. Accordingly, the recent financial crisis can cause a number of 
different outcomes and an impact felt across the world.  
The financial crisis started in 2007, with 2008 witnessing momentum. The first stage 
of the crisis, which spanned July 2007–August 2008, was explained as the onset of 
the American mortgage crisis, which had witnessed significant write-downs by banks 
owing to bad mortgages, with bankruptcies witnessed after. The second stage began 
in September 2008, when the liquidity crisis began; this witnessed banks, specifically, 
coming to experience unparalleled liquidity stress, consequently affecting their 
capacity to lend. The subsequent stage stemmed from the liquidity crisis, which 
caused access to credit to be frozen for banks, businesses and households, therefore 
causing shocks to economic activity and a lack of trust across the banking system as 
a whole (Grigor’ev, Salikhov, 2008). The various phases inherent in the financial crisis 
can be viewed differently by professionals in the domain: as an example, Sakbani 
(2010) emphasises the need to consider the actions of central banks and the 
imbalances in international payments.  
Importantly, the crisis was recognised as extreme destruction, and was predicted at 
equating to approximately US$ 50 trillion—notably on the same level as one year’s 
world GDP (Aisen, Franken, 2010). Furthermore, it has been acknowledged as the 
worst crisis to have been witnessed since the Wall Street Crash of the 1920s and the 
Great Depression of the 1930s (Ashby, 2010), with some even viewing it as the most 
significant crisis across finance capitalism’s history (Turner, 2009). The financial crisis, 
which spanned 2007–2009, has been linked with a decline in values across bonds, 
stocks, property and other assets, with the crisis teaching a significant lesson in 
regards the various dimensions of a crisis (Claessens, Kose, 2013). Furthermore, 
across a global scale and in terms of its impact, the crisis was unprecedented, with 
issues exported through a variety of different channels, including commerce, 
currencies, derivatives and investments, into other countries (Stiglitz, 2010; Moshirian, 
2011). 
The USA is known to have been the originating country in the financial crisis, with the 
failure of a number of well-known banks witnessed. The spread of the crisis was 
significant at the global level as a result of economic interlinkages and integration. As 
has been stated by Dovern & Roye (2014), the majority of all advanced and emerging 
world economies felt the impacts of the crisis. As noted by Ioan & Maria (2009), the 
crisis could be compared to a tsunami, which affected almost every country in the 
world. The growth witnessed by many countries quickly fell into decline both during 
and following the crisis, with stock markets demonstrating volatility, subsequently 
affecting investor confidence. The severity of the crisis was wide-ranging, and caused 
a number of concerns in regards the world’s overall economic stability (Spence, 2009). 
In this vein, it is important to recognise that no country escaped unscathed.  
The crisis was seen to spread across all financial markets, including Europe and the 
rest of the world. The crisis demonstrated transmission through both direct and indirect 
channels, with progression seen to develop quickly owing to the financial systems of 
the world being integrated through the US (Frenkel & Rapetti, 2009). Importantly, the 
worldwide integration of the financial systems caused the crisis to demonstrate 
expedited growth (Chava & Purnanandam, 2011; Raz, Indra, Artikasih & Citra, 2012), 
with the integration impacting the economies through a crash in domestic liquidity, 
reduced overseas financing for organisations, and lowering stock prices (Siddiqui, 
2009). Importantly, the crisis’s effects were seen across the world, although there was 
variation in this regard, with more emerging economies demonstrating more 
pronounced effects (Fraga & Rocha, 2014; Bhattarai, 2015). Furthermore, those 
countries with greater economic freedom and greater dependence on the financial 
sector were seen to be more exposed (Shostya, 2014), whilst in advanced economies 
it was transmitted and appeared immediately (Claessens, Kose & Terrones, 2010).  
Pakistan for instance as a country was recognised as feeling the effects of the crisis, 
with the present work seeing to observe the phenomenon from an empirical 
standpoint. The country’s subsequent circumstances are analysed in consideration to 
the aspects of efficiency and financial performance, with the efficiency analysis carried 
out through a completion of data envelopment analysis; in terms of observing the 
impacts of the crisis on the financial performance of commercial banks in the country, 
a panel regression model was implemented. His findings suggest that the banking 
sector in Pakistan was not affected by the global financial crisis either in terms of 
efficiency or performance.  
A negative effect stemming from banking performance was witnessed across many 
countries as a result of the credit crunch and subsequent liquidity issues. The 
confidence of investors was knocked, with a number of concerns raised in regards 
financial and economic systems’ stability across the globe (Spence, 2009). In this 
regard, a suitable explanation for the occurrence can be provided by the bank run 
theory, which addresses a number of pessimistic expectations of depositors in regards 
future economic stability during periods of economic decline. This can encourage them 
to immediately withdraw cash, thus causing liquidity issues across the banking system 
as a whole. In an effort to satisfy liquidity requirements, banks may need to trade their 
assets—even if this incurs further loss (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Accordingly, the 
bank run theory is recognised as being amongst the most critical characteristics of the 
severe economic crises—and thus is a base of real economic problems. Throughout 
the great depression, economic issues were also developed mainly through bank runs 
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Gorton, 1988). Moreover, the banks were unable to satisfy 
lenders’ financing requirements as a result of the shortage of funds available in this 
regard. This can also result in bankruptcy, economic recession and insolvency, with 
Fisher (1933) further recognising the key role to be adopted by debt in economic 
expansion and depression. 
Across the banking sector, performance and efficiency were seen to decline during 
periods of financial crisis, with the phenomenon the focus of empirical investigation by 
researchers. In one of these works, Anayiotos, Toroyan & Vamvakidis (2010) detailed 
banking sector decline efficiency in emerging European economies throughout 
periods of crisis. Through the adoption of the ration analysis, a decline was witnessed 
across various aspects, including credit quality, liquidity and profitability in the case of 
South African banks during the financial crisis (Kumbirai & Webb, 2010). The notable 
difference of crisis to pre-crisis patterns was, however, only recognised in regards 
profitability-related indicators. A negative but notable impact on profitability in the 
banking sector was also established in the study of Dietrich & Wanzenried (2011) in 
the context of Switzerland, with state-owned banks’ performance seeming better when 
compared with those owned by private investors. In addition, other works also 
documented the significant negative effects stemming from the crisis in terms of 
financial performance and efficiency across banks in Jordan (Zeitun & Benjelloun, 
2012; Al Qudah & Malkawi, 2014). Furthermore, in the Indian context, Singh & Makkar 
(2014) came to recognise a significant impact of global financial crisis on the volatility 
of stocks on the banking sector. Moreover, an overall decline in efficiency was 
recognised across European banks following the crisis, as detailed by Matousek, 
Rughoo, Sarantis & Assaf (2015), with comparable effects seen in financial firms in 
the US in the work of Hippler & Hassan (2015). Another work also noted a negative 
effect on pure and scale technical efficiency in Australian banks (Moradi-Motlagh & 
Babacan, 2015).  
 
 
1.4. Research Aims and Objectives 
The main aims of this thesis are to provide a broad analysis on the research 
contributions, recognized as exploring Risk and Efficiency in the banking sector. Risk 
by itself is a vital aspect in the financial system and efficiency from the other angel is 
also a very important aspect in the financial system. Therefore, in order to provide a 
solid investigation on banking risk and efficiency. First, will investigate the variables 
affecting bank risk in the allocated study area. Second, will look at the variables that 
impact the efficiency levels in the specified area. Finally, and after observing results 
on the variables affecting the two main study aspects (Risk and Efficiency). It is also 
important to take a comprehensive look at all parts – Islamic & Conventional - of the 
banking sector. Unlike most previous studies, the aim of this research is concerned 
with examining these issues in both Islamic and conventional banking systems in 
order to deliver a more comprehensive research. Furthermore, when including 
Islamic banking, it is needed to consider the countries in which such types of banks 
perform the most in order to achieve the most accurate results. 
Objectives are as follows: 
First, to examine the variables affecting risk in banking systems in the MENA 
area. Banking systems have different financial and market aspects which would 
in one way or another have an impact on banking risk.  
Second, to witness the variables affecting efficiency in banking systems in the 
MENA area. Efficiency, just as risk is another banking aspect which could be 
affected by different financial and market aspects. 
Third, to compare risk and efficiency levels between Islamic and conventional 
banks in the MENA area. As Islamic differs from conventional banks, the two 
different systems are expected to vary in terms of risk and efficiency. 
Fourth, to observe the financial crisis impact on risk and efficiency levels in both 
Islamic and conventional banks in the MENA area.  As financial crisis has 
impacted all banking systems, elements like risk and efficiency are expected to 
be impacted. 
1.5. Research Contribution 
This PhD builds on the existing theoretical and empirical literature on efficiency 
and risk in banking in the following ways: 
• The study investigates and analyses the statistical outcomes – using the 
proposed methodology- in both Islamic and conventional banking systems, 
which should allow a better and clearer angle of the analysis providing such a 
comparative study. Simply by comparing the two financial elements’ outcomes 
(Islamic and Conventional). 
▪ Since Islamic finance derived its rules and regulations from Islamic 
Sharī‘ah’ law, these rules and regulations have many differences when 
compared with conventional finance. This of course will make the banking 
system platforms different in the following ways: 
(a) The working systems will be different from conventional to Islamic 
which means different  banking inputs’ to be taken. 
(b) As a result of these major differences in inputs, the outputs will 
eventually be different. Efficiency levels and risk levels should differ 
from conventional to Islamic banking systems. 
• The study examines risk in three different variables, assuming two types of 
risks (Credit and Insolvency) compared with one or two proxies used in 
previous studies; this of course, increases the level of accuracy in such an 
important manner of the research, which will also impact the overall results 
and outcomes. 
• The period of time covered is a crucial aspect in terms of providing adequate 
time for reliable results. By covering a ten-year period spanning 2006–2015, 
the results should cover comprehensive financial changes. 
• The period of time covered is also crucial simply because it covers the recent 
global financial crisis and its impact on the financial sector all over the world. 
• Geographically, the analysis will be more diverse than previous studies 
because it covers the main countries dealing with both Islamic and 
Conventional banking systems at the same time. And this should provide a 
much wider look at the issues investigated. The geographic factor is essential, 
because these mentioned research gaps include coverage of the MENA 
countries which are (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab 
Emirates, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan). 
 
The remainder of thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some of the 
previous theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 presents data and 
methodology. Section 4 presents models’ analysis. Section 5 compares and 
discusses the models’ results and findings. Finally, Section 6 concludes the thesis 


















2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
In recent years, the worldwide banking industry has experienced significant change 
as a result of the advent of alternative profit-based financial systems. In the GCC 
(Gulf Cooperation Council), SEA (South East Asia) and a number of European 
countries, Islamic finance has become a fundamental element in the economic 
development agenda, and rapidly is establishing a position in the world’s financial 
arena. The business is growing also as a result of its ability to cater to people’s 
financial needs without causing problems surrounding their religious and social 
beliefs and values.  
Throughout the past twenty years—notably before the onset of the late-2007 
financial crisis—there began the integration of European banking markets. 
Technological change combined with deregulation contributed to the progressive 
process of financial integration, and subsequently caused increases in competition to 
be witnessed in the financial field (Goddard et al., 2007). Accordingly, much 
importance has been attributed to improved efficiency in the banking field; in other 
words, banks have been forced to satisfy efficient production and adhere to best 
practice to the greatest possible degree. Similarly, such an increase in competition 
could, in the short-term as a minimum, result in potentially excessive risk-taking as a 
result of increased competition, which subsequently decreases banks’ market power 
and, as a result, their charter value. 
The literature review for this thesis looks at the theoretical and empirical evidence on 
the relationship between efficiency and risk. This section will be divided into different 
parts. Starting with the theoretical literature and then moving onto the empirical 
literature. Finally, the review will address the nature of “Islamic Finance” and the 
impact that it can have on both efficiency and risk on the financial systems operating 
under Islamic rules and regulations. 
2.1.1. Banking Risk 
According to (Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009), banks face several types of risk. 
All the following are examples of the various risks banks encounter: 
• Borrowers may submit payments late or fail altogether to make payments. 
• Depositors may demand the return of their money at a faster rate than the bank has 
reserved for. 
• Market interest rates may change and hurt the value of a bank’s loans. 
• Investments made by the bank in securities or private companies may lose value. 
• Human input errors or fraud in computer systems can lead to losses. 
To monitor, manage, and measure these risks, banks are actively engaged in risk 
management. In a bank, the risk management function contributes to the 
management of the risks a bank faces by continuously measuring the risk of its 
current portfolio of assets and other exposures, communicating the risk profile of the 
bank to other bank functions and by taking steps either directly or in collaboration 
with other bank functions to reduce the possibility of loss or to mitigate the size of the 
potential loss (Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009). 
From a regulatory perspective, the size and risk of a bank’s assets are the most 
important determinants of how much regulatory reserve capital the bank is required 
to hold. A bank with high-risk assets faces the possibility that those assets could 
quickly lose value. If the market—depositors—perceives that the bank is unstable 
and deposits are in peril, then nervous depositors may withdraw their funds from the 
bank. If too many depositors want to withdraw their funds at the same time, then fear 
that the bank will run out of money could break out. And when there is a widespread 
withdrawal of money from a bank, the bank may be forced to sell its assets under 
pressure. To avoid this, regulators would want a bank with high risk assets to have 
more reserves available. Therefore, understanding banking regulation requires 
understanding financial risk management.  
There are many kinds of risk a bank may encounter. The risks debated below are 
those recognised by the Basel Accords, the cornerstone of international risk-based 
banking regulation. The Basel Accords, are the result of a cooperative attempt by 
banking regulators from major developed countries to create a worldwide valid and 
widely applicable framework for banks and bank risk management (Apostolik, 
Donohue and Went, 2009). 
The Basel Accord, concentrates on three types of risk: 
1. Credit risk 
2. Market risk 
3. Operational risk 
The Basel Accord also identifies that there are other kinds of risk that may include 
these different core risk types (see Figure below) 
 
Figure 5. Banking Risk 
Source; (Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009). 
 
2.1.1.1. Credit risk  
Credit risk is the possible loss a bank would suffer if a bank borrower fails to meet its 
obligations—pay interest on the loan and repay the amount borrowed—in 
accordance with agreed terms. Credit risk is the single largest risk most banks face 
and arises from the possibility that loans or bonds held by a bank will not be repaid 
either partially or fully. Credit risk is often synonymous with default risk (Apostolik, 
Donohue and Went, 2009). 
2.1.1.2. Market risk  
Market risk is the risk of losses to the bank rising from activities in market prices as a 
result of changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, equity and commodity 
prices (Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009). The components of market risk are as 
follows: 
• Interest rate risk. 
• Equity risk. 
• Foreign exchange risk. 
• Commodity risk. 
 
2.1.1.3. Other Risk Types 
Beyond the three main kinds of risk—credit, market, and operational—there are 
other risks banks meet and must manage properly. These risks include: Liquidity 
risk, Business risk and Reputational risk (Apostolik, Donohue and Went, 2009). 
2.1.2. Efficiency 
Efficiency, as a concept, is now receiving much more interest in the economic 
literature, and may be recognised as the ratio of output–input in any system. It further 
centres on the overall measure of diligence, as shown in the course of performing a 
particular task. Essentially, this implies the ability to circumvent or at least reduce 
waste without decreasing the output expected in this regard.  
Banking sector efficiency is regarded as a fundamental aspect assisting in the fruition 
of a productive financial industry. One of the key factors underpinning the 
establishment of banks was the need to enable intermediation through redirecting 
funds from the surplus sector to the deficit sector of the economy. This focus is seen 
to surpass banks’ soundness, but rather encompasses banks in providing credit for 
much-needed growth. In the view of Ikhide (2009), a banking system’s overall 
soundness, strength and solvency are relevant to the performance of the economy as 
a whole. Without a well-functioning banking system, the ability of the economy to 
function is lacking. As a result of such reasons, amongst others, much emphasis is 
placed on the operational efficiency of banks. When a country opens its door to 
international trade, much faster growth is experienced. This adopts the assumption 
that export-led growth can achieve financial and industrial development (Stiglitz, 
2002), with such a factor recognised as significantly influential in the growth of Asia, 
which has been seen to enhance the population’s standard of living. Importantly, such 
a position is seen to starkly go against that of Africa, which accordingly highlights the 
need to examine the efficiency of the banking sector in the way in which their role is 
carried out (Oluitan, 2014). 
Inefficiencies in banks are, importantly, recognised as an intrinsic factor. In the view 
of Turati (2003), ‘banks are regarded as firms that emerge as a result of some sort of 
market imperfections; hence they bring about a certain degree of inefficiency with 
respect to perfect competitive outcomes’. A work was carried out by the European 
commission (2001), as recognised by Turati (2003) provided support to the 
aforementioned thought when showing that European banks were seen to be 
especially inefficient. In this regard, the efficiency of banks is fundamental at both 
micro and macro levels and in order to assign resources effectively, banks should be 
sound and efficient (Hussein, 2000). 
In banking, efficiency may be differentiated between technical and allocative 
efficiency, with the latter seen to relate to the degree to which resources are assigned 
to the use with the highest value. A firm is seen to be efficient if it produces a particular 
set of outputs using the smallest possible volume of inputs (Falkena et al., 2004). In 
this vein, outputs may be seen to be a total balance of deposits or loans, whereas 
inputs might include capital, labour and other operating costs. Furthermore, a firm is 
recognised as cost-efficiency should it be technically and allocatively efficient, as 
noted by Mester (1997). Various works centred on X‐inefficiency—which may be seen 
to be a measure of the loss of technical and allocative efficiency—have been 
conducted on an international scale, with the findings showing X‐inefficiency as falling 
between 20% and 30% of all banking costs in the US (Berger & Mester, 1997). In the 
view of Falkena et al. (2004), X-inefficiency, as a concept, implies that comfortable 
incumbents might not be able to be repeated in the most efficient approach. Should 
there be only a few parties dominating the market, this might mean they are sheltered 
from competitive forces and therefore could use rule-of-thumb as opposed to 
implementing best practice approaches.  
A number of different works have sought to examine overall efficiency in banking, 
especially through the use of non-parametric and parametric approaches. 
Nonetheless, very few works have examined bank efficiency determinants.  
The ability of banks to demonstrate efficient performance, i.e. to secure accurate 
information in regard to the financial prospects of customers and accordingly to write 
and implement effective contracts, essentially depends on the contracting, legal and 
regulatory environments in which they operate, as well as the property rights. Such an 
environment is seen to include accounting practices, chartering rules, government 
regulations and market conditions (e.g. market power) under which banks operate 
(Hughes & Mester, 2008). 
According to Hughes & Mester (2008), these features demonstrate differences across 
a number of facets, including political jurisdictions, which can, in turn, result in 
differences in bank efficiency on the basis of jurisdictions. Moreover, the internal and 
external mechanisms disciplining bank managers can also be affected by the 
operating environment, where internal discipline could be reduced or encouraged 
through capital structure, governing boards, managerial compensation or 
organisational form.  
In the work of Altunbas et al. (2001), which centred on banking institutions operating 
in the German context, it was established that public and mutual banks demonstrate 
slight profit and cost efficiency advantages when compared with those entities 
operating in the private commercial domain, which is described by the scholars as 
owing to their lower fund costs. The aforementioned literature, however, does not 
provide adequate assistance in terms of establishing whether or not efficiency 
differences between the different types of bank have any degree of influence on their 
risk profile or capital strength. The aims pursued in this study seek to address such 
issues.   
In a research centred on the risk vulnerability of large domestic banks based in the 
US, it was established by Linbo Fan (2004) that profit efficiency is vulnerable to credit 
risk, although notably not to insolvency risk not to the combination of loan products. In 
this vein, the point is posited by Hahm (2004) that there is a need for banking 
supervision, alongside the risk management of banks, to be improved so as to ensure 
financial liberalisation is successful. This is based on a work carried out in regards 
interest rate and exchange rate exposure in the context of banks in Korea prior to the 
1997 Asia Pacific economic crisis, which established that commercial banks’ 
performance was notably linked with their pre-crisis risk exposure (Abd Karim et al., 
2010). 
2.1.3. Financial Crisis 
There are a number of different perspectives to be adopted in regards the causes of 
the crisis, including US monetary policy, extreme elasticity in international monetary 
and financial systems, global imbalances, a lack of regulations, and large-scale 
worldwide labour supply shocks resulting in excesses in money and liquidity. In this 
regard, a more wide-ranging view was presented by Jagannathan, Kapoor & 
Schaumburg (2013), who state that the causes of the financial crisis may be 
considered as outcomes stemming from the inability to deal with events, whether in 
terms of emerging economies to absorb savings through consumption and domestic 
investments as a result of poor national financial markets, or the inability of exchange 
rates to adopt the role of shock absorbers as a result of capital controls encouraged 
through immediate national objectives, or even the lack of ability of the economy in the 
US to adjust to the incentives induced through significant monetary inflow, resulting in 
balances and checks breaking down across different financial institutions.  
In this regard, it has been indicated by a member of the Executive Board of ECB 
(Gonzalez-Paramo, 2011b), that the aforementioned aspects and characteristics 
could have underpinning the crisis, with these same views detailed in other works, 
such as those by Cabal (2013), Firtescu (2012), Vermorken (2011), Sakbani (2010), 
Stiglitz (2010), and detailed as follows: 
• The significant degree of lending by the financial and private sectors as a result 
of the low interest rates;  
• The increase in financial disequilibria and asset price bubbles; 
• The biased incentives-based system that resulted in investors taking excessive 
risks; 
• Regulators neglecting to adapt to the financial system’s changes;  
• Failures in the market in relation to data asymmetry and the lack of risk 
transparency inherent in various products;  
• The presence of clear conflicts, subsequently impacting the key agents deemed 
necessary in securitisation; and 
• Investors neglecting to carry out their due diligence, and instead depending on 
data and models that seemed unsuitable in directing consideration to relevant 
risks. 
In the view of Cabal (2013), global financial crisis causes include inadequate levels of 
liquid assets and low bank capital, notably stemming from expansions in balance 
sheets and significant liquidity risks, as well as a lack of alignment between liabilities 
and assets, and these being funded with liabilities incurring low liquidity premiums. 
Accordingly, the volume of reserves as possessed by banks was considered either 
inadequate quality or insufficient overall when considering asset values and their 
reductions and write-offs (Vermorken, 2011).  The extreme leverage in off- and on-
balance sheets, alongside the steady decline in capital base quality and levels, and 
banks holding poor liquidity levels, are all recognised as some of the key factors 
responsible for the extremity of the crisis (BIS, 2010b). Furthermore, it is recognised 
that the banking system was unable to absorb credit losses and systematic trading, 
and was unable to deal with large off-balance sheet exposures and the 
reintermediation of such, which had been pivotal in creating the shadow banking 
system.  
Through a procyclical deleveraging process combined with interlinked systematic 
institutions through a number of complicated transactions, the crisis escalated further. 
Throughout the most significant crisis phase, a decline in confidence was recognised 
in the market in terms of the liquidity and overall solvency of a number of banking 
institutions. Banking sector weaknesses were transmitted across the financial system 
and real economy, subsequently causing a significant contraction of credit availability 
and liquidity (BIS, 2010b). 
The financial crisis’s causes can be reviewed as being a lack of caution in the ability 
of portfolio management to derive returns, with models and data poorly positioned to 
predict risks, monetary authorities showing a willingness to mitigate asset price 
downturn effects, market efficiencies (Gonzalez-Paramo, 2011a), a lack of financial 
system supervision, poor understanding in regards financial innovation, transparency 
in accounting rules, and conflict of interest in various areas, including rating agencies 
and collateralise debt obligations/mortgage issuers (Vermorken, 2011). 
A number of organisations and professionals in the arena have examined the causes 
of the recent global financial crisis; however, a summary in this regard has been 
provided by Jickling (2009), who indicates the causes on a more in-depth and wider 
scale. These are recognised as accounting, credit default swaps (CDS), deregulatory 
legislation, failure of risk management systems, financial innovation, fragmented 
regulation, global imbalances, government-mandated subprime lending, housing 
bubble, human frailty, imprudent mortgage lending, a lack of transparency and 
accountability in mortgage finance, mark-to-market accounting, non-banks runs, , no 
systematic risk regulator,  off-balance sheet finance, rating agencies, securitisation, 
shadow banking system, complexity, bad computer models, excessive leverage, 
relaxed regulation of leverage, over-the-counter derivatives, short-term incentives, tail 
risk, and the black swan theory. Furthermore, there is also a need to highlight the fact 
that, in various instances, the failure stems from a number of different factors in 
combination rather than just one.  
It is acknowledged on a wide scale that one of the factors underpinning the crisis is 
the deviation from well-established principles in risk management, chiefly 
demonstrated by financial institutions. The essential and critical risk management 
practices state: ‘know your counterparties’, ‘invest only in products you understand’, 
‘do not outsource credit risk management by relying exclusively on external credit 
assessments’, and ‘do not rely exclusively on quantitative models, however 
sophisticated’ (Gonzalez-Paramo, 2011). In this regard, it is accurate to state that most 
of these teachings were not implemented. 
From a more wide-ranging and holistic approach, a lack of rules and regulations, 
alongside human decisions, may also be recognised as human passion-led 
behaviours, as noted by (Mortreul, 2010): in this vein, it is stated that credit risk 
management was not considered well, with borrowers instrumentalised, financial and 
technical innovations permitted for risk exposition diffusion, complexity not well 
managed, and accounting norms alongside financial reporting not directed towards 
improving and rebuilding confidence and trust. A comparable view can be seen 
adopted in the work of Ashby (2010), who emphasises the importance of behavioural 
aspects more so than methods: communications weaknesses across various financial 
institutions, cultural and human inadequacies across the industry, as well as at inter 
and infra-firm levels, a lack of consideration across credit unions and investment firms, 
and a lack of adequate supervision.  
A number of lessons can be gleaned from this situation, with Mortreuil (2010) 
recognising the value of sound regulations, first and foremost. A financial regulations 
system needs to be recognised as far, reliable and strong, with endemic incentive 
issues within and across the financial sector needing to be managed so as to 
overcome the encouragement of short-termism and excessive risk-taking (Kapoor, 
2010). In this regard, there is a need for the principle of corporate governance to be 
actively applied and shared responsibly, with the link between those regulating and 
regulators requiring supervision, competence and expertise, and the ability to make 
changes (Kane, 2012). Furthermore, accountability, consumer respect, fair wages and 
fair pricing all need to be implemented (Mortreuil, 2010). Furthermore, alongside 
changes in financial and regulations arenas, institutional and policy changes need to 
be made so as to encourage greater savings in developed countries, with legal reforms 
needing to encourage capital in developing regions in an effort to help global recovery 
(Jagannathan, Kapoor & Schaumburg, 2013), as well as the application of the 
necessary financial system structural changes (Kapoor, 2010). In this regard, an in-
depth examination into financial architecture, regulations and regulators, as well as 
their capacity and roles, may be seen in the work of Moshirian (2011). 
Importantly, as noted above, important lessons can be garnered from the financial 
crisis, with Ashby (2010) providing an overview in this regard, stating that financial 
institutions need to consider improvements in risk cultures, internal control and 
compensation arrangements. Moreover, regulators need to ensure awareness in the 
fact that online restricted capital requirement increases can be rationalised, whilst 
notable increases would be costly. As such, there is a need to emphasise not what 
should be implemented but how implementation should take place, with suitable 
market incentives needing to be encouraged.   
2.1.3.1. The Role of Risk Management during Financial Crisis 
Credit risk management is a fundamental aspect of any wide-ranging approach to risk 
management, and is considered fundamental in the long-run when seeking to achieve 
banking success (BIS, 2000). Credit risk management seeks to limit losses as a result 
of the credit risks stemming from customers, as well as any risks inherent when striving 
to achieve a good risk/return ration. There is a need for banks to ensure insight into 
identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling credit risk, whilst also establishing 
that adequate capital is held against such risks, with any risks seen to arise afforded 
suitable compensation (BIS, 2000). Prior to the financial crisis, many banks were seen 
to have made significant investments in improving their credit risk management; in 
particular, banks invested in methods, processes, resources and technology geared 
towards the assessment, monitoring, management and modelling of their credit risk 
(KPMG, 2007). The more conventional credit risk measurement frameworks have 
been devised in line with new approach frameworks (Saunders & Allen, 2002): 
• Mortality models, such as Credit Risk Plus; 
• Optional pricing model, such as KMV and Moody’s; 
• Reduced form models, such as KPMG and Kamakura; 
• Time varying models, such as Credit Portfolio View; and 
• VAR models, such as CreditMetrics. 
The key factors underpinning the implementation of these approaches were (Saunders 
& Allen, 2002): 
• Declining and volatile values of collateral; 
• Disintermediation; 
• More competitive margins; 
• Structural increase in bankruptcies; 
• Technology; 
• The BIS risk-based capital requirement; and 
• The growth of off-balance-sheet derivatives. 
Nonetheless, a number of scholars have come to identify either insignificant effects 
following the crisis or, conversely, positive effects. In one such work, it was found that 
there had been an increase in banking efficiency in China throughout the period of 
crisis (Yao, Chen & Wang, 2011), whilst a comparable less effect was seen across the 
Turkish banking sector (Gencer, Orhan & Sahinbas, 2011), with the scholars 
recognising this as an outcome of restructuring. On the other hand, however, Önder 
& Özyildirım (2013) recognised credit-owned banks as making a positive contribution 
in terms of decreasing the negative effects of the crisis and accordingly further 
improving economic growth in Turkey. The insignificant effects of the crisis on the 
Oman banking sector’s profitability was detailed in the work of Sangeetha (2012), with 
domestic commercial banks showing a relatively higher level resilience. However, 
Bourkhis & Nabi (2013) drew a comparison centred on the soundness and 
performance of conventional banks with Islamic banks during the period of the 
financial crisis, notably taking into account 16 countries, with the significant differences 
between the two categories not identified by researchers; however, Islamic banks 
were seen to perform somewhat better both during and following the crisis period. On 
the other hand, better performance was seen across conventional banks chosen from 
OIC countries in the work conducted by Mobarek & Kalonov (2014), with the variation 
in banking sector behaviours throughout the period of crisis also documented in the 
studies by Dias & Ramos (2014) and Xiang, Shamsuddin & Worthington (2015). 
A number of works have been carried out in the Pakistani context, although they are 
lacking in scope. In the work of Haque & Tariq (2012), for example, the efficiency of 
conventional and Islamic banks in the country was examined, with an overall decline 
noted in banking sector efficiency throughout the years 2006–2009. Islamic banks 
were found, in this regard, to be more efficient. Generally speaking, banking efficiency 
in Pakistan was examined without consideration to the effects of the financial crisis, 
with comparable findings detailed in Phulpoto, Shah & Shaikh (2012); the latter 
established better performance across Islamic banks during the period of crisis. 
Nonetheless, a small sample comprising four banks from each side was utilised by 
Nazir, Safdar & Akram (2012), who further identified a significant effect associated 
with the global financial crisis in terms with the relative ability of different financial 
performance determinants to explain its variations. This study’s main emphasis is 
placed on financial performance determinants, with the effects of crisis also afforded 
some consideration. It is believed that a more wide-ranging research in order to 
establish the effects of the crisis on the Pakistani banking sector can provide valuable 
contributions in the wealth of knowledge known in this regard. This is addressed in the 
current study through analysing the effects of the global financial crisis on Pakistani 
banks’ financial performance and efficiency.  
The 2008–2010 financial crisis is commonly recognised as the worst since the 1930s’ 
Depression, as noted above, with the global financial crisis known to have had a 
notable impact on the performance of the performance of financial institutions and 
competition across the financial systems. This has reintroduced the discussion 
pertaining to the sensitive link between commercial banks’ performance and 
macroeconomics, which are recognised as the most critical of financial institutions for 
the economy.  
Works centred on explaining the link between banking performance and business 
cycles (Albertazzi & Gambacorta, 2009; Athanasoglou, Brissimis & Delis, 2008; Bolt, 
de Haan, Hoeberichts, van Oordt & Swank, 2010) have been followed by new 
evidence relating to bank performance determinants throughout the financial crisis 
period (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Berger & Bouwman, 2011; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 
2011). Furthermore, in some area, including the EU, for example, the crisis’s ever-
expanding reach and ongoing banking insecurities have warranted state support and 
the need for banking system performance to undergo reassessment (Efthyvoulou & 
Yildirim, 2014). 
Regardless of its value from the standpoints of both research and policy, however, 
very few papers have examined the effects of the global financial crisis on European 
banks and their efficiency. As far as the researcher is aware, Isik & Hassan (2003), 
Sufian (2010), Luo, Yao, Chen & Wang (2011), Chortareas, Girardone & Ventouri 
(2013) and Moradi-Motlagh & Babacan (2015) are the only researchers to have 
applied the frontier approach whilst carrying out an empirical study in an effort to 
analyse the effects of the crisis on the efficiency of banks.  
Their findings garnered in this work emphasise a notable decrease in 2009, not only 
in efficiency but also in cost and profit. There are a number of values for cost and profit 
efficiency spanning countries or groups of banks. Banks’ average cost efficiency in the 
sample was seen to be 0.9624, with notable differences across banking groups. The 
findings show that, overall, scores of cost and profit efficiency in the case of larger 
banks are much greater than those of small and medium banks. Furthermore, greater 
efficiency can be seen in the case of publicly traded banks. Moreover, more efficiency 
in regards profit efficiency is identified in Eurozone banks, although cost efficiency 
makes them less efficient. In addition, banks from old EU member states are seen to 
be more efficient in terms of profit than banks that are new EU members. 
2.2. Theoretical Literature 
2.2.1. Agency Cost 
The theoretical literature available in regard to banks’ risk-taking determinants—and, 
in particular, research analysing the link between the capital of a bank and risk 
positions—commonly derive contrasting findings. One of the key rationales behind this 
is owing to the fact that the majority of the hypotheses are non-exclusive: for instance, 
information asymmetry and agency cost problems could have a notable impact on 
risk–bank capital trade-offs, as highlighted by Jensen (1986) and Berger (1995), which 
goes some way to describing why some institutions could react to increased capital 
requirements through taking on more risk, whereas others could decrease leverage 
(Altunbas et al., 2007). 
A number of trade-offs are recognised between bank risk-taking and their efficiencies, 
and the fact that market prices are associated with risks and inefficiencies (Kwan & 
Eisenbeis (1996). In contrast, however, other scholars (Shrieves & Dahl, 1992; 
Jacques & Nigro, 1995) recognise that bank capital and risk positioning-related 
changes, as implemented by the management of banking institutions, are both 
established and affected by endogenous and exogenous factors. Overall, there is a 
tendency amongst management to offset capital increases with risk increases; 
however, such trade-offs are affected, to a significant degree, by regulatory pressure. 
Specifically, regulatory pressure, as highlighted in the new risk-based banking capital 
criteria, appear to have been valuable in terms of offsetting banks’ inclination to 
increase their risk-taking and become involved in risky behaviours, which is an activity 
most prevalent amongst those with low capital (Kwan & Eisenbeis ,1995).  
Both veins of research imply that in-depth examination into the way in which 
management responds to the market pricing of efficiencies and bank risk may be 
warranted, along with attention directed to how this impacts the capital decisions made 
by banks in contrast with the incentives to engage in excessive perquisite consumption 
and higher levels of risk-taking. Specifically, the works of Jensen (1986) and Stultz 
(1990) suggest that there are a number of theoretical justifications centred on the view 
that asymmetries between agency costs and information could have a notable effect 
on such trade-offs, and could potentially explain why some entities respond to higher 
capital costs by shouldering a greater degree of risk, and why some reduce risk whilst 
others consume perquisites. 
The view of Jensen (l986), as an example, suggests that managers’ roles are centred 
on being stockholder agents, and are known to be burdened with conflicts of interest 
that can shape and impact asset selection, and the behaviour, efficiency and overall 
performance of a firm. Managers seem to maximise their own levels of implicit and 
explicit compensation to the detriment of shareholders, especially when they are risk-
averse. Owing to the fact that both power and managerial compensation are 
commonly associated with the growth of organisations and with larger business size, 
there may be the tendency amongst management to maximise business growth 
beyond efficient size. Of course, this is dependent on the overall operational efficiency 
of the entity, with returns lowered, thus going against shareholder interest.  It 
decreases operational efficiency, lowers returns and works against the interests of 
shareholders (Jensen, l986). 
Agency problems are also considered, in theory, to encourage management to evade 
capital market monitoring through depending on the financing of investment in an 
internal rather than external nature. In actuality, there is the tendency to demonstrate 
project over-investment, including making investment in negative net present value. 
They will engage in inefficient behaviour when there is free cash available. This issue 
of investment and its financing becomes more serious when there is asymmetric 
information on the quality of investment projects between management and the 
shareholders. In the case of banks, it is generally thought that their assets are opaque, 
and hence, this asymmetric information problem may be particularly critical with 
respect to their asset choice (Jensen, l986). 
2.2.2. Depositors Protection Schemes 
The work of Hughes, Lang, Mester & Moon (1994) provides a somewhat different 
hypothesis in regard to the link between risk-taking and efficiency, and is seen to have 
a contrasting sign prediction. The scholars recognise that the more conventional 
efficiency estimations and production functions are derived in line with the postulation 
of risk neutrality; however, when a significant portion of managers’ wealth of human 
capital is linked with firm performance, managers may be seen to be risk-averse as 
opposed to risk-neutral. Accordingly, within the domain of risk aversion, management 
might be more inclined to trade-off reduced earnings in favour of reduced risk. By 
implementing such an approach, additional costs are incurred when making loans and 
monitoring loan performance, which would be recognised as measured inefficiencies. 
In line with the hypothesis offered by the aforementioned scholars, it might be 
expected that a positive link between asset quality and inefficiency measures would 
be identified, with higher loan quality measures seen to be linked with higher 
inefficiencies.  
Furthermore, according to (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1995) the literature also suggests that 
bank risk might not only have an impact on inefficiencies and leverage, but also could 
be dependent on inefficiencies and leverage itself. With this noted, managers might 
be encouraged to take more risk in an effort to offset greater capitalisation as 
Management may be induced to offset higher capitalization by taking more risk. In 
banking, the leverage decision is more complex (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1995). 
In the banking context, the decision to leverage becomes more complicated when 
considering deposit insurance and regulation, which means some of the conclusions 
drawn in line with the corporate finance literature might change. It is paramount to 
consider the effects of the federal deposit insurance regulations and structure on the 
risk of banks and the return trade-off in the context of a portfolio theoretic framework. 
The effects on bank incentives as a result of deposit insurance, to take risk and exploit 
deposit insurance subsidy, are analysed. Such an empirical and theoretical work 
suggests that deposit insurance value is enhanced with the increase in asset, risk and 
leverage.  It indicates that the value of deposit insurance increases as asset risk and 
leverage increase. 
2.2.3. Managerial Moral Hazard 
According to (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1995), it is also highlighted by theory that, between 
risk-related premiums in the control of moral hazard behaviour and those capital 
standards aimed at risk-taking limitation, there is an isomorphism. In other words, 
theory demonstrates that there is an isomorphism between risk related premiums to 
control moral hazard behaviour and capital standards designed to limit risk taking. 
Upon understanding of the correspondence between bank capital requirements and 
risk-based premiums, there was an ever-growing concern expressed to suggest that 
institutions might be encouraged to take on a greater degree of risk in order to offset 
higher capital requirements as a result of increases in regulatory capital requirements; 
unquestionably, institutions should be operating in a safer, sounder manner. Kwan & 
Eisenbeis continue that others have prioritised developing more in-depth 
understanding of the monitoring role, seeking to offset institutions’ incentives to modify 
their portfolios upon the making of capital decisions or the establishment of risk-related 
premiums, in an effort to rebalance portfolios in order to take on more risk. In short, 
once this correspondence between risk-based premiums and bank capital 
requirements became understood, concern began to be expressed that increases in 
regulatory capital requirements may have the perverse effect of inducing institutions 
to take on more risk to offset higher capital requirements rather than to induce 
institutions to operate in a safer and sound manner (Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1995).   
In the view of Hughes & Mester (2008), the literature on financial intermediation implies 
that, through monitoring and screening lenders, banks are able to overcome possible 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems caused as a result of the imperfect 
information between lenders and borrowers.  
The capacity of banks to restructure and reduce asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers, and their capacity to shoulder risks, are at the foundation of bank 
production. Such abilities are fundamental components of bank output, and are seen 
to have a significant impact on the managerial incentives to produce financial services 
with efficiency and care. That banks’ liabilities are demandable debt gives banks an 
incentive advantage over other intermediaries. The notably high level of debt in the 
capital structure of a bank means managers are disciplined in their risk-taking and 
diligence in creating financial services through making the bank vulnerable to an ever-
increased risk of insolvency (Hughes & Mester, 2008) 
Debt’s demandable aspect, if not entirely insured, would result in additional safety 
concerns and performance pressure which will increase liquidity risk. Such factors are 
likely to mean banks are sound monitors of their lenders. Accordingly, the banking 
relationship is able to enhance bank customers’ financial performance and accordingly 
improve credit access for organisations too informationally transparent to lend in public 
debt and equity markets (Hughes & Mester, 1998, 2009).  
Throughout recent times, research centred on the efficiency of banks has reviewed 
various factors, including asset quality, and non-performing loans in particular. 
Disregarding or failing to consider such a variable could result in an erroneous bank 
efficiency measure (Mester, 1996). This might be more apparent when considering 
that a large volume of non-performing roles could indicate banks’ tendency to utilise 
fewer resources than usual in their credit assessment and loans monitoring processes. 
Moreover, non-performing loans result in banking sector inefficiency, as identified in 
the works of Altunbas et al. (2000), Fan & Shaffer (2004) and Girardone et al. (2004), 
owing to the fact that efficient banks are recognised as being better at credit risk 
management, as noted by Berger & DeYoung (1997). 
When considering the quality and risk factors when completing cost efficiency 
assessments in the context of Japanese commercial banks throughout 1993–1996, it 
was found by Altunbas et al. (2000) that the level of non-performing loans can be 
positively linked with the inefficiency of banks. Moreover, there is a tendency of banks 
to exhibit efficiency decreases following risk factor control. Furthermore, banks tend 
to experience a decrease in their scale efficiency level after controlling for risk factors. 
This finding also could be in line with the research of bank efficiency levels in the USA, 
as carried out by Hughes & Mester (1993), as well as on the assessment of cost 
efficiency in the context of Italian banks, as completed by Girardone et al. (2004). 
In contrast, the profit efficiency of large commercial banks in the USA has been 
analysed by Fan & Shaffer (2004) through consideration to non-performing loans. The 
work established that, despite non-performing loans having a negative relation to the 
profit efficiency of banks, such a relation is not statistically significant.  
In the view of Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez & Molyneux (2010), throughout more recent 
times, there has been a greater degree of integration and liberalisation witnessed 
amongst European banking systems in regard to greater service and product 
deregulation. Such a progressive process in the domain of financial integration has 
gone some way to improving competition and accordingly highlighting the value of 
financial institutions’ efficiency. Nonetheless, a number of authors pose the view that 
such an increase in competition could result in greater bank risk-taking incentives—
even if just in the short-term (see, for example, Danthine et al., 1999; Hellman et al., 
2000). 
Such incentives have been recognised as needing to be counterbalanced by 
regulators through facilitating a more prominent role to be played by capital adequacy 
in the banking regulatory process. In this regard, as a result of both market and 
regulatory pressures, the majority of European banks have fallen under pressure to 
increase and improve upon their capitalisation.  
One further valuable aspect for consideration is concerned with whether the link 
between capital, efficiency and risk differs for those banks with different ownership 
frameworks. One of the few sectors in which mutual, private and public organisations 
work together in a competitive market is that of European banking (Goddard et al., 
2001). Importantly, however, there is little empirical guidance to suggest whether there 
are systematic differences apparent in the link between efficiency for banks with 
different ownership characteristics, and capital strength.  
When considering that both mutual and public banks recognise a number of economic 
and/or social development objectives, it may be predicted that different risk-taking and 
performance features may be apparent when comparing such institutions with those 
functioning in the private sector. A number of theoretical works have demonstrated 
that an efficiency/competitive advantage may be identified in mutual banks, even if 
they show expense preference behaviours (Purroy & Salas, 2000; Berenguer et al., 
2003).  
When considering the model underpinning these hypotheses, and as noted by various 
scholars (Hughes & Moon, 1995; Hughes & Mester, 1998), capital and risk are likely 
to be influenced by the efficiency level of the banking entity. Through a regulatory lens, 
considering all other things equal, it may be that regulators allow an efficient firm with 
improved management to benefit from a greater degree of leverage. In contrast, 
however, from a more moral hazard perspective, a less efficient organisation could be 
tempted to take on higher risk in an effort to counterbalance the lost returns. In turn, 
efficiency could also affect bank risk level (Berger & De Young, 1997). For instance, 
managers who are not very efficient at assessing and monitoring loans are not likely 
to be very efficient in achieving a high level of operating efficiency. Lastly, the decision 
might be made by a bank to opt for maximising short-term profits through decreasing 
the volume of funds assigned to the allocation and monitoring of loans. Other things 
being equal, this would mean that the risk and efficiency measures would be boosted 
in terms of creating a positive link between efficiency and risk—at least in the short-
term. Earlier studies analysing the various determinants of banking risk consider the 
fact that both risk and capital are established on a concurrent basis (Shrieves & Dahl, 
1992; Jacques & Nigro, 1997; Rime, 2001a). Moreover, it may be that risk and capital 
are established at once through the efficiency levels demonstrated by the banking firm 
(Kwan & Eisenbeis, 1997; Hughes & Moon, 1995; Hughes & Mester, 1998).  
Accordingly, capital, efficiency and risk are all interwoven, which implies that any 
empirical approach applied in an effort to model the links between capital and risk also 
need to take into account the efficiency of the bank. When examining such links, it is 
also necessary to consider various bank ownership types owing to the fact that a 
different impact on capital, efficiency and risk could be apparent across mutual, private 
and public banks as a result of agency issues.  
2.3. Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature centred on the effects of banking capital regulations can be 
associated with the research centred on bank efficiency, as highlighted by Kwan & 
Eisenbeis (1997). In line with the work by Hughes & Moon (1995), the aforementioned 
authors pose the view that it is fundamental to ensure the explicit recognition of the 
concept of efficiency along with consideration to those empirical models linking the 
relationship between bank risk and capital. By so doing, such researches have 
provided a link between the literature considered earlier with financial regulation 
effects on risk-taking and the rich empirical work available on bank efficiency. The 
findings emphasise that both capital and efficiency are determinants that should be 
considered in regard to moral hazard incentives and risk-taking amongst banks.  
The majority of research has centred on efficiency comparisons between mutual and 
private banking institutions in the USA. For instance, the work of O’Hara (1981) and 
Nicols (1967) suggests that mutual organisations are likely to demonstrate greater 
efficiency when compared with those operating in the private sector. In this regard, 
mutual firms are seen to be more efficient, as determined by Mester (1989, 1993), 
whilst the work of Cebenoyan et al. (1993), on the other hand, implies no variation 
between mutual and joint stock Savings and Loans (S&L) banks in terms of efficiency. 
Various other studies have determined preference behaviour in mutual banks in the 
USA (Akella & Greenbaum, 1988; Krinsky & Thomas, 1995). 
In this vein, Berger & De Young (1997) and Kwan & Eisenbeis (1997) make reference 
to the importance of explicitly acknowledging the bank efficiency concept in empirical 
frameworks centred on examining banks’ risk determinants. The work of Berger & De 
Young (1997) emphasise that reductions in cost efficiency precede increases in 
problem loans (specifically at thinly capitalised banks). Moreover, it is also recognised 
that problem loans commonly lead to cost efficiency decreases. In this regard, it was 
recognised by Kwan & Eisenbeis (1997) that poorly performing banks are seen to be 
at greater risk of risk-taking, with highly capitalised banks also seen to be more efficient 
than less capitalised banks.  
The efficiency levels of banks could have a notable impact on the future risk of banks. 
In consideration to the ‘bad management’ hypothesis highlighted by Berger & 
DeYoung (1997) and Williams (2004), banks functioning at low efficiency levels 
experience larger costs as a result of inadequate monitoring in credit and poor control 
of operating expenses, as can be seen immediately when examining lower cost 
efficiency. Moreover, non-performing loans result in banking sector inefficient, as 
identified in the works of Altunbas et al. (2000), Fan & Shaffer (2004) and Girardone 
et al. (2004), owing to the fact that efficient banks are recognised as being better at 
credit risk management, as noted by Berger & DeYoung (1997). 
The assumption is made by the ‘cost skimping’ hypothesis that there is a trade-off to 
be made between short-term cost efficiency and future risk-taking as a result of the 
various factors of moral hazard. In this instance, banks seem to be more cost-efficient 
when dedicating fewer resources to credit monitoring and screening activities. 
Accordingly, non-performing loan stocks appear to be unaffected in the short-term. In 
the medium-term, however, greater risk levels could be reached by banks when 
considering their need to procure those additional inputs fundamental to administering 
future higher risks. In regard to the efficiency of revenues, greater short-term profit 
levels are commonly identified at the cost of less stringent credit screening. This also 
is usually apparent in higher future risks. Otherwise stated, it may be that a bank is 
tempted to increase revenues through taking on higher risks in an effort to 
counterbalance lost returns (Fiordelisi, F., Marques-Ibanez, D., and Molyneux, P. 
2010).  
According to Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, and Molyneux,  (2010) there is what is 
referred to as the ‘bad luck hypothesis’, which is recognised as associated with the 
outcomes of bank risk increases on levels of efficiency. In other words, it is related to 
the consequences of increases in bank risk on efficiency levels. The view is posed 
that external exogenous events (such as unexpected shocks, for example) have the 
propensity to increase the number of problem loans for banks that are not in line with 
the skills or risk-taking tendencies of the managers, which means that banks that are 
unrelated to managers’ skills or their risk taking appetite would be exposed to these 
external exogenous events. Such risk increases cause subsequent costs and 
managerial efforts to be invested. Therefore, in line with this hypothesis, it is stated 
that bank risk increases to precede cost and revenue efficiency declines. In other 
words, it is expected to have increases in bank risk to precede falls in cost and revenue 
efficiency. (Fiordelisi, F., Marques-Ibanez, D., and Molyneux, P. 2010).  
The efficiency studies applied to the banking sector focus predominantly on 
conventional banking. The work of Berger & Humphrey (1997) surveyed 130 studies 
that apply frontier efficiency analysis to conventional financial institutions in 21 
countries. They documented that the different efficiency approaches do not 
necessarily achieve consistent results (Berger & Humphrey, 1997) 
The work of Berger (2007) centred on completing a critical review, using 100 research 
drawing a comparison between different nations’ banking inefficiencies. It was 
established that foreign-owned banks have efficiency disadvantages relative to 
domestically owned banks, with the former more likely to outweigh the efficiency 
advantages in developed nations, with a contrasting result witnessed in developing 
nations.   
In the literature pertaining to traditional banking, scholars have provided a link between 
efficiency and various factors. Some works have centred on completing cross-country 
comparisons in regard to the efficiency of conventional banks, such as that by Bonin 
et al. (2005), which examined eleven transition countries (In their study, they have 
included observations for commercial banks from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania, Russia and Hungary over the period 2005 to 2011. Financial and 
banking crises took place in Bulgaria, over the period 1996 to 1997, in Russia, in 1997 
and in Romania, over the period 1998 to 1999. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
were less affected in comparison with the other countries. The 2000s have marked the 
beginning of the revival of the economic growth in these countries. In these conditions, 
in Eastern Europe, the global financial crisis occurred after a period of economic 
growth, financed mainly by external loans, which generated an economic environment 
characterized by an increasing disequilibrium) and accordingly identified that foreign-
owned banks are seen to be more cost-efficient than other banks, and were also seen 
to deliver improved service, specifically if a strategic foreign owner was in place. 
(Bonin et al. 2005), 
Furthermore, other efficiency-based researches carried out recently also have taken 
into account country-specific environmental factors: the work of Bos & Kool (2006), for 
example, utilised the dataset of 401 largely independent cooperative local banks in the 
Netherlands, and established that utilising exogenous input prices as opposed to 
endogenous input prices is paramount for the cost frontier, owing to the fact that cost 
inefficiencies spread is seen to be more plausible and larger. Moreover, the research 
further emphasised that a number of the environmental factors in the nation affect 
efficiency score to some degree. Researchers have also focused on conventional 
banks’ levels of efficiency in line with their diversification, size and specialisation, and 
type, such as wholesale or retail banking. In this vein, the research by Kwan (2006), 
carried out in a Hong Kong context, established that the x-efficiency of banks was 
seen to drop in line with various characteristics, including bank size, deposit-to-asset 
ratio, loan growth, loan loss and loan-to-asset ratio, whilst off-balance sheet activities 
achieve an increase in x-efficiency. Comparably, other researchers have drawn a 
contrast between the efficiency scores of foreign-owned banking institutions with that 
of domestic-owned entities. In this vein, the work of Isik & Hassan (2002), which 
centred on analysing Turkish banks, established that foreign banks, both in subsidiary 
and branch forms, are more profit-efficient and incur higher costs than their domestic 
counterparts; however, profit efficiency differences are seen to be far more apparent.  
2.3.1. Efficiency  
During more recent times, works centred on the efficiency of banks have considered 
asset quality, specifically in consideration to non-performing loans. Neglecting to 
consider such a variable could ultimately result in an incorrect bank efficiency measure 
(Mester, 1996). This is recognised as true owing to the fact that a significant volume 
of non-performing loans could indicate banks making use of a smaller number of 
resources than is common when conducting loan-monitoring and credit assessments. 
Furthermore, non-performing loans could result in banking sector inefficiency, as has 
been established in a number of works, including those by Altunbas et al. (2000), Fan 
& Shaffer (2004) and Girardone et al. (2004). This is owing to the fact that those banks 
seen to be efficient are more capable in terms of credit risk management, as noted by 
Berger & DeYoung (1997). 
When taking into consideration various quality and risk factors when completing an 
estimation as to the overall cost efficiency of Japanese banks for the specific period 
spanning 1993–1996, it was found by Altunbas et al. (2000) that the level of non-
performing loans was positively linked with the inefficiency of banks. Moreover, there 
was a tendency amongst banks to face a decline in their overall scale efficiency level 
following the control of risk factors. This finding is seen to be in line with the work 
carried out by Hughes & Mester (1993) on the efficiency of banks in the US through 
consideration to efficiency, as well as on the overall assessment of cost efficiency 
amongst Italian banks, as highlighted by Girardone et al. (2004). In contrast, profit 
efficiency in the case of larger commercial banks, based in the US, was examined in 
the study of Fan & Shaffer (2004) through consideration to non-performing loans. It 
was established that, despite non-performing loans being negatively associated with 
the profit efficiency of banks, nonetheless, it was not statistically significant (Abd Karim 
et al., 2010). 
In the view of Sealey & Lindley (1977), in regards prior theory pertaining to financial 
firms, a lack of success can be recognised as owing to the incomplete or altogether 
inadequate application of the fundamentals underpinning firm theory. It has been 
noted by the scholars that other researchers have not been successful in suitably 
categorising the inputs and outputs of financial firms by failing to take into account the 
criteria on which a financial organisation makes a decision, and secondly through 
failing to examine the production and cost of a financial firm (Oluitan, 2014). 
A number of different works have been carried out in the field of bank efficiency, 
although the majority are based on transition and developed economies. Such papers 
have placed emphasis on various elements of the banking sector, with Berger & 
Humphrey (1997) completing a survey-based research, taking into consideration 130 
past works spanning 21 different countries. It has been found that a number of different 
methodologies are unable to provide consistent results. Inefficiency, as a concept, is 
a not a phenomenon seen to be related to the under-developed, but rather is seen to 
span across various levels of development. In this vein, the work of Berger et al. 
(1997), which took a sample of 760 branches of large US commercial banks, implies 
that there are as many as double the number of branches that could achieve minimised 
costs with ‘an X-inefficiencies of more than 20% of operating costs’. Casu & Molyneux 
(2003) provide support for this view in their work of the European banking system 
through the application of the Tobit regression model approach. It has been 
established that, following the EU legislative harmonisation, minor improvements have 
been made in regards bank efficiency.  
In the literature, the concept of inclusion pertaining to various country- and firm-specific 
variables that could potentially contribute in terms of the variations in the efficiency 
term has been discussed. This approach has been considered in the work of Battese 
& Coelli (1995), which centred on a panel study of 14 paddy farmers from an Indian 
village. It was found that a framework for technical inefficiency effects, which 
encompasses a constant term, age, year of observation and schooling of farmers, was 
a critical element in the stochastic frontier production function. In this regard, Hollo & 
Nagy (2006) directed attention towards this concept when completing their work on 
bank efficiency in the enlarged European Union, with consideration centred on the 
effects of controlling for country-specific factors that do not necessarily stem from the 
operational environment of banks. It was established that controls for such factors help 
to minimise the scale of the gap between new and old member states, and the same 
in reverse.  
Various works on efficiency have sought to analyse the concept of banks’ ownership, 
with the work of Hauner (2005), utilising a sample of large German and Austrian banks, 
coming to find that state-owned banking institutions demonstrate a greater degree of 
cost-efficiency (potentially owing to the availability of lower cost funds), whereas 
cooperative banks, on the other hand, are only as cost-efficient as private ones. The 
foundation of the present work may be seen as comparable to that of Chen (2009), 
whose work analysed the overall efficiency of banks in Sub-Saharan African middle-
income countries. It was recognised that, on average, banks were positioned to save 
up to 30% of their overall costs if they were to operate on the efficient frontier. In a 
comparable vein, it was noted that foreign banks are far more efficient that both 
domestic and public banks. The work of Ikhide (2009), focused on commercial banks 
in Namibia, was carried out along the same vein, with the view outlined that 
commercial banks in the country are positioned to improve their overall efficiency 
through improving their scale of operation, although the present level of input 
combination was not found to achieve maximum efficiency.  
In regards commercial banks, these have been seen to operate in an environment that 
is becoming more and more competitive (Isik & Hassan, 2002; Mester, 1997; Yeh, 
1996). With commercial banks functioning in this environment, long-term viability is 
seen to depend on their overall efficiency (Mester, 1997), where the effective and 
efficient use of resources is seen to be critical to all bankers. Although this 
consideration has always been afforded recognition and relevance, worldwide trends, 
as in the cases of increasing competition for financial services, technological 
innovations, deregulation and banking consolidation, have induced more much more 
attention in terms of controlling costs and ensuring a greater degree of efficiency to 
products and services (Spong, Sullivan & De Young, 1995; Ncube, 2009). 
The determinants of bank performance in transitional economies have been examined 
by Grigorian & Manole (2002), with the scholars predicting efficiency through the 
adoption of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach before running a Tobit-
censored regression with the aim of identifying bank efficiency determinants. The key 
findings imply that foreign ownership and consolidation can improve the overall 
efficiency of a commercial bank. They further note that well-capitalised banks, GDP 
per capita and greater market share are more positive determinants of bank efficiency. 
Furthermore, evidence has been garnered to imply that non-bank financial institutions 
and the securities market play a role in decreasing bank efficiency. In this vein, the 
DEA method has been adopted by Casu & Molyneux (2003) in an effort to examine 
European banking systems’ productive efficiency and whether or not improvements 
and convergence has been witnessed for the period spanning 1993–1997. 
Furthermore, the Tobit regression was implemented with the aim of establishing the 
key factors underpinning European bank efficiency. The findings suggest that 
profitability ratios may be positively linked with bank efficiency, in addition to public-
listed banks; on the other hand, no link between the extent of capitalisation and bank 
efficiency was identified. In this regard, the cost efficiency of Greek banks, alongside 
their determinant factors, was examined in the study of Pasiouras et al. (2007). A DEA 
method was implemented in estimating allocative, cost and technical efficiency, with 
a Tobit regression applied in order to establish the external and internal factors 
affecting bank efficiency. The key findings suggest that, amongst Greek banks, an 
average efficiency of 82% was identified. Moreover, it was noted that bank size is 
positively linked with a greater degree of bank efficiency; nonetheless, it was 
recognised that GDP per capita and unemployment have an influential and negative 
effect on bank efficiency. In addition, it is stated that the number of branches, degree 
of capitalisation and quantity of ATMs also has an impact on the overall efficiency of 
banks depending on the measure of efficiency applied. In this regard, the determinants 
of efficiency and their dynamics have been examined in the work of Hassan & Sanchez 
(2007) in the context of the banking industry in Latin America. The findings garnered 
by the study show that the extent of capitalisation, interest rate spread, growth of GDP 
and profitability ratios are positively linked with greater efficiency amongst banks. In 
contrast, the value of stock traded, loan loss reserves and inflation rates have a 
conflicting relationship with bank efficiency. In this regard, the determinants of bank 
efficiency were studied by Delis & Papanikolaou (2009) in the case of ten newly 
acceded European countries. A semi-parametric two-stage framework was adopted in 
order to analyse the effects of industry-specific, bank-specific and macroeconomic 
variables on the efficiency of banks. The key findings show that foreign ownership, 
GDP growth and market interest rates are all positively linked with bank efficiency. In 
contrast, the concentration of the industry and credit risk both present a negative link 
with the efficiency of banks. In this vein, the level of bank efficiency in MENA countries 
has been evaluated by Naceur et al. (2009) through the application of a Meta frontier, 
as calculated by DEA. Subsequently, a Tobit regression was adopted in order to 
examine the effects of bank-specific, financial and institutional determinants of bank 
efficiency, with the results showing that, overall, MENA countries have achieved an 
efficiency score of 67%. In contrast, highly capitalised banks, stock market 
developments and greater liquidity all help to improve bank efficiency; higher market 
concentration, and greater credit to the private sector, on the other hand, are 
recognised as decreasing banks’ efficiency levels. In a comparable way, the DEA 
methodology was applied by Daley & Mathews (2009) in an effort to estimate technical 
efficiency scores among a group of Jamaican banks for the period spanning 1998–
2007. Conditional convergence was estimated through the use of panel data 
estimation techniques, with the size of the bank and cost over income recognised as 
inversely linked to the efficiency of banks; on the other hand, growth in GDP is seen 
to have a positive effect in line with bank efficiency.  
The determinants underpinning commercial banks’ cost efficiency have been analysed 
by Kalluru & Bhat (2009) in the context of India for the period spanning 1992–2006. In 
an effort to calculate efficiency, the scholars adopted the SFA (Stochastic Frontier 
Approach) approach, before obtaining the determinants of the efficiency scores 
through the application of a Tobit regression. The preliminary set of findings suggests 
that, in commercial banks operating in India, cost efficiency has declined for the period 
of study. It has also been recognised that banks’ earning capacity is the most critical 
positive determinant of bank efficiency, followed by various non-interest activities and 
diversification. Importantly, the determinants of bank efficiency in the context of Brazil, 
for the period spanning 2000–2007, were studied in the work of Tecles & Tabak 
(2010), with the Bayesian Stochastic Frontier adopted in an effort to identify bank 
efficiency determinants. The key findings show that large banks are the most profit- 
and cost-efficient, alongside foreign-owned banks. Moreover, a positive link between 
bank efficiency and capitalisation was recognised. Furthermore, in the study of Wezel 
(2010), the overall efficiency displayed by domestic and foreign banks in Central 
America was examined for the period 2002–2007, with the DEA and SFA 
methodologies adopted in an effort to secure efficiency estimates. The key findings 
imply that foreign banks are not always seen to demonstrate greater efficiency than 
domestic banks, and that larger banks are more efficient, overall, than smaller banks 
(Garza-Garcia, 2010). 
2.3.2. Islamic finance: 
Islamic finance centres on providing financial services in line with Islamic 
jurisprudence (Shari’ah). Shari’ah prohibits any involvement with interest (Riba), those 
products deemed as unnecessarily high-risk (Gharar), any product or service in the 
gambling arena (Maysir), short sales, as well as the financing of any activities deemed 
prohibited as a result of causing harmful effects. It further necessitates that parties 
adhere to various principles of fair treatment and alignment with contracts. It is 
required that transactions be underpinned by actual economic activities, with risk-
sharing present in economic transactions (Kammer and Norat et al., 2015) 
Owing to Islamic finance products being contract-based, they may be categorised into 
three different groups, as recognised by Hussain, Shahmoradi & Turk (2015): 
• Debt financing structured as sales: this might include sales with deferred 
payments and mark-up, as referred to as Murabahah, or those purchased made 
encompassing products’ deferred delivery, referred to as Salam for basic 
products and Istisna’ for manufactured products, with Ijārah referring to leasing 
with varying purchasing options. Pure lending is permitted but only when 
deemed benevolent Qard, which is commonly used in the case of current 
deposits. 
• PLS—Profit-and-Loss-Sharing: This is very much like a financing option and 
encompasses two different modalities, namely profit-sharing and loss-bearing, 
and pure profit-and-loss-sharing. In the case of the former, this involves the 
investor or bank as the financier providing capital whilst the beneficiary provides 
labour and skills. The profits are shared, but losses are ultimately shouldered 
by the financier, who should not play a role in interfering with the overall 
conduction and management unless there is a breach of contract, negligence 
or misconduct. In regards the latter modality, this involves two parties partaking 
in the equity-like financing of a project, with profits and losses shared equally.  
• Services, including agency contracts (Wadi’ah) and safe-keeping contracts 
(Wakalah), for current deposits and those widely used for money market 
transactions, respectively. 
Although Islamic finance may be seen to include a number of different services, it 
remains that banking continues to dominate the sector, representing approximately 
80% of all Islamic finance assets in 2013 (IFSB, 2014). Furthermore, the Sukuk market 
is known to be developing quickly, with assets equating to approximately 15% of the 
industry, with other services including equity markets, insurance, investment funds, 
microfinance and leasing (Kammer and Norat et al., 2015). 
Islamic finance is positioned to add further value in three different aspects. Primarily, 
it seeks to facilitate a greater degree of financial inclusion, particularly in regards large 
populations that may be considered without the necessary services. Secondly, it 
directs focus on asset-backed financing and risk-sharing elements, meaning there is 
the potential to provide SMEs with support, as well as public infrastructure investment. 
Lastly, the fact it prohibits speculation and encompasses risk-sharing aspects imply 
that Islamic finance could essentially be deemed less risky from a systematic 
perspective than that of conventional finance. In order to achieve such potential, 
however, and to further enable the industry to develop both safely and soundly, various 
obstacles first need to be considered and overcome (Kammer and Norat et al., 2015). 
Over the past ten years, Islamic finance has witnessed considerable growth, with the 
banking segment recognised as becoming systematically important in a number of 
countries across a large range of regions. Accordingly, it is expected that Islamic 
finance will continue to grow and expand in line with economic growth, particularly in 
those countries where Muslim populations are, at present, without banking services. 
In this vein, it is also recognised that large savings garnered by a number of oil-
exporting regions with the aim of investing in Shari’ah-compliant financial products are 
fuelling this growth.  
The development witnessed across Islamic finance promises a number of potential 
advantages, amongst which there is the likelihood of less risk and potential of crisis 
owing to its risk-sharing aspect, which in turn increases sounder risk management and 
lower leverage from both customers and financial institutions. The view is also argued 
that Islamic finance demonstrates greater stability than conventional finance owing to 
the fact that: a) Islamic finance encompasses prohibitions in regards speculation; b) 
financing is known to be asset-based, meaning there is complete collateral; and c) it 
is recognised as being built on a foundation of strong ethical precepts. Furthermore, 
IFIs (Islamic Financial Institutions) are recognised as being a valuable platform in 
terms of increasing access to financial inclusion, as well as access to finance amongst 
SMEs, which ultimately encourages and facilitates economic development and 
growth.   
Regardless, however, there do remain a number of challenges inherent in Islamic 
finance. As an example, irrespective of the attention directed towards the setting of 
standards through Islamic finance, the industry remains governed, in a number of 
regions, by a supervisory and regulatory model devised for conventional finance. As 
such, the unique nature of Islamic finance is not considered (Al-Maraj, 2014). 
Accordingly, the industry remains in its early stages, and therefore is seen to be lacking 
economies of scale whilst functioning in an environment where financial infrastructure, 
legal and tax rules, and access to central bank liquidity and financial safety nets are 
either absent or, if available, are unable to fully consider the individual aspects of 
Islamic finance (Askari, Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2010; Ernst & Young, 2014; IFSB, IsDB & 
IRTI, 2010).  
In consideration to the value of Islamic finance for its many members, the IMF has 
established and maintained a long-term interest in the outcomes potentially stemming 
from financial and macroeconomic stability. In this vein, a key role has been played in 
the introduction of the IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board), with the IMF also 
considering the implications of Islamic finance for those members where it has been 
considered valuable, specifically in the context of its Article IV consultations and its 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) assessments. Moreover, it has also 
delivered training and technical support in mind of providing countries with the ability 
to improve the supervision and regulation of Islamic banks, and the development of 
domestic Sukuk markets.  
The more recent development witnessed across Islamic finance has resulted in 
greater demand in terms of the provision of policy advice and capacity-building across 
various aspects delivered by the IMF. Such requirements for advice will be likely to 
cause industry growth and an increase in systematic importance, especially in those 
areas linked with IB, macroeconomic policies and Sukuk markets.  
In Islamic banking, under the Islamic Sharī‘ah (Islamic law) any products, activities and 
derivatives with a speculative element, or otherwise with the ability to generate interest 
for benefit, is forbidden (Yahia, 2010). In an effort to explain Islamic banking precisely, 
Hawary (2004) suggests four main principles surrounding Islamic banking’s operation 
from a practical perspective:  
3. There needs to be risk-sharing across all financial activities.  
4. All financial transactions need to have ‘material finality’, which means any 
financial activities in Islamic banking are required to be backed by collateral. 
This explains why most conventional derivatives are prohibited in Islamic 
banking.  
5. There cannot be exploitation with any party involved in the transaction.  
6. Sinful activities are not permitted to be financed, such as in relation to alcohol, 
pork products, pornography and gambling, etc.  
According to Iqbal & Molyneux (2005), back in the 1970s, Islamic banking was a 
strange and unusual system. It was more centred on perfection, and once was 
considered ‘wishful thinking’. Al-Ajmi et al. (2009), however, with an assets estimation 
of $1 trillion, suggests that such a high number of investments increased and 
publicised the overall concept of Islamic banking in the world, and thereby encouraged 
further countries to grant more licenses for such institutes. 
 
Figure 6. Islamic banking asset growth (US$b)  
(Source: IMF, the Banker, Central Bank Reports, EY Universe) 
 
In the current Islamic financial system, under Sharī‘ah law, Islamic banks are not 
allowed to trade in highly leveraged companies. Practically speaking, however, Islamic 
banks can invest in only companies holding a 60:40 ratio of equity-to-debt capital 
structure (Salman, 2008). Haniffa & Hudaib (2007) argue that Islamic banks may be 
less attractive for those non-Muslims interested in investing in organisations with 
activities considered ethical. This might be resulting from Islamic banks being too 
complacent with the belief of having a captive market amongst Muslims who can be 
dragged by religious motivations. 
A number of works have centred on the overall efficiency of Islamic Banking. The work 
of Hassan & Hussein (2003) examined the relative efficiency associated with the 
banking industry in the context of Sudan through directing consideration to a panel of 
17 banks spanning a period of 1992–2000. A number of parametric and non-
parametric approaches were carried out in order to analyse five efficiency measures, 
namely cost, allocative, technical, pure technical and scale efficiency scores. Overall, 
average costs and profit efficiency spanning this period were seen to be 55% and 
50%, respectively, which suggests that the x-efficiency of these banks in Sudan should 
be improved through ensuring the adequate management and allocation of their 
inputs.  
Another work was carried out by Hassan (2003) centred on examining Islamic banking 
system efficiency in the contexts of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, with the conclusion 
drawn that Islamic banking is much more cost-effective when contrasted with more 
conventional banking practices, whereas the same is not efficient when considering 
the overall generation of profit. Moreover, the work established that Islamic banks, 
which are large and are able to secure significant profits, are more efficient. In this 
same vein, another work was conducted by Brown & Skully (2003), which recognised 
that the Iranian banking system seems to be more established than that of the 
Sudanese system. The analysis was carried out for 35 banks across both countries, 
with the sound performance of Iranian banks recognised as owing to its banking 
industry being large. This factor is recognised as owing to the Iranian banking 
industry’s cost efficiency. In Sudan, the banks being less cost efficient is believed to 
be owing to the agricultural primary sector’s financing practices. The work carried out 
by Yudistira (2004) implements a DEA approach to analysing the scale and technical 
efficiencies of 18 different Islamic banks across 12 countries for the period spanning 
1997–2000. Generally, the efficiency results imply that inefficiency across 18 Islamic 
banks is minor at just above 10%, which is recognised as notably low when reviewed 
alongside a number of other more conventional counterparts. The findings imply that 
there are diseconomies of scale in the case of small-to-medium Islamic banks. In this 
area, the work of Bader et al. (2007) estimated the cost, revenue and profit efficiency 
of 43 Islamic and 37 conventional banks for the years spanning 1990–2005 in 21 
countries using DEA. It is suggested through the findings that there are no notable 
differences between the overall efficiency results of conventional versus Islamic banks 
(Yudistira, 2004). 
Similarly, a comparison was carried out between cost and profit efficiency of 37 
conventional banks and 43 Islamic banks across 21 OIC countries, applying the SFA 
(Stochastic Frontier Approach) (Shamsher et al., 2008). The findings imply that there 
are no key differences identifiable between the overall efficiency results of 
conventional banks when compared with Islamic banks.  
Nonetheless, across most of these works, focus is centred on a comparison of 
performance, particularly profitability, through the adoption of financial ratios, applying 
time constraints and a small volume of Islamic banks. Efficiency studies in the field of 
Islamic banking are scarce, which can be explained by three factors: the lack of good 
quality data, the problems associated with successfully modelling the uncharacteristic 
nature of Islamic banks’ cost revenue model, and the need to accurately take into 
account various environmental conditions in different regions.  
In specific consideration to the cross-country comparison on the efficiency of 
banks, the study of Berger (2007) summarised 100 studies, and recognised that 
efficiency has been measured using either: 1. the estimation of nation-specific 
frontiers; or 2. the estimation of common frontiers, such as specific variables in the 
estimation to account for countries differences. Although the former method ensures 
sample homogeneity, it does not allow authors to draw a direct contrast between 
banks of different countries. On the other hand, however, the latter method enables a 
direct comparison to be carried out in regard to efficiency levels and rankings across 
different countries (e.g. Coelli et al., 2005; Bos & Schmiedel, 2007) through making 
the implicit assumption that banks in different countries have access to the same 
technology and therefore can effectively compete with one another. Nonetheless, such 
a method requires that sample heterogeneity is managed through controlling for 
systematic differences between the sample that are not attributable to inefficiency, 






The study’s methodology will be applied according to four main steps: first, 
estimating efficiency through The Data Enveloping Analysis (DEA) approach; 
second, establishing Risk figures by applying three potential risk indicators; third, 
identifying those potential variables affecting risk and efficiency through the SUR 
approach; and finally, estimating risk and efficiency levels before and after the global 
financial crisis 
The study will also apply the methodology in two different scenarios: first, with 
Islamic banks; and second, with conventional banks. This step is taken in order to 
present comparable results amongst the different banking systems, which would 
produce clearer, wider and more understandable findings. 
3.1.1. Philosophy 
Positivism is seen to align itself with the stance that only factual information garnered 
through observation, including measurement, may be viewed as reliable. Through 
such studies, the researcher adopts the role of data collector and interpreter only 
through an objective approach, with the findings commonly quantifiable and 
observable (Easterby-Smith et al. 2008) 
In essence, the foundation of positivism rests on quantifiable observations that lend 
themselves to statistical analysis, with Collins (2010) emphasising that, as a 
philosophy, positivism is recognised as adhering to the empirical view that human 
experience leads to knowledge.  
3.1.2. Deductive Research 
The backbone of deductive research is the testing of theory, which is commonly 
associated with datasets, quantitative analysis and surveys. Such reasoning is seen 
to narrow its scope from more general through to more specific. It is common for such 
an approach to be referred to as top-down, with a thought on a theory then be 
narrowed into more specific hypotheses that ultimately undergo testing with the use of 
specific data. Collins (2010) 
 
 
Figure 7. Methodology Sample.  
Source: (Creswell, 2002). 
3.1.3. Empirical Study 
A work of an empirical nature might encompass statistical analysis or a type of 
qualitative study. Empirical research is a work making use of empirical evidence, and 
is well positioned in garnering knowledge through direct and indirect experiences 
and/or observations. In this regard, such research may apply either quantitative or 
qualitative analysis.  
3.1.4. Quantitative Method 
A quantitative approach can require substantial datasets, in addition to statistics and 
tables when concluding findings. Such works are made up of those studies in which 
the data concerned may undergo examination in terms of numbers. Quantitative 
research is more predominantly based on its original plans, with the results undergoing 
analysis and interpretation. As can be implied by the term, quantitative research is 
focused on the gathering and subsequent analysis of numerical data, with an 
emphasis commonly seen to be placed on relatively large-scale and representative 
sets of data, and sometimes presented or recognised as being concerned with the 
gathering of facts, although such a view differs between researchers (Creswell, 2002).  
3.1.5. Research Questions 
As discussed in the introduction section, the main objectives can be summarised as 
follows: 
• To examine the variables affecting risk in banking systems in the MENA area 
• To witness the variables affecting efficiency in banking systems in the MENA 
area 
• To compare risk and efficiency levels between Islamic and conventional banks. 
• To observe the financial crisis impact on risk and efficiency levels in both 
Islamic and conventional banks. 
These objectives lead to three main research questions as follows: 
1- Do Islamic banks experience less or more Risk levels, and are Islamic banks 
more or less efficient than conventional banks in the MENA area? 
2- WHAT ARE the potential variables affecting Risk from one side and Efficiency 
on the other side in banking systems in the MENA area? 
3- How were Islamic and conventional banks affected by the recent financial 
crisis? 
3.2. Research Hypothesis 
3.2.1. Risk 
Generally speaking, Islamic banking systems may be recognised through 
consideration to different aspects that seem, on the one hand, to decrease credit risk. 
It is considered that lenders’ religious beliefs and the greater discipline linked with 
higher deposit fragility could encourage loyalty whilst discouraging default. In one 
sense, greater credit risk could be witnessed by Islamic banks as a result of various 
factors, including Islamic loan contracts and their complexity, limited default penalties, 
and the moral hazard incentives induced as a result of PLS agreements. In specific 
regards insolvency risk, the link with depositors could mean Islamic banks are better 
positioned to bear losses; however, operational restrictions in terms of risk 
management and investment could mean such entities are not as stable when 
contrasted with conventional banking systems. Furthermore, although Islamic banking 
prohibits interest, such institutions are in competition with conventional banks, 
meaning they may be forced to offer similar pricing structures. Regardless of whether 
or not they demonstrate lower or higher sensitivity in comparison to conventional 
banks remains an empirical question, with this paper seeking to provide an answer. 
More specifically, this thesis directs attention to establishing whether or not banks’ 
credit risk is less or more responsive to interest rate movements, taking into 
consideration the greater risk aversion demonstrated by Islamic lenders. Furthermore, 
interest rate sensitivity in regards insolvency risk is also analysed.  
H1: Islamic banks face greater credit risk when contrasted with conventional banking 
systems. 
The profit or loss system can mean Islamic banks are positioned as being riskier, 
although larger payouts to investment account holders can ultimately mean deposits 
are increased, thus encouraging shareholders to raise more equity capital so as to 
prevent ownership rights dilution whilst maintaining capital ratios. On the other hand, 
poor payouts could mean withdrawals are encouraged, thereby resulting in possible 
liquidity issues and, as a result, solvency problems.   
In Islamic banks, equity holders may face risks in terms of transferring a portion of 
their profits to account holders so as to decrease withdrawal-related risks. In this 
regard, such a risk is recognised as Displaced Commercial Risk (AAOIFI, 1999). 
However, should crisis be seen as likely, management may be well positioned to share 
losses with investment account holders in order to ensure insolvency is circumvented. 
This implies that Islamic banking entities may be better able to bear losses when 
compared with conventional banking systems. Such additional capacity depends on 
the weight of investment deposits in overall funding. When good performance levels 
are seen across Islamic banks, their profit rates may increase, albeit at a slower rate, 
so as to ensure deposit inflow volatility is limited. 




When drawing a contrast between business orientation, asset quality, cost efficiency 
and conventional and stability in Islamic and conventional banks, little significant 
difference can be seen between the groups. Although Islamic banks are known to be 
more cost-effective, such a benefit is seen in contrast when focusing on a sample of 
countries offering both Islamic and conventional banking services. Accordingly, 
conventional banks are seen to be more cost-effective when contrasted alongside 
Islamic banks, where both banks exist. Any significant difference in business 
orientation, as established through the share of fee-based to toyal income or share of 
non-deposit in total funding, were not identified. Moreover, no notable differences were 
established in terms of Islamic banks’ stability, although Islamic banks were 
recognised as having greater capital–asset ratios. Nonetheless, some degree of 
variation in terms of stability and efficiency in conventional banks was identified across 
those countries with different market shares of Islamic banks. In particular, in those 
regions where Islamic banks’ market share is seen to be greater, there tends to be 
greater cost-effectiveness across conventional banks, although lesser stability (Beck 
et al, 2010) 
In specific regards efficiency, it is a-priori ambiguous when considering whether 
greater efficiency should be seen in the case of Islamic or conventional banks. In one 
sense, screening and monitoring costs need to be lower for Islamic banks when 
considering the lower agency problems; conversely, however, Islamic banking, which 
goes hand-in-hand with greater complexities, could incur higher costs and therefore 
make Islamic banks less efficient.  
H3: Islamic banks demonstrate lower or same efficiency levels when compared with 
conventional banks. 
It was found by Donsyah (2003) that Islamic banking is more efficient when contrasted 
with conventional banks throughout the period of the global financial crisis (Al-samdi 
et al, 2013) 
H4: Efficiency levels of Islamic banks experienced more increase compared to 
conventional banks after the global financial crisis when compared to conventional 






3.3.1. Regression Models 
LLR S = α + β1 CapitalAssetRatio + β2 Size + β3 LiquidAssets + β4 HHI + β7 DomesticInterestRate + 
β8 GDPPer-Capita + β9 GDPPer-CapitaGrowth + β10 MuslimShare + β12 LoanGrowth + β13 
AssetsGrowth + β14 ReturnOnEquity + β15 NetIncome …………………. (1) 
LLR c  = α + β1 CapitalAssetRatio + β2 Size + β3 LiquidAssets + β4 HHI + β7 DomesticInterestRate + 
β8 GDPPer-Capita + β9 GDPPer-CapitaGrowth + β10 MuslimShare + β12 LoanGrowth + β13 
AssetsGrowth + β14 ReturnOnEquity + β15 NetIncome …………………. (2) 
NPL s = α + β1 CapitalAssetRatio + β2 Size + β3 LiquidAssets + β4 HHI + β7 DomesticInterestRate + 
β8 GDPPer-Capita + β9 GDPPer-CapitaGrowth + β10 MuslimShare + β12 LoanGrowth + β13 
AssetsGrowth + β14 ReturnOnEquity + β15 NetIncome …………………. (3) 
NPL c = α + β1 CapitalAssetRatio + β2 Size + β3 LiquidAssets + β4 HHI + β7 DomesticInterestRate + 
β8 GDPPer-Capita + β9 GDPPer-CapitaGrowth + β10 MuslimShare + β12 LoanGrowth + β13 
AssetsGrowth + β14 ReturnOnEquity + β15 NetIncome …………………. (4) 
Z s = α + β1 CapitalAssetRatio + β2 Size + β3 LiquidAssets + β4 HHI + β7 DomesticInterestRate + β8 
GDPPer-Capita + β9 GDPPer-CapitaGrowth + β10 MuslimShare + β12 LoanGrowth + β13 
AssetsGrowth + β14 ReturnOnEquity + β15 NetIncome …………………. (5) 
Z c = α + β1 CapitalAssetRatio + β2 Size + β3 LiquidAssets + β4 HHI + β7 DomesticInterestRate + β8 
GDPPer-Capita + β9 GDPPer-CapitaGrowth + β10 MuslimShare + β12 LoanGrowth + β13 
AssetsGrowth + β14 ReturnOnEquity + β15 NetIncome …………………. (6) 
EFF s = α α + β1 ReturnOnAssets + β2 Size + β3 LiquidAssets + β4 HHI + β7 DomesticInterestRate + 
β8 GDPPer-Capita + β9 GDPPer-CapitaGrowth + β10 MuslimShare + β12 LoanIntensity + β13 Non-
PerformingLoans + β13 Non-InterestIncome + β14 Zscore…………………. (7) 
EFF c = α + β1 ReturnOnAssets + β2 Size + β3 LiquidAssets + β4 HHI + β7 DomesticInterestRate + β8 
GDPPer-Capita + β9 GDPPer-CapitaGrowth + β10 MuslimShare + β12 LoanIntensity + β13 Non-




3.3.1.1. Risk Proxies 
LLRij = Loan-loss reserves for bank i in country j 
Zscorei j = Z score for bank i in country j 
NPL i j = non-performing loans over total loans for bank i in country j 
CAR = Equity capital to asset ratio.  
ROE = Net income/ total equity  
Net Income = Total profit – cost 
Size = Logarithim of total assets 
LAD = Liquid asset to short term deposit  
Loan Growth = Annual growth rate of gross loans. 
Asset Growth = Annual growth rate of total assets. 
Macroeconomic pointers: Muslim Share, Domestic Interest Rate, HHI, GDP Per-
Capita, and GDP Per-Capita Growth. 
Muslim Share: share of the Muslim population in the total population of each country 
as Muslim Countries with >90% of Muslims in their population, dummy that take a 
value of one, and zero otherwise. 
Domestic Interest Rate: Deposit Interest Rate provided by the World Bank website; 
for years and countries with missing observations, the data are obtained from the 
central bank websites. 
HHI: A proxy for market concentration with a value between 0 and 1. Higher values 
show that the market is more concentrated.                 
GDP Per-Capita: GDP Per-Capita in US$. 
GDP Per-Capita Growth: Annual growth rate of GDP Per-Capita. 
 
3.3.1.2. Efficiency Proxies 
EFFij = Efficiency scores for bank i in country j (derived from DEA) 
Input: (Wage Rate), (Deposits), (Physical Capital Price) 
Output: (Loans), (Security) 
Return on Assets (ROA) = Net income / Total asset 
Size = Logarithm of total assets 
LAD = Liquid asset to short term deposit 
Loan Growth = Annual growth rate of gross loans. 
Asset Growth = Annual growth rate of total assets. 
Macroeconomic pointers: Muslim Share, Domestic Interest Rate, HHI, GDP Per-
Capita, and GDP Per-Capita Growth. 
Muslim Share: share of the Muslim population in the total population of each country 
as Muslim Countries with >90% of Muslims in their population, dummy that take a 
value of one, and zero otherwise. 
Domestic Interest Rate: Deposit Interest Rate provided by the World Bank website; 
for years and countries with missing observations, the data are obtained from the 
central bank websites. 
HHI: A proxy for market concentration with a value between 0 and 1. Higher values 
show that the market is more concentrated.                 
GDP Per-Capita: GDP Per-Capita in US$. 
GDP Per-Capita Growth: Annual growth rate of GDP Per-Capita. 
Loan Intensity = Loans over total assets 
Credit Risk = non-performing loans over total loans 
Insolvency Risk = Z Score 
(NIE) = Non-interest expenses over total assets  
 
Various bank- and country-specific variables are included, which are recognised as 
describing and measuring risk in the banking system. Loan loss reserves, as one 
aspect of total assets (LLR), (Zscore), and (NPL) are all adopted as ways of 
measuring banking risk on a distinct basis. Higher reserves are seen to be indicative 
of a larger degree of banking risk, accounting for future negative periods. 
Undoubtedly, such a prediction as a measure of riskiness may be queried; however, 
accounting ratio such as this has been applied widely across the literature in mind of 
evaluating risk inclination.  
Dummy Variables 
Some other variables were included as dummy variables. These variables are as 
follows: 
• Type of the bank: a dummy that take a value of 1 for Islamic banks, and 0 for 
conventional banks. 
• Muslim Share: The share of the Muslim population in the total population of 
each country as Muslim Countries with >90% of Muslims in their population, 
dummy that take a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
3.3.2. Independent variables  
The ratio of capital asset is used because on one hand, if the equity increases, the 
moral hazard problems are lowered along with an increase in the banks’ monitoring 
incentives, and on the other hand, the risk-taking capacity of the banks is enhanced 
by higher equity. It is inclusive of this variable because we are enabled to study the 
variation in the relationship between risk and equity capital between the traditional 
banks and the Islamic banks.  
Since past researchers over the determinants of margins are suggestive of a positive 
relationship (Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007). It is viable to consider equity as a proxy of 
risk aversion (Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; McShane and Sharpe, 
1985) greater returns are expected in banks with higher equity. There can be 
different sorts of limitations on the Islamic banks with respect to their investment of 
different kinds of earning assets that can affect their stability adversely. Therefore, 
the net loans’ share is included in the total assets of earning so that the extent of 
impact of the composition of total assets of earning over the risk of insolvency can be 
investigated.  
Clear (1992) found the impact of expansion of credit upon the rates of loan carge-off 
and non-performing loan rates to be negative, though research in the following years 
determined a positive effect. It was found that borrowers do not default as soon as 
they take on the loans. For the analysis of insolvency risk, as there is the need to 
consider the banks’ growth strategy, the loan growth is used to replace total asset 
growth.  
Lepetit et al. (2008a) demonstrate that a greater risk of insolvency is exhibited by the 
European banks that have higher non-interest income share in the net operating 
income. The other equation also includes the non-interest income’s share in the total 
operating income as the research by Lepetit et al. (2008b) and Carbo and Rodriguez 
(2007) led to the conclusion that banks are enabled to lower their margins by the 
non-interest income.  
The number of Muslims may be attracting Islamic banks and vice versa. Therefore, 
the share of the population of Muslims in each country is also used. The dummy 
variable is defined as 1 for the countries that have at least 90 per cent population of 
Muslims and 0 for the countries in which the shares of Muslims are less than 90 per 
cent.  
The level of domestic rates of interest is also controlled for. The extent of rates of 
domestic interest may impact the risk appetite of the banks (Maddaloni and Peydro , 
2011; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2008 
and Rajan, 2006)  
Particularly, when the rates of interest are low, the risk-taking appetite of the banks is 
greater. Nevertheless, the levels of interest rate may impact the borrowers’ tendency 
to repay the motivation to default is greater at higher levels (Alessandri and 
Drehmann, 2010; Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa, 2010; Carling et al., 2007 and 
Jarrow and Turnbull, 2000). 
We include the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) in the risk model in an attempt to 
observe the potential effect of concentration of the banking sector on the risk taking 
behaviour. 
We also use it in efficiency model because some authors believe there is a negative 
connection between HHI and EFF since in highly concentrated markets risk aversion 
may prevail (Sathye, 2001). Moreover, Naceur et al. (2009) suggest that ‘greater 
market concentration might reduce competition and thus efficiency’. However, if 
economies of scale drive bank M&As, then increased concentration could lead to 
efficiency improvements (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2000; Casu and Girardone, 
2009), (Garza-Garcia, 2010). 
We also include the variables of GDP Per-Capita as well as growth in it to control for 
the growth and level in the population’s prosperity. Also in efficiency, it is expected 
have a relationship between GDP and EFF in a positive manner since the demand 
for financial services tends to raise as economies increase, increasing demand for 
financial services and improving the quality of loans (Garza-Garcia, 2010). 
The logarithm of total asset is considered as a proxy for size (Size) in the risk model. 
Large banks can benefit from both scale economies and diversification as claimed by 
Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001). At the same time, larger banks might be more 
risky, since they may try and exploit Too-Big-To-Fail safety net subsidies (Kane, 
2010). It is also considered in efficiency model as Hauner (2005) explains that larger 
banks could pay less for their inputs than their counterparts and that there could be 
increasing returns to scale through the allocation of fixed costs (Abedifar, Molyneux 
and Tarazi, 2013). 
The growth rate of gross loans (Loan Growth) is controlled for in the risk equation 
because a significant increase in credit could reflect weaker screening standards, 
tranquil collateral requirements, or lower interest rates (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 
2006; Ogura, 2006). Clair (1992) says ‘a negative effect of credit expansion on non-
performing loans and loan charge-off rates, although for subsequent years a positive 
link is detected’. As pointed out by Berger and Udell (2004) and Foos, Norden, and 
Weber (2010) borrowers do not default immediately after taking-on loans. For 
insolvency risk analysis, the growth strategy of banks is taking into account, 
therefore, total asset growth (Asset Growth)is used in lieu of loan growth (Garza-
Garcia, 2010). 
The return on equity is used in the risk model for the reason that a company can only 
create shareholder value, economic profits, if the ROE is greater than its cost of 
equity capital (the expected return shareholders require for investing in the company 
given the particular risk of the company) (Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi, 2013). 
The return on Assets variable is used as there is an expected sign between ROA 
and EFF in a positive way since more efficient banks generate higher returns 
(Mester, 1996; Pastor et al., 1997; Carbo et al., 1999; Casu and Molyneux, 2003).  
In the efficiency model we use the variable NIE which measures operating expenses 
across the banking sectors; the literature has found that reduced operating expenses 
increase the efficiency of the financial institutions (Bourke, 1989), and a negative 
sign is expected (Garza-Garcia, 2010). 
Also in the efficiency model we use the variable NPL which captures the level of 
credit risk and the expected relationship with EFF is negative since more efficient 
banks have a better quality portfolio (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1995; Resti, 1997; Bar et 
al., 2002). However, the empirical literature finds mixed evidence, Altunbas et al. 
(2000) suggests that efficiency is not very sensitive to credit risk whilst Hughes and 
Mester (1993) and Delis and Papanikolaou (2009) find an inverse relationship 
between credit risk and bank efficiency. We also use the variable Z score which 
proxies insolvency risk levels for the same reason (Alam, 2012) 
Banks that are more liquid may be more efficient and also less exposed to risks. In 
the sense that all other things being equal, an efficient bank can produce more 
output part of which includes liquid and other assets so we account for this by using 
liquid assets to deposits ratio (LAD) (Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi, 2013). 
The loan intensity variable reflects the lending intensity of the banking sector and a 
positive relationship with EFF is expected since loans are the main source of bank 
profits; however, the quality of the loans may deteriorate under some circumstances, 
for example during an economic recession, in which case a higher degree of loan 
intensity may be detrimental to bank efficiency (Garza-Garcia, 2010). 
 
3.4. Variables and Measures 
3.4.1. Risk Estimation 
Previous studies like (Altunbas et al., 2007) and (Alam, N. 2012) have used one 
proxy (loan loss reserve) in order to measure risk. Others like (Fiordelisi et al., 2010) 
used two proxies (Expected default frequency and non-performing loans). We will 
use three different proxies to measure risk as follows in the next part. Each proxy is 
presented and explained at a time in analysis and discussion sections.  
3.4.1.1. Loan Loss Reserves (LLR): 
Loan loss reserves are accounting entries banks concerned with covering estimated 
losses on loans due to defaults and non-payment. 
LLR = Ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to Gross Loans. 
Loan loss reserve accounts are an important part of banks’ ability to sustain losses. 
Such an accounting ratio has been widely used across literature in an effort to 
assess bank inclination towards risk.  
3.4.1.2. Non-performing Loans NPL: 
The Non-Performing Loans (NPL) is a widely used accounting indicator of banks’ 
risk. The literature identifies two sets of factors to explain the evolution of NPLs over 
time. One group focuses on external events such as the overall macroeconomic 
conditions, which are likely to affect the borrowers’ capacity to repay their loans, 
while the second group, which looks more at the variability of NPLs across banks, 
attributes the level of non-performing loans to bank-level factors. 
NPL = non-performing loans over total loans 
3.4.1.3. Altman Z Score:  
The Z score provides a quantitative measurement tool able to examine the financial 
health of an organisation. This score provides insight into those elements 
contributing to the financial health of an organisation, and further identifies patterns 
emerging to indicate improvements or declines in the financial condition of a firm.  
It is recognised that the Z score is a critical tool utilised by business managers to 
evaluate financial health. This assists managers in aligning their business 
approaches alongside capital choices of capital allocation, which helps to ensure 
financial condition transparency to equity capital providers and lenders. The Z score 
is used by managers to increase capital and accordingly secure credit, and is 
recognised as a valuable approach to demonstrating to investors the credit value of 





Zscore = ROAA + CAR)/ SDROAA , where ROA stands for the assets’ return, CAR 
represents the equity capital to assets ratio, and SD(ROAA) stands for the standard 
deviation of ROAA. There is an inverse relationship between Zscore and the bank’s 
insolvency probability. When the value of assets of a bank gets less than its debt, the 
bank becomes insolvent. A higher value of Zscore represents higher stability of the 
bank. Zscore logarithm and the where E(ROA) is the expected return on assets, 
CAR is the ratio of equity capital to assets, and SD(ROA) is the standard deviation of 
ROA. 
3.4.2. Efficiency Estimation 
A study of efficiency usually includes estimating the efficient frontier and determining 
the extent of deviations from the efficient frontier by each cross-section. In order to 
do this, two approaches are common for the estimation. Data Enveloping Analysis 
(non-parametric) and the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (parametric). According to 
Berger and Humphrey (1997). 
In specific consideration to the Data Enveloping Analysis (DEA) approach, this may 
be recognised as a non-parametric methodology utilising the linear programming 
approach. Farrell (1957) was the first to suggest such an approach; however, 
Charnes et al. (1978) went on to direct the method towards analysis. This approach 
adopts the foundation of economic optimalisation in regards the efficiency frontier. It 
is created as the piecewise linear combination; this links the observations in the 
series undergoing analysis, subsequently garnering a convex production possibility 
set. As a result, the DEA efficiency score is defined in relation to various other 
Decision-Making Units—notably those different from the usual absolute standard. 
Accordingly, there is no requirement for the DEA to adhere to a complete 
specification pertaining to the underlying functional form for the relationship—a 
stipulation fundamental to the parametric methodology. Such a method does, 
however, make the assumption that, in the estimated relationship, there is no 
random errors, which therefore is best aligned with a balanced panel (Ncuba, 2009). 
3.4.2.1. DEA as Efficiency Measurement Tool  
Bank efficiency measurement involves two different approaches: intermediation and 
production. Whilst the former witnesses banks assuming intermediating funds 
between investors and savers, the latter, on the other hand, places emphasis on banks 
as firm-delivering services through facilitating transactions (Mostafa, 2011). 
Accordingly, the literature available on bank efficiency measurements utilised one of 
these methods.  
The main function of a bank, in the case of a financial intermediary, is as an efficient 
enabler or financial resources through investments and financial benefits in return 
(Batchelor, 2005). In other words, funds are borrowed from depositors by banks with 
the aim of lending to others; thus, deposits may be recognised as inputs (Mester, 2003; 
Chen et al., 2008). Importantly, such an approach may be recognised as applicable to 
both Islamic and conventional banking structures, as shown in the subsequent two 
figures.  
When banks are seen to perform intermediation functions and generate deposit 
liabilities, as a result, the level of money is influenced, with interest for both investors 
and depositors increasing. In line with this, there are a number of works centred on 
the measurement of bank efficiency through the application of DEA. Importantly, the 
basic CCR DEA model underwent modification through the linear programming 
equation in line with satisfying the need and aims of various works.  
Importantly, at the very foundation of the service industry is productivity, with efficiency 
and effectiveness afforded much attention in this regard (Sherman & Zhu, 2006). 
Importantly, it is common for literature in this field to use the two terms 
interchangeably, with much extensive study directed towards financial institutions’ 
efficiency during recent years. Importantly, when considering financial institutions in 
particular, efficiency may be seen to suggest improved profitability, a large volume of 
funds, better prices and improved service quality for consumers, alongside less risk 
(Berger et al., 1993). Despite the fact that the main focus of banks is centred on 
identifying approaches to funds-generation, as well as lending funds at a greater rate, 
a number of concerns have been developed in the way in which operational 
productivity is managed so as to ensure attracting investors whilst also achieving 
higher profitability (Sherman & Zhu, 2006).  
Importantly, therefore, efficiency may be recognised as the ratio of output to input 
(Cooper et al., 2006; Sherman & Zhu, 2006). Such a measurement is able to establish 
how organisations can achieve maximum output and profit whilst also minimising cost 
(Mokhtar et al., 2008). In this regard, the value of the efficiency measurement can be 
seen through its ability to facilitate management in benchmarking the performance of 
banks whilst recognising and highlighting areas of inefficiency for improvement 
(Mostafa, 2007). Importantly, inefficiency is not only restricted to considerations of 
poor management performance but rather could be owing to managerial, socio-
economic and technological factors (Sherman & Zhu, 2006).  
 
3.4.3. Efficiency Classifications  
As noted in the study by Sherman & Zhu (2006), bank productivity as a whole 
ultimately rests on four individual efficiency classifications, and outlined as follows:  
1. Technical efficiency: Also referred to as global efficiency, which centres on the 
capacity of banks to generate outputs with fewer inputs, i.e. resources.  
2. Scale efficiency: Making reference to the level of optimal activity, where 
inefficiency may be seen should optimal levels not be achieved in the 
deliverance of goods or services, resulting in additional costs.  
3. Price efficiency: Recognised as the capacity of banks to enhance their overall 
efficiency if the inputs could be secured at lower costs without compromising 
on quality.  
4. Allocative efficiency: Referencing the measurement of the most optimum 
combination of inputs in an effort to create outputs focused on improving 
efficiency. 
(Sherman & Zhu, 2006).  
Moreover, in line with its definition, technical efficiency could be seen to relate to the 
capacity of the organisation to improve its output in line with the given inputs (Cooper 
et al., 2006). Technical inefficiency, therefore, could be witnessed in cases where 
banks produce additional outputs with the actual inputs or otherwise when banks 
produce actual output with a lesser volume of inputs (Sherman & Zhu, 2006). 
Importantly, as noted by Mester (2003), technical inefficiency can be witnessed when 
banks waste input.  
Further to the aforementioned classification, efficiency may also be recognised as X-
efficiency, which centres on the productivity of the bank in terms of using input to 
generate outputs from the point of view of choosing the most suitable inputs. From a 
conceptual standpoint, X-efficiency measurement may be further broken down into 
two individual aspects of efficiency for extended efficiency analysis, namely cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency, in line with the economic concept of cost-minimisation 
and profit-maximisation (Mester, 2003; Mensah, 2012).  
Importantly, the effects of revenue and cost are considered in line with profit efficiency 
owing to its capacity in measuring the ration of bank profit to maximum level of profit, 
as seen to be achievable by efficient banks. For banks, a greater efficiency analysis 
can be achieved through the inclusion of risk-return trade-offs incorporation (Mester, 
2003). In this regard, choosing variables for the input–output relationships and 
efficiency model implemented are able to establish the type of efficiency under 
investigation (Mostafa, 2011). 
 
Figure 8. Bank efficiency classification.  
Source: (adapted from Sherman & Zhu, 2006) 
3.4.3.1. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and its Basic Models  
As discussed above, the DEA was first developed by Farrel (1957) and later expanded 
by Charnes-Cooper & Rhodes (1978) (Klimberg et al., 2009), and may be viewed as 
a non-parametric approach making use of the linear programming to measure the level 
of efficiency of comparable decision-making units (DMU) through the adoption of 
different inputs and outputs (Klimberg et al., 2009).  
Efficiency = Output / Input (1)  
Nonetheless, such a measurement is not entirely able to represent efficiency owing to 
the fact that, all too often, numerous inputs are utilised in order to establish single or 
more outputs, thus resulting in changes to the original equation with the inclusion of 
multiple inputs and multiple outputs and their measurement (Zhu & Sherman, 2006). 
The 1978 modification was generated as a result of making changes to the original 
equation (Ayadi, 1998; Zhu & Sherman, 2006; Cooper et al., 2006).  
Efficiency = Weighted sumof output / Weighted sum of input (2)  
In this case, approaches to DMUs’ efficiency measurement may be referred to as a 
group of firms under study, such as banks, for example. DEA is recognised as a 
valuable and sound approach to efficiency measurement when faced with a limited 
number of DMUs (i.e. banks) (Cooper et al., 2006; Klimberg et al., 2009; Hassan et 
al., 2009; Ahmad & Luo, 2010).  
In 1984, Sherman implemented the first changes to the DEA framework; since this 
time, the measurement has been widely used by the banking sector across the globe 
with the aim of measuring the operational efficiency of such entities (Sherman & Zhu, 
2006). Importantly, the DEA facilitates efficiency measurement from a number of 
different inputs and outputs within various DMUs (Sherman & Zhu, 2006).  
As such, the mathematical equation utilised in order to establish DMUs’ maximum 
efficiency through the use of the input–output efficiency measure may be expressed 




N: Total number of DMUs  
J: Weighted sum of outputs  
I: Weighted sum of inputs  
M: The base DMU (calculating mth DMU)  
N: DMUs  
I: Inputs  
J: Outputs  
vmj: Weights for output   
umi: Weights for input.  
Owing to the fact that the aforementioned equation is in the fractional function, 
computation may be problematic; hence, CCR (1978) changes the equation into a 
linear programming equation. This is done by establishing the ratio’s denominator to 
one or unity to create a linear programming equation, as shown in Model 2, commonly 
referred to as the output-maximisation CCR model (Cooper et al., 2006; Sherman & 
Zhu, 2006; Ramanathan, 2007; Chen et al., 2008): 
 
Upon the application of the DEA in order to measure a set of DMUs in terms of bank 
efficiency, the linear programming algorithm determines each DMU’s efficiency in line 
with the input and output variables in order to determine the greatest ration of weighted 
sum of output I line with the weighted sum of input, which is then used as a benchmark 
for other DMUs; this means the best-practice DMUs can be seen on the efficient 
frontier line. This may be seen to infer that the best-practice units are generally efficient 
and may be established through the efficiency score of the DEA as 100%, i.e. as 
having an efficiency of 1. 
The non-negativity limitations were implemented by Charnes et al. (1979) in an effort 
to ensure inputs and outputs achieve positive weight values, meaning the efficiency 
score assigned will rest between 1 and 0, with efficiency index no greater than 1. 
Those units seen to be less efficient are recognised by <100% (efficiency <1). The 
relative units to this frontier represent the degree of inefficiency.  
The above explanations were derived from Soteriou and Stavrinides (1997), Cooper 
et al. (2006), Sherman and Zhu (2006), Ramanathan (2007), Chen et al. (2008), 
Hassan et al. (2009), Klimberg et al. (2009), and Yahya et al. (2012), (Othman et al., 
2016). 
3.5. Data Sources 
Bank-level data were retrieved from the Bankscope database and the websites of 
individual banks. Country-level variables, including domestic interest rate, GDP per 
capita and the growth rate of GDP per capita are collected from the World Bank 
website. The share of Muslim population in each country is obtained from Pew 
Research Center (2009). The Bankscope classification for Islamic banks is 
inaccurate in many banks and therefor, all banks have been cross-checked with their 
websites to ensure accuracy. 
Across ten, our sample comprises 255 banks; 65 Islamic banks and 190 commercial 
banks. In all countries, both Islamic and conventional banking are authorized and 
practiced. The largest number of observations is from Turkey. Approximately, 25% of 
the total observations are for Islamic banks and the remaining 75% relate to 
conventional banks.  
Relatively large conventional banks establish Islamic windows which are financial 
products and services in compliance with Sharī‘ah laws. Islamic banks are, on 
average, more capitalized and profitable than conventional banks. The lower levels 
of debt (possibly as a response to higher withdrawal risk) and higher non-interest 
income of Islamic banks might partly explain their greater profitability. Net interest 
margin of Islamic banks does not appear to be significantly different from that of 
conventional banks; however, Islamic banks have lower implicit interest income and 
expense rates than conventional banks. Interestingly, the structure of the asset 
portfolio of Islamic banks is significantly different from that of conventional banks. 
Islamic banks have a higher ratio of net loans to total earning assets possibly 
because they are limited in their investments in other earning assets (such as 
bonds). Gross loans and total assets grow at higher rates for Islamic than 
conventional banks. The cost to income ratio of Islamic banks is slightly higher than 
that of conventional banks. 
3.5.1. Data Collection 
This study involves banks’ balance sheet, income statement and annual reports data 
for Islamic and Conventional banking countries in the MENA area for the period 
2006–2015. The data will be collected from the Bank-Scope Database, which 
includes banking information for both conventional and Islamic banks. The study will 
present breakdown by type of banking. The total number of observations will include 
majority of banks ‘Islamic and Conventional’ in the specified time frame and area. 
More details and breakdown will be added at a later stage of the study. 
 
3.6. Diagnostic Tests 
Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results are as shown in the 
next chapter. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in order to find any 


















4. Empirical Findings and Analysis 
4.1. Introduction 
The study results were analysed and interpreted in five ways. First, through 
descriptive analysis as tables show. Second, through Collinearity tests. Third, 
through regression results and analysis. Fourth, through the variables orders in 
terms of importance. 
The regression variables are regressed to see the effect of independent variables 
(i.e. Size, Capital Asset Ratio, Return on equity, net income, Return on Assets, Size 
of the firm, Liquid Assets, Muslim Share, Domestic Interest Rate, HHI, GDP Per 
Capita, and GDP Per Capita Growth, Loan Growth Assets Growth, Loan Intensity 
and NIE) on dependent variables (i.e. Loan Loss Reserve, Non-Performing Loans as 
proxies for credit risk, Z score as proxies for insolvency risk and Efficiency scores 
derived from DEA as proxy for efficiency).  
Regression analysis are carried out. In equations 1 and 2, loan loss reserve is used 
as a dependent variable to represent risk and all the independent variables are 
added to see their mutual effect on the dependent variable for Islamic banks and 
conventional banks respectively. Whereas, equations 3 and 4 non-performing loan is 
used as a dependent variable to represent risk and all the independent variables are 
added to see their mutual effect on the dependent variable for Islamic banks and 
conventional banks respectively. In equations 5 and 6, non-performing loan is used 
as a dependent variable to represent risk and all the independent variables are 
added to see their mutual effect on the dependent variable for Islamic banks and 
conventional banks respectively. In equations 7 and 8 efficiency scores derived from 
DEA are used as a dependent variable to represent efficiency and all the efficiency-
effect independent variables are added to see their mutual effect on the dependent 
variable for Islamic banks and conventional banks respectively.  
4.2. Risk 
4.2.1. Descriptive 
Banking risk was investigated using three different variables. Two are usually 
associated with credit risk (Loan loss reserves and non-performing loans) and one 
associated with insolvency risk (Z score). Therefore, the study distinguish credit from 
insolvency risk in our comparison. 









LLR 415 -3 8 3.65 2.150 
NPL 261 -3 8 4.84 1.607 
Z Score 499 -3 14 1.73 1.745 
      
 
Table 3. Descriptive Results. Conventional Only 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
LLR 1420 -4 9 4.40 1.961 
NPL 1168 -4 9 4.68 1.821 
Z Score 1419 -4 17 2.38 2.393 
      
 
Credit risk in Islamic banks as shown in tables 2 and 3 had a mean of 3.65 in loan 
loss reserve and a mean of 4.84 in non-performing loans. While in conventional 
banks as shown in table 2, loan loss reserves scored a mean of 4.40 and 4.68 for 
non-performing loans. After comparing the means of Islamic and conventional banks, 
with a little higher score for Islamic banks in terms of loan loss reserve and a little 
higher score in conventional banks in terms of non-performing loans, the study found 
that no serious difference between Islamic and conventional banks was found. 
Furthermore, Islamic and conventional banks experience the same level of credit 
risk. 
On the other hand, Insolvency risk was found to be different. The study shows a 
better mean score in conventional banks with a mean of 1.73 in Islamic and 2.38 in 
Conventional banks. Furthermore, conventional banks in MENA countries for the 
period of 2006 to 2015 were more stable than Islamic banks in the same area and 
during the same period. These findings answer the first part of our first research 
question. 
4.3. Risk presented by Loan Loss Reserve 
4.3.1. Islamic Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks as shown below. 









LLR 415 -3 8 3.65 2.150 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
415     
 
As for correlations, Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results 
are as shown in the table below. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in 
order to find any multiCollinearity (Tollerance and VIF). 
Table 5. Collinearity Tests for Credit Risk (LLR). Islamic Banks 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
CAR .363 2.753 
Return on Equity ROE .826 1.210 
Net Income .467 2.143 
Size .363 2.752 
LAD .433 2.308 
Domestic Interest Rate % 
.638 1.568 
GDP PerCapita .613 1.631 
GDP PerCapita Growth % 
.802 1.246 
Muslim Share .690 1.449 
LGrowth .305 3.279 
Agrowth .288 3.477 
HHI .613 1.631 
 
As the standard benchmark figures were mainly above 0.2 for tolerance and below 7 
for VIF, then the study found that no serious multiCollinearity was found among the 
dependent variables in Islamic banks (see appendix). 
In Islamic banks, it was found that capital assets ratio, Size and GDP per capita are 
significant at 1% significance level, also Liquid assets are significant at 5% 
significance level. GDP Per Capita Growth were found to be significant at 10% 
significance level. 
As for the regression results in Islamic banks (see appendix), The R squared is 
certainly significant (.706) which means that about 71% of changes in risk levels 
variable can be explained by the regression. Also in model 1, there was a significant 
effect of the independent variables on risk, (F = 46.877, p < .005). 
Independent variables like Capital Assets ratio, Net income, GDP per capita, GDP 
per capita growth, Loan growth and Assets growth were found to be affecting the 
dependent variable of risk in an opposite manner. The study found that the 
dependent variable increases when the values of these independent variables 
decrease and vice versa. On the other hand, the study found Return on equity, Size, 
Liquid assets, Domestic interest rate, Muslim shares and Market concentration to be 
affecting the dependent variable of risk in a positive manner. The dependent variable 
increases when the values of these independent variable increase and vice versa.  





(Constant) -8.227 .000 
CAR -3.684 .000 
Return on Equity ROE .078 .938 
Net Income -1.000 .318 
Size 14.106 .000 
LAD 2.980 .003 
Domestic Interest Rate % .672 .502 
GDP PerCapita -5.336 .000 
GDP PerCapita Growth % -1.763 .079 
Muslim Share 1.470 .143 
LGrowth -.196 .845 
Agrowth -.563 .574 
HHI 1.139 .256 
On a relative scale, the value of beta (β) explains the contribution of independent 
variable within dependent variable. See table below. 






















Table 8. Credit (LLR) Risk. Islamic Banks 
Most Significant Least Significant 
CAR GDP PerCapita 
Growth % 
Size   
GDP PerCapita   
 
Only Capital Assets Ratio, Size of the firm and GDP Per Capita are the statistically 
significant predictor variables that cannot be left out from the multiple regressions 
under any circumstances. 
4.3.2. Conventional Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for conventional banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of conventional banks as shown below. 









LLR 1420 -4 9 4.40 1.961 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
1420     
 
As for correlations, Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results 
are as shown in the table below. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in 
order to find any multiCollinearity (Tollerance and VIF). 
Table 10. Collinearity Tests for Credit Risk (LLR). Conventional Banks 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
CAR .708 1.413 
Return on Equity ROE .947 1.056 
Net Income .421 2.375 
Size .351 2.850 








Muslim Share .670 1.492 
LGrowth .309 3.233 
Agrowth .303 3.306 
HHI .733 1.364 
 
The study found that as the standard benchmark figures were mainly above 0.2 for 
tolerance and below 7 for VIF, then the study found that no serious multiCollinearity 
was found among the dependent variables in Conventional banks (see appendix). 
In Conventional banks, it was found that Size, Domestic interest rate, GDP per 
capita and Muslim shares are significant at 1% significance level. Also, Returnon 
equity and GDP per capita growth are significant at 5% significance level. Assets 
growth were found to be significant at 10% significance level. 
As for the regression results in Conventional banks (see appendix), The R squared 
is certainly significant (.734) which means that about 74% of changes in risk levels 
variable can be explained by the regression. Also in model 2, there was a significant 
effect of the independent variables on risk, (F = 267.690, p < .005). 
Independent variables like Capital assets ratio, Return on equity, Liquid Assets, 
Domestic interest rate, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, Assets growth and 
Market concentration were found to be affecting the dependent variable of risk in an 
opposite manner. Therefore, the study found that the dependent variable increases 
when the values of these independent variables decrease and vice versa. On the 
other hand, the study found Net income, Size, Muslim shares and Loan growth to be 
affecting the dependent variable of risk in a positive manner. The dependent variable 
increases when the values of these independent variable increase and vice versa.  





(Constant) -12.913 .000 
CAR -1.313 .189 
Return on Equity ROE -3.427 .001 
Net Income .487 .626 
Size 33.966 .000 








Muslim Share 6.032 .000 
LGrowth 1.128 .260 
Agrowth -2.239 .025 
HHI -1.267 .206 
 
On a relative scale, the value of beta (β) explains the contribution of independent 
variable within dependent variable. See table below. 























Table 13. Credit (LLR) Risk. Conventional Only 
Most Significant Least Significant 
Size Agrowth 
Domestic Interest Rate % 
  
GDP PerCapita   
Muslim Share   
 
Only Size of the firm, Domestic Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita and Muslim Share are 
the statistically significant predictor variables that cannot be left out from the multiple 
regressions under any circumstances.  
In conclusion of equation 1 and 2, the study identifies the variables with most 
influence on Risk in Islamic banks which are Capital Assets Ratio, Size, Liquid 
Assets, GDP Per Capita and GDP Per Capita Growth were the most influential 
factors on Risk in Islamic banks. 
On the other hand, variables like Return on Equity, Size of the firm, Domestic 
Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Capita Growth, Muslim Share and Assets 
Growth were the least influential factors on Risk levels in Conventional banks. 
4.4. Risk presented by Non-Performing Loans 
4.4.1. Islamic Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks as shown below. 









NPL 261 -3 8 4.84 1.607 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
261     
 
As for correlations, Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results 
are as shown in the table. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in order to 
find any multiCollinearity (Tollerance and VIF). 
Table 15. Collinearity Tests for Credit Risk (NPL). Islamic Banks 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
CAR .372 2.692 
Return on Equity 
ROE 
.837 1.195 
Net Income .441 2.266 
Size .340 2.944 








Muslim Share .698 1.433 
LGrowth .324 3.084 
Agrowth .305 3.282 
HHI .580 1.725 
 
As the standard benchmark figures were mainly above 0.2 for tolerance and below 7 
for VIF, then the study found that no serious multiCollinearity was found among the 
dependent variables in Islamic banks (see appendix). 
In Islamic banks, it was found that Size is significant at 1% significance level. Also, 
Capital assets ratio, GDP per capita and Market concentration are significant at 5% 
significance level. Liquid assets and Muslim shares were found to be significant at 
10% significance level. 
As for the regression results in Islamic banks (see appendix), The R squared is 
certainly significant (.555) which means that about 56% of changes in risk levels 
variable can be explained by the regression. Also in model 3, there was a significant 
effect of the independent variables on risk, (F = 21.719, p < .005). 
Independent variables like Capital assets ratio, Return on equity, Net income, GDP 
per capita, Muslim shares, Loan growth and Assets growth were found to be 
affecting the dependent variable of risk in an opposite manner. The study found that 
the dependent variable increases when the values of these independent variables 
decrease and vice versa. On the other hand, the study found Size, Liquid assets, 
Domestic interest rate, GDP per capita and Market concentration to be affecting the 
dependent variable of risk in a positive manner. The dependent variable increases 
when the values of these independent variable increase and vice versa.  
 





(Constant) -2.474 .014 
CAR -3.513 .001 
Return on Equity ROE -.339 .735 
Net Income -.586 .558 
Size 7.608 .000 
LAD 1.698 .091 
Domestic Interest Rate % .610 .543 
GDP PerCapita -3.471 .001 
GDP PerCapita Growth % .520 .604 
Muslim Share -1.687 .093 
LGrowth -.177 .859 
Agrowth -.204 .839 
HHI 3.349 .001 
 
On a relative scale, the value of beta (β) explains the contribution of independent 
variable within dependent variable. See table below. 






















Table 18. Credit (NPL) Risk. Islamic Only 
Most Significant Least Significant 
Size LAD 
  Muslim Share 
 
Only Size of the firm is the statistically significant predictor variable that cannot be 
left out from the multiple regressions under any circumstances. 
4.4.2. Conventional Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for conventional banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of conventional banks as shown below. 









NPL 1168 -4 9 4.68 1.821 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
1168     
 
As for correlations, Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results 
are as shown in the table below. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in 
order to find any multiCollinearity (Tollerance and VIF). 
Table 20. Collinearity Tests for Credit Risk (NPL). Conventional Banks 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
CAR .721 1.387 
Return on Equity ROE 
.936 1.069 
Net Income .405 2.470 
Size .344 2.905 
LAD .994 1.006 
Domestic Interest Rate % 
.629 1.590 
GDP PerCapita .703 1.422 
GDP PerCapita Growth % 
.776 1.288 
Muslim Share .677 1.476 
LGrowth .306 3.268 
Agrowth .299 3.344 
HHI .738 1.354 
 
When can say that as the standard benchmark figures were mainly above 0.2 for 
tolerance and below 7 for VIF, then the study found that no serious multiCollinearity 
was found among the dependent variables in Islamic banks (see appendix). 
In Conventional banks, it was found that Size, Domestic interest rate, GDP per 
capita and Muslim shares are significant at 1% significance level. Also, Return on 
equity and GDP per capita growth are significant at 5% significance level. Assets 
growth was found to be significant at 10% significance level. 
As for the regression results in Conventional banks (see appendix), The R squared 
is certainly significant (.637) which means that about 64% of changes in risk levels 
variable can be explained by the regression. Also in model 4, there was a significant 
effect of the independent variables on risk, (F = 147.503, p < .005). 
Independent variables like Capital assets ratio, Return on equity, Domestic interest 
rate, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, Assets growth and Market 
concentration were found to be affecting the dependent variable of risk in an 
opposite manner. The study found that the dependent variable increases when the 
values of these independent variables decrease and vice versa. On the other hand, 
Net income, Size, Liquid assets, Muslim shares and Loan growth to be affecting the 
dependent variable of risk in a positive manner. The dependent variable increases 
when the values of these independent variables increase and vice versa.  





(Constant) -7.373 .000 
CAR -.821 .412 
Return on Equity 
ROE 
-2.824 .005 
Net Income .482 .630 
Size 24.833 .000 








Muslim Share 4.344 .000 
Lgrowth .731 .465 
Agrowth -1.979 .048 
HHI -1.258 .209 
 
On a relative scale the value of beta (β) explains the contribution of independent 
variable within dependent variable. See table below 
 




Return on Equity ROE 
-.261 
Net Income 5.5E-05 
Size .858 
LAD 3.4E-05 













Table 23. Credit (NPL) Risk. Conventional Only 
Most Significant Least Significant 
Size Agrowth 
Domestic Interest Rate % 
  
GDP PerCapita   
Muslim Share   
 
Only Size of the firm, Domestic Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita and Muslim Share are 
the statistically significant predictor variables that cannot be left out from the multiple 
regressions under any circumstances.  
In conclusion of equations 3 and 4, the study identifies the variables with most 
influence on Risk in Islamic banks which are Capital Assets Ratio, Size of the firm, 
Liquid Assets, GDP Per Capita, Muslim Share and HHI were the most influential 
factors on Risk in Islamic banks. 
On the other hand, variables like Return on Equity, Size of the firm, Domestic 
Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Capita Growth, Muslim Share and Assets 
Growth were the least influential factors on Risk levels in Conventional banks. 
4.5. Risk presented by Z score 
4.5.1. Islamic Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks as shown below. 









Z Score 499 -3 14 1.73 1.745 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
499     
 
As for correlations, Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results 
are as shown in the table below. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in 
order to find any multiCollinearity (Tollerance and VIF).  
Table 25. Collinearity Tests for Insolvency Risk. Islamic Banks 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
CAR .293 3.410 
Return on Equity 
ROE 
.715 1.400 
Net Income .432 2.313 
Size .339 2.954 








Muslim Share .623 1.606 
LGrowth .300 3.335 
Agrowth .283 3.539 
HHI .620 1.612 
 
As the standard benchmark figures were mainly above 0.2 for tolerance and below 7 
for VIF, then the study found that no serious multiCollinearity was found among the 
dependent variables in Islamic banks (see appendix). 
In Islamic banks, it was found that Return on equity are significant at 1% significance 
level. Also, Muslim shares are significant at 5% significance level. Market 
concentration are significant at 10% significance level. 
As for the regression results in Islamic banks (see appendix), The R squared is 
certainly significant (.290) which means that about 30% of changes in risk levels 
variable can be explained by the regression. Also in model 5, there was a significant 
effect of the independent variables on risk, (F = 8.831, p < .005). 
Independent variable like Capital assets ratio, Loan growth, Assets growth and 
Market concentration were found to be affecting the dependent variable of risk in an 
opposite manner. The study found that the dependent variable increases when the 
values of these independent variables decrease and vice versa. On the other hand, 
the study found Return on equity, Net income, Size, Liquid assets, Domestic interest 
rate, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth and Muslim shares to be affecting the 
dependent variable of risk in a positive manner. The dependent variable increases 
when the values of these independent variable increase and vice versa.  





(Constant) -.760 .448 
CAR -1.341 .181 
Return on Equity 
ROE 
4.931 .000 
Net Income 1.286 .200 
Size 1.336 .183 








Muslim Share 2.898 .004 
LGrowth -.018 .986 
Agrowth -.356 .722 
HHI -2.297 .023 
 
On a relative scale the value of beta (β) explains the contribution of independent 
variable within dependent variable. See table below. 























Table 28. Insolvency Risk. Islamic Only 
Most Significant Least Significant 
Return on Equity ROE HHI 
 
Only Return on Equity is the statistically significant predictor variable that cannot be 
left out from the multiple regressions under any circumstances. 
4.5.2. Conventional Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for conventional banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of conventional banks as shown below. 
 









Z Score 1419 -4 17 2.38 2.393 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
1419     
 
As for correlations, Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results 
are as shown in the table below. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in 
order to find any multiCollinearity (Tollerance and VIF) 
 
Table 30. Collinearity Tests for Insolvency Risk. Conventional Banks 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
CAR .682 1.466 
Return on Equity ROE .937 1.067 
Net Income .422 2.372 
Size .340 2.941 
LAD .995 1.005 
Domestic Interest Rate % 
.617 1.621 
GDP PerCapita .690 1.449 
GDP PerCapita Growth % 
.771 1.298 
Muslim Share .640 1.562 
LGrowth .296 3.376 
Agrowth .290 3.449 
HHI .742 1.347 
 
When can say that as the standard benchmark figures were mainly above 0.2 for 
tolerance and below 7 for VIF, then the study found that no serious multiCollinearity 
was found among the dependent variables in Islamic banks (see appendix). 
In Conventional banks, it was found that Return on equity, Net income and GDP per 
capita are significant at 1% significance level. Also, Muslim shares are significant at 
5% significance level. Capital assets ratio, Size and GDP per capita growth were 
found to be significant at 10% significance level. 
As for the regression results in Conventional banks (see appendix), The R squared 
is significant at (.195) which means that about 20% of changes in risk levels variable 
can be explained by the regression. Also in model 6, there was a significant effect of 
the independent variables on risk, (F = 22.080, p < .005). 
Independent variables like Capita assets ratio, Liquid assets and Loan growth were 
found to be affecting the dependent variable of risk in an opposite manner. The study 
found that the dependent variable increases when the values of these independent 
variables decrease and vice versa. On the other hand, the study found Return on 
equity, Net income, Size, Domestic interest rate, GDP per capita, GDP per capita 
growth, Muslim shares, Assets growth and Market concentration to be affecting the 
dependent variable of risk in a positive manner. The dependent variable increases 
when the values of these independent variable increase and vice versa.  





(Constant) .818 .413 
CAR -1.837 .066 
Return on Equity ROE 4.610 .000 
Net Income 5.145 .000 
Size 1.851 .064 








Muslim Share 2.703 .007 
LGrowth -.817 .414 
Agrowth .434 .664 
HHI .817 .414 
 
On a relative scale the value of beta (β) explains the contribution of independent 
variable within dependent variable. See table below. 
 





Return on Equity ROE 
.888 
Net Income .001 
Size .120 
LAD -.001 














Table 33. Insolvency Risk. Conventional Only 
Most Significant Least Significant 
Return on Equity ROE CAR 
Net Income Size 
GDP PerCapita GDP PerCapita 
Growth % 
 
Only Return on Equity, Net Income and GDP Per Capita are the statistically 
significant predictor variables that cannot be left out from the multiple regressions 
under any circumstances.  
In conclusion of equations 5 and 6, the study identifies the variables with most 
influence on Risk in Islamic banks which are Return on Equity, Muslim Share and 
HHI were the most influential factors on Risk in Islamic banks. 
On the other hand, variables like Capital Assets Ratio, Return on Equity, Net 
Income, Size of the firm, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Capita Growth and Muslim 
Share were the least influential factors on Risk levels in Conventional banks. 
In conclusion of equations 1 – 6 and after using three different proxies to measure 
risk levels. The study can now answer the first research question “What are the 
variables that affect risk”.  
Credit risk in Islamic banks is positively affected by Size of the firm, Liquid Assets, 
HHI. While Credit risk in Islamic banks is negatively affected by Capital Assets Ratio, 
GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Capita Growth and Muslim Share. 
On the other hand, Credit risk in Conventional Banks is positively affected by Size of 
the firm, Muslim Share and Assets Growth. While Credit risk in conventional banks is 
negatively affected by Return on Equity, Domestic Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita 
and GDP Per Capita Growth. 
Insolvency risk in Islamic banks is affected by Return on Equity, Muslim Share and 
HHI with a positive impact only.  
Insolvency risk in conventional banks is positively affected by Return on Equity, Net 
Income, Size of the firm, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Capita Growth and Muslim 
Share. While; Capital Assets Ratio was the only significant variable with a negative 
effect on insolvency risk in conventional banks. 
4.6. Efficiency 
4.6.1. Descriptive 
When compared the efficiency scores in Islamic and conventional banks, the study 
found as shown in tables 32 and 33 that the mean for Islamic banks was similar to 
the mean in conventional banks. With almost no difference, the study found that 
Islamic banks in the MENA area for the period of 2006 to 2015 were as efficient as 
conventional banks. These findings answer the second part of our first research 
question. 
Table 34, Descriptive Results. Islamic Only 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Effeciency 
Scores 
650 .0000000 1.00000 .56 .741 
      
 
Table 35. Descriptive Results. Conventional Only 
Descriptive Statistics 





1900 .0000000 1.00000 .5693 .38340248 




4.7. Efficiency presented by DEA scores 
4.7.1. Islamic Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks as shown below. 
 
 











650 .00 1.00 .5619 .41027 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
650     
As for correlations, Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results 
are as shown in the table below. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in 
order to find any multiCollinearity (Tollerance and VIF). 
 
Table 37. Collinearity Tests for Efficiency. Islamic Banks 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
ROA .733 1.363 
Size .472 2.120 








Muslim Share .648 1.544 
HHI .542 1.846 
LoanIntensity .783 1.277 
CRNPL .765 1.307 
NIE .643 1.554 
Z Score .690 1.449 
 
As the standard benchmark figures were mainly above 0.2 for tolerance and below 7 
for VIF, then the study found that no serious multiCollinearity was found among the 
dependent variables in Islamic banks (see appendix). 
In Islamic banks, it was found that Market concentration is significant at 5% 
significance level. Domestic interest rate, GDP per capita growth, Muslim shares, 
Non-performing and Z scores were found to be significant at 10% significance level. 
As for the regression results in Islamic banks (see appendix), The R squared is 
significant at (.129) which means that about 13% of changes in risk levels variable 
can be explained by the regression. Also in model 7, there was a significant effect of 
the independent variables on risk, (F = 3.360, p < .005). 
Independent variables like Size, Liquid assets, GDP per capita, Muslim shares and 
NIE were found to be affecting the dependent variable of risk in an opposite manner. 
The study found that the dependent variable increases when the values of these 
independent variables decrease and vice versa. On the other hand, the study found 
Return on assets, Domestic interest rate, GDP per capita growth, Market 
concentration, Loan intensity, non-performing loans and Z scores to be affecting the 
dependent variable of risk in a positive manner. The dependent variable increases 
when the values of these. 
 





(Constant) 16.663 .000 
ROA .557 .578 
Size -.776 .439 








Muslim Share -2.198 .029 
HHI 3.067 .002 
LoanIntensity .959 .339 
CRNPL 2.150 .033 
NIE -1.560 .121 
Z Score 2.115 .036 
 
On a relative scale the value of beta (β) explains the contribution of independent 
variable within dependent variable. See table below. 



















Z Score .006 
 
Table 40. Efficiency. Islamic Only 
Most Significant Least Significant 





  CRNPL 
  Z Score 
 
Only HHI is the statistically significant predictor variable that cannot be left out from 
the multiple regressions under any circumstances. 
4.7.2. Conventional Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for conventional banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of conventional banks as shown below. 
Table 41. Efficiency Scores a proxy for Efficiency. Conventional Only 
Descriptive Statistics 
















1900     
 
As for correlations, Pearson correlation coefficient test has been applied and results 
are as shown in the table below. Two tests have been used as diagnostic tests in 
order to find any multiCollinearity (Tollerance and VIF).  
Table 42. Collinearity Tests for Efficiency. Conventional Banks 
  Collinearity Statistics 
 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)     
ROA .919 1.089 
Size .699 1.431 
LAD .993 1.007 
Domestic Interest Rate % 
.563 1.776 
GDP PerCapita .691 1.448 
GDP PerCapita Growth % 
.777 1.287 
Muslim Share .659 1.518 
HHI .764 1.309 
LoanIntensity .808 1.238 
CRNPL .886 1.128 
NIE .940 1.064 
Z Score .842 1.187 
 
When can say that as the standard benchmark figures were mainly above 0.2 for 
tolerance and below 7 for VIF, then the study found that no serious multiCollinearity 
was found among the dependent variables in Conventional banks (see appendix). 
In Conventional banks, it was found that Size and Loan intensity are significant at 
1% significance level. Also, Market concentration and Non-performing loans are 
significant at 5% significance level. Domestic interest rate, Muslim shares and Z 
scores are significant at 10% significance level. 
As for the regression results in Conventional banks (see appendix), The R squared 
is significant at (.328) which means that about 33% of changes in risk levels variable 
can be explained by the regression. Also in model 8, there was a significant effect of 
the independent variables on risk, (F = 36.427, p < .005). 
Independent variables like Liquid assets, Domestic interest rate and Loan intensity 
were found to be affecting the dependent variable of risk in an opposite manner. The 
study found that the dependent variable increases when the values of these 
independent variables decrease and vice versa. On the other hand, the study found 
Return on assets, Size, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth, Muslim shares, 
Market concentration, non-performing loans, NIE and Z scores to be affecting the 
dependent variable of risk in a positive manner. The dependent variable increases 
when the values of these independent variable increase and vice versa.  





(Constant) 61.358 0.000 
ROA 1.391 .164 
Size 13.165 .000 
LAD -.957 .339 
Domestic Interest Rate % 
-1.797 .073 
GDP PerCapita .412 .681 
GDP PerCapita Growth % 
1.135 .257 
Muslim Share 2.508 .012 
HHI 3.113 .002 
LoanIntensity -7.434 .000 
CRNPL 3.430 .001 
NIE .962 .336 
Z Score 2.278 .023 
On a relative scale the value of beta (β) explains the contribution of independent 
variable within dependent variable. See table below. 



















Z Score .002 
 
 
Table 45. Efficiency. Conventional Only 
Most Significant Least Significant 
Size Domestic Interest 
Rate % 
LoanIntensity Muslim Share 
  Z Score 
 
Only Size of the firm and Loan Intensity are the statistically significant predictor 
variables that cannot be left out from the multiple regressions under any 
circumstances.  
The study identifies the variables with most influence on efficiency in Islamic banks 
which include; Domestic Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita, Muslim Share, HHI, Non-
performing Loans and Z Score. 
On the other hand, variables like Size of the firm, Domestic Rate, Muslim Share, 
HHI, Loan Intensity, Non-performing Loans and Z Scores were the most influential 
factors on efficiency levels in Conventional banks. 
In conclusion of equations 7 and 8 and after running the models to determine the 
effect on efficiency levels, the study can now answer the second research question 
“What are the variables that affect efficiency”.  
In Islamic banks; Domestic Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita, HHI, Non-performing 
Loans and Z Score were found to have a positive effect on efficiency. While; Muslim 
Share was found to be negatively impacting efficiency. 
In conventional banks; Size of the firm, Muslim Share, HHI, Non-performing Loans 
and Z Score had a positive impact on efficiency. While; Domestic Interest Rate and 
Loan Intensity were found to have a negative impact on efficiency 
4.8. Financial Crisis Impact 
4.8.1. Risk 
4.8.1.1. 4.8.1.1 Islamic Banks Before or During 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks before or during the financial crisis 
as shown in the table below. 









LLR 167 -2 8 3.57 2.124 
NPL 92 -3 8 4.69 1.747 
Z Score 214 -2 7 1.83 1.690 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
77     
4.8.1.2. Islamic Banks After 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks after the financial crisis as shown in 
the table below. 









LLR 248 -3 8 3.71 2.170 
NPL 169 1 8 4.91 1.526 
Z Score 282 -3 14 1.68 1.787 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
141     
 
4.8.1.3. Conventional Banks Before or During 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for conventional banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of conventional banks before or during the financial 
crisis as shown in the table below. 
 









LLR 654 -4 9 4.29 1.936 
NPL 495 -4 9 4.55 1.768 
Z Score 652 -4 17 2.61 2.408 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
431     
4.8.1.4. Conventional Banks After 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for conventional banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of conventional banks after the financial crisis as 
shown in the table below. 









LLR1 771 -3 9 4.49 1.974 
NPL 673 -3 9 4.77 1.854 
Z Score 756 -3 16 2.21 2.366 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
549     
 
4.8.2. Efficiency  
4.8.1.2. Islamic Banks Before or During 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks before or during the financial crisis 
as shown in the table below. 








Scores 330 .00 1.0000 
     






330     
4.8.1.3. Islamic Banks After 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks after the financial crisis as shown in 



















325     
4.8.1.4. Conventional Banks Before or During 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for conventional banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of conventional banks before or during the financial 
crisis as shown in the table below. 
 
 
Table 52. Efficiency Before or During Financial Crisis. Conventional only 
Descriptive Statistics 










955     
4.8.1.5. Conventional Banks After 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for conventional banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of conventional banks after or during the financial 
crisis as shown in the table below. 
 














950     
 
 
4.9. Geographic Distribution 
The sample is divided into two parts. The first part “GCC” which includes Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and United Arab Emirates. The second part “MENA” 
which includes Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Jordan and Sudan. 
4.9.1. GCC, Islamic Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks before or during the financial crisis 
as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 54. Descriptive Analysis. GCC, Islamic Only 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LLR1 223 -2 8 4.56 1.907 
LnNPL 196 -3 8 4.91 1.747 
Z Score 286 -3 14 1.45 1.822 
Effeciency Scores 350 .00 8.17 .6271 .93857 
Valid N (listwise) 175     
 
 
4.9.2. GCC, Conventional Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks before or during the financial crisis 
as shown in the table below. 
 
 
Table 55. Descriptive Analysis. GCC, Conventional Only 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LLR1 475 -2 9 4.96 1.883 
LnNPL 461 -2 9 4.97 1.765 
Z Score 561 -3 17 2.45 2.693 
Effeciency Scores 650 .00000000000 1.0000000000 .62095816000 .37991041700 
Valid N (listwise) 419     
 
 
4.9.3. Mena, Islamic Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks before or during the financial crisis 
as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 56. Descriptive Analysis. MENA, Islamic Only 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LLR1 192 -3 6 2.60 1.933 
LnNPL 65 1 7 4.61 1.062 
Z Score 213 -2 12 2.12 1.561 
Effeciency Scores 300 .00 1.00 .4858 .39195 
Valid N (listwise) 44     
 
 
4.9.4. Mena, Conventional Banks 
For the descriptive analysis; the table below displays descriptive statistics of the 
instructive variables for Islamic banks. Mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum. These are the values of Islamic banks before or during the financial crisis 
as shown in the table below. 
 
Table 57. Descriptive Analysis. MENA, Conventional Only 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LLR1 947 -4 8 4.13 1.944 
LnNPL 708 -4 8 4.49 1.833 
Z Score 859 -4 15 2.33 2.174 
Effeciency Scores 1252 .00000000000 1.0000000000 .54249299700 .38283734900 




This chapter has provided in details all the model results starting with descriptive 
analysis, collinearity tests, regression results and potential financial aspects with 
possible effects on credit risk, insolvency risk and Efficiency in both Islamic and 
conventional banks. 
The results in this chapter can provide answers to the study’s hypothesis, the study 
has found that hypothesis are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Islamic banks face greater credit risk when contrasted with 
conventional banking systems is rejected. 
Hypothesis 2: Islamic banks demonstrate greater stability when compared with 
conventional banking systems is rejected. 
Hypothesis 3: Islamic banks demonstrate lower or same efficiency levels when 
compared with conventional banks is approved. 
Hypothesis 4: Efficiency levels of Islamic banks experienced more increase than 
conventional banks after the global financial crisis when compared to conventional 





















This chapter discusses the models results as follows; first, discusses the impact of 
potential variable affecting risk. Second, debates the influence of possible variable 
affecting efficiency. Third, discusses the impact of the global financial crisis on risk 
and efficiency. 
5.2. Risk 
Size of the firm along with Muslim shares were found to be significant aspects in risk 
models. The study found that size of the firm always affects the level of risk in a 
positive way, as risk arises along with a rise in firm size. The study also found that 
there was no difference between Islamic and conventional banks. Jensen (1986) 
argues that Managers seem to maximise their own levels of implicit and explicit 
compensation to the detriment of shareholders, especially when they are risk-averse. 
Owing to the fact that both power and managerial compensation are commonly 
associated with the growth of organisations and with larger business size, there may 
be the tendency amongst management to maximise business growth beyond 
efficient size. These findings are fully consistent with literature like Hughes, Mester, 
and Moon (2001), who claimed that Large banks could benefit from both scale 
economies and diversification. (Kane, 2010) also reports that, larger banks might be 
riskier, since they may try and exploit Too-Big-To-Fail safety net subsidies. 
Banks’ size played an important role on the level of risk. Larger banks showed higher 
levels of risk and this could be a result of less control level. Muslim share was also 
an important aspect as countries with high Muslim shares experienced a higher level 
of risk. The positive association of Muslim share with risk means that banks 
performing in such countries whether Islamic or conventional, experience a risk of 
religious causes as higher share of Muslim would require higher Sharī‘ah’ 
compliance whether through Islamic banks or conventional banks with Islamic 
window. 
Liquid Assets results were found to be also affecting risk levels in a positive manner 
in both Islamic and conventional banks. This can be explained by (Kwan & 
Eisenbeis, 1995) who argue that it is also highlighted by theory that, between risk-
related premiums in the control of moral hazard behaviour and those capital 
standards aimed at risk-taking limitation, there is an isomorphism. Upon 
understanding of the correspondence between bank capital requirements and risk-
based premiums, there was an ever-growing concern expressed to suggest that 
institutions might be encouraged to take on a greater degree of risk in order to offset 
higher capital requirements because of increases in regulatory capital requirements; 
unquestionably, institutions should be operating in a safer, sounder manner. 
Liquid assets in banks increased the level of risk. No difference was found between 
Islamic and conventional banks. This shows that banks intend to take on greater 
risks in order to offset higher capital requirements as a result of increase in 
regulatory capital requirements. The similar results between Islamic and 
conventional are expected, simply because liquid assets under Sharī‘ah’ compliance 
regulations require the same basic banking regulations. Therefore, no different 
outcomes are expected 
Environmental factors like GDP Per Capita were observed to have a negative impact 
on Risk. This of course is consistent with previous studies and literature as reported 
by Richard et al. (2008), who argues that Banks’ credit risk can be influenced by the 
environmental factors in which banks perform. The same negative impact was found 
on conventional banks. 
Risk was also affected by GDP Per Capita, as banks’ credit risk showed higher 
levels with low GDP Per Capita. These findings are expected, simply because 
previous studies have reported that banks credit risk is influenced by such 
enviourmental factors. Also, and as expected that no difference was found in terms 
of Islamic banking simply because GDP Per Capita do not involve changes based on 
Sharī‘ah’ compliance. 
Other environmental factors like domestic interest rates were investigated and the 
study found that the credit risk of Islamic banks was not significantly sensitive to 
domestic interest rates. These results are consistent with (Abedifar, Molyneux and 
Tarazi, 2013) who found that there was no significant relationship between credit risk 
and domestic interest rate in Islamic banks. However, a negative impact of domestic 
interest rates was found in conventional banks. This is also consistent with same 
study of (Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi, 2013) as they found an impact of domestic 
interest rate on credit risk. However, the impact level is different in our study. 
On the other hand, other enviourmental factors like domestic interest rates have 
influenced risk in conventional banks. This is expected as Sharī‘ah’ compliance does 
not approve interest-based loans. Moreover, Islamic banks are unlikely to be 
impacted simply because they do not deal with interest-based loans. Conventional 
banks on the other hand are affected by domestic interest rate because such a factor 
affects their interest-based products. The findings show that risk levels in 
conventional banks were higher with lower domestic interest rate. 
The results show that capital assets ratio was found to have a negative relationship 
with Risk in both Islamic and conventional banks. However, since Diamond 1984 
argues that an increase in equity can lower moral hazard problems and increase the 
monitoring incentives of banks (Diamond, 1984). Also higher equity can increase 
banks’ risk-taking capacity. The study found that the results are not consistent with 
previous literature.  
Capital assets ratio affected both Islamic and conventional banks in the same 
manner. Although previous studies argue that risk is low with higher capital assets, 
the results were not as expected based on previous studies. The regional differences 
might have been the cause behind it. 
There also appears to be a positive relationship between liquidity and risk as banks 
with higher liquidity levels have higher reserve levels. This suggests that banks with 
higher liquidity levels take on more risks which confirm to the Basel guidelines 
whereby banks are encourage being more liquid to cover the risks being taken. 
These results are consistent with Alam 2012. 
The study found that liquidity was associated with risk. This was expected, as banks 
tend to have high liquidity along with higher risk they take. Banks need to have high 
liquidity to cover their risk. No difference was found among Islamic and conventional 
banks. No Sharī‘ah’ compliance regulations for liquidity by itself and therefore; the 
same outcome among Islamic and conventional banking is expected. 
Return on equity was found affecting risk in a positive way in Islamic banks and a 
negative way in Conventional banks. However, interesting results were found when 
considering insolvency risk with z score a measure. The results were opposite in 
conventional banks as return on equity were affecting risk in a positive manner. This 
can be explained, as insolvency risk is different from credit risk. This gives us the 
answer for the second research question. 
The study found contradicting results among Islamic and conventional banks in 
terms of return on equity. The Sharī‘ah’ compliance regulations are expected to be 
the cause behind such contradiction. 
5.3. Efficiency 
The variable NPL captures the level of credit risk and the expected relationship with 
EFF is negative since more efficient banks have a better quality portfolio (Kwan and 
Eisenbeis, 1995; Resti, 1997; Bar et al., 2002). However, the empirical literature 
finds mixed evidence, Altunbas et al. (2000) suggests that efficiency is not very 
sensitive to credit risk whilst Hughes and Mester (1993) and Delis and Papanikolaou 
(2009) find an inverse relationship between credit risk and bank efficiency. The study 
found NPL to have a positive relationship with efficiency with a significance level in 
both Islamic and conventional. Although our results contradict with (Kwan and 
Eisenbeis, 1995; Resti, 1997; Bar et al., 2002), the results are consistent with others 
like Altunbas et al. (2000). In addition, the results also support the hypothesis of bad 
management proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997), which suggests that poor 
management in the banking institutions results in bad quality loans, and therefore, 
escalates the level of non-performing loans 
The (LOATA) Loan intensity variable reflects the lending intensity of the banking 
sector and a positive relationship with EFF is expected since loans are the main 
source of bank profits; however, the quality of the loans may deteriorate under some 
circumstances, for example during an economic recession, in which case a higher 
degree of loan intensity may be detrimental to bank efficiency which was the case in 
our results as loan intensity was found negative and significant in conventional 
banks. However, in Islamic banks the study found the normal scenario with a positive 
relationship to efficiency but not as significant.  
Size had a positive relationship to efficiency in conventional banks. This is consistent 
with previous literature as Hauner (2005) explains that larger banks could pay less 
for their inputs than their counterparts and that there could be increasing returns to 
scale through the allocation of fixed costs. Islamic banks on the other hand had a 
negative relationship but with no significant level to efficiency. Although this not 
consistent previous literature, it can be explained by the fact that Islamic banks still 
have a small portion of the banking sector even in Muslim countries. This small 
portion in the market can eliminate size differences among all Islamic banks. This is 
consistent with Isik & Hassan (2002) and Kaparakis et al (1994) who showed that 
average cost and profit efficiency decrease with increasing bank size. One plausible 
reason for this is that overhead costs for small bank are relatively low because they 
often operate few branches, so may possess operational advantage, which 
contributes to higher efficiency (Isik & Hassan, 2002). 
The Z score, which represents insolvency risk, was found to have a significant and 
positive impact on efficiency in both Islamic and conventional banks. If we also 
consider NPL in order to observe the impact of risk as a whole on efficiency, the 
study found that our results are consistent with Altuncar who found that Inefficient 
European banks appear to take on less risk.  
In terms of environmental factors, GDP Per Capita growth was found to be a 
significant aspect in Islamic banks only with a positive relationship to efficiency in 
Islamic and conventional banks.  This suggests that an increase in the economic 
activity increases the demand for financial services, improving bank efficiency (Daley 
and Mathews, 2009; Delis and Papanikolaou, 2009). The results are similar to those 
found by (Garza-Garcia, 2010). 
Market concentration (HHI) was found to be significant in both Islamic and 
conventional banks with a positive relationship. Some authors believe there is a 
negative relationship between CONC and EFF since in highly concentrated markets 
risk aversion may prevail (Sathye, 2001). In addition, Naceur et al. (2009) suggest 
that greater market concentration might reduce competition and thus efficiency. 
However, if economies of scale drive bank M&As, then increased concentration may 
lead to efficiency improvements (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2000; Casu and 
Girardone, 2009). Because of the mix results reported by different scholars, the 
study found that the results are normal. The results are also consistent with (Garza-
Garcia, 2010). 
Muslim share was found to be affecting efficiency in both Islamic and conventional 
banks. However, the results vary. As Muslim share had a negative relationship with 
efficiency in Islamic banks and a positive relationship with efficiency in conventional 
banks.  
Domestic interest rate was found to be significantly affecting efficiency in different 
manners. In Islamic banks, domestic interest rate had a positive relationship with 
efficiency. On the other hand, it had a negative relationship with efficiency in 
conventional banks. The results in conventional banks are consistent with Indonesia. 
This gives us the answer for the second part of our second research question 
5.4. Financial Crisis 
5.4.1. Islamic 
Table 58. Descriptive Results. Islamic Only 
Variable Average Before Average After 
LLR 3.568862275 3.71 
NPL 4.69112013 4.91 
Z Score 1.828953771 1.68 
EFF_Sco .43 .69 
 
In Islamic banks, credit risk was elevated but with a very low portion as shown in the 
table above loan loss reserves and non-performing loans had a slight rise. 
Insolvency risk on the other hand had a similar result as a little increase in Z score 
was observed. 
Efficiency had a different result. As banking efficiency in Islamic banks was found to 





Table 59. Descriptive Results. Islamic Only 
Variable Average Before Average After 
LLR 4.29 4.49 
NPL 4.55 4.77 
Z Score 2.61 2.21 
EFF_Sco .4956 .6434 
 
In conventional banks, similar results were observed as credit risk was elevated but 
with a very low portion as shown in the table above loan loss reserves and non-
performing loans had a slight rise. Insolvency risk on the other hand had a similar 
result as a little increase in Z score was found. 
Efficiency in conventional banks and similarly to Islamic banks were different 
compared to risk. As banking efficiency in conventional banks was found to be better 
after the financial crisis with an increase of about 15% which is about 6% less than 
efficiency improvement in Islamic banks. 
The study found that risk was negatively affected by the global financial crisis. The 
study also found that Islamic and conventional banks had no difference. In terms of 
banking efficiency, both Islamic and conventional banks showed a positive sign. As 
efficiency levels were elevated after the financial crisis. The only difference the study 
also found between Islamic and conventional banks is the level of increase, as 
Islamic banks had a higher level of increase by 6%. These findings provide an 
answer to the third research question. 
5.5. Summary 
This thesis examines the level of risk and efficiency, the determinants of risk and 
efficiency, and also examines the level of impact of the global financial crisis on risk 
and efficiency. 
The findings show that credit risk levels were similar in both Islamic and conventional 
banks. Banks experience the same level of credit risk and the Sharī‘ah’ compliance 
regulations had no effect on the level of credit risk in Islamic banks. 
This study has examined the potential financial aspects that affect risk and efficiency 
in all banks in ten countries in the MENA area and attempted to ascertain whether 
the level of impact is different from Islamic to conventional banking systems. Also, 
this study examined whether risk and efficiency in both Islamic and Conventional 
banks were affected by the global financial crisis and try to observe the level of 
impact. This study examined risk and efficiency over ten years to investigate present 
level and initiate trends in banking risk and efficiency. 
In banking risk and after comparing the means of Islamic and conventional banks, 
with a little higher score for Islamic banks in terms of loan loss reserve and a little 
higher score in conventional banks in terms of non-performing loans, the study found 
that no serious difference between Islamic and conventional banks was found. As 
Credit risk in Islamic banks had a mean of 3.65 in loan loss reserve and a mean of 
4.84 in non-performing loans. While in conventional banks as shown in table 2, loan 
loss reserves scored a mean of 4.40 and 4.68 for non-performing loans. 
Furthermore, Islamic and conventional banks experience the same level of credit 
risk.  
Insolvency risk on the other hand was found to be different. As the study found a 
better mean score in conventional banks with a mean of 1.73 in Islamic and 2.38 in 
Conventional banks. Furthermore, conventional banks in MENA countries for the 
period of 2006 to 2015 were more stable than Islamic banks in the same area and 
during the same period.  
In terms of the impact of financial aspects on credit risk. It was found that variables 
like Capital Assets Ratio, Size of the firm, Liquid Assets, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per 
Capita Growth, Muslim Share and HHI had the biggest impact on credit risk in 
Islamic banks while other variables like Return on Equity, Net Income, Domestic 
Interest Rate, Muslim Share, Loan Growth, Assets Growth, HHI and GDP Per Capita 
Growth were found to have the smallest impact on credit risk in Islamic banks. 
In conventional banks, variables like Return on Equity, Size of the firm, Domestic 
Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Capita Growth, Muslim Share and Assets 
Growth were found to be the most impacting credit risk in conventional banks. Other 
variables like Capital Assets Ratio, Net Income, Liquid Assets, Loan Growth and HHI 
had the least effect on credit risk in conventional banks. 
In terms of the impact of financial aspects on insolvency risk. It was found that 
variables like Return on Equity, Muslim Share and HHI had the biggest impact on 
insolvency risk in Islamic banks while other variables like Capital Assets Ratio, Net 
Income, Size, Liquid Assets, Domestic Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per 
Capita Growth, Loan Growth and Assets Growth were found to have the smallest 
impact on insolvency risk in Islamic banks. 
In conventional banks, variables like Capital Assets Ratio, Return on Equity, Net 
Income, Size, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Capita Growth and Muslim Share were 
found to be the most impacting insolvency risk in conventional banks. Other 
variables like Liquid Assets, Domestic Interest Rate, Loan Growth, Assets Growth 
and HHI had the least effect on insolvency risk in conventional banks. 
In banking Efficiency, when compared the efficiency scores in Islamic and 
conventional banks, the study found that the mean for Islamic banks was higher than 
the mean in conventional banks. The study found that Islamic banks in the MENA 
area for the period of 2006 to 2015 were more efficient than conventional banks. 
In terms of the impact of financial aspects on efficiency. It was found that variables 
like Domestic Interest Rate, GDP Per Capita Growth, Muslim Share, HHI, Non-
Performing Loans and Z Score had the biggest impact on risk in Islamic banks while 
other variables like Return on Equity, Size of the firm, Liquid Assets, GDP Per 
Capita, Loan Intensity and NIE were found to have the smallest impact on risk in 
Islamic banks. 
In conventional banks, variables like Size of the firm, Domestic Rate, Muslim Share, 
HHI, Loan Intensity, Non-performing Loan and Z score were found to be the most 
impacting risk in conventional banks. Other variables like Return on Assets, Liquid 
Assets, GDP Per Capita, GDP Per Capita Growth and NIE had the least effect on 
risk in conventional banks. 
After the global financial crisis, banking risk was negatively affected in both Islamic 
and conventional banks. Although the level of impact was little, we can observe the 
crisis impact and can also see that no difference was found between Islamic and 
conventional banks in terms of crisis impact. 
Efficiency after the financial crisis was increased in both Islamic and conventional 
banks. The study found that the level of banking efficiency was better in both 





















    6.1. Introduction 
The principal aim of this chapter is to highlight the main conclusion of this 
investigation. This chapter is divided into five sections: an overview of the study; a 
summary of the key findings; a description of the contributions of the research in 
Risk and Efficiency; the limitations of the study; and finally, recommendations for 
further research in the field of risk and efficiency. 
    6.2. Overview 
The study was divided into three main parts. First, provided measures of credit risk, 
insolvency risk and efficiency levels in both Islamic and conventional banks. Second, 
the study has investigated the potential factors affecting credit risk, insolvency risk 
and efficiency. Third, the study has examined the level of impact of the global 
financial crisis on credit risk, insolvency risk and efficiency in Islamic and 
conventional banks. 
    6.3. Key findings 
After using two proxies to measure credit risk, the study has found that credit risk in 
Islamic and conventional banks is similar. A slight rise in loan loss reserve for 
conventional and a slight rise in non-performing loans in Islamic. The overall results 
show a similar credit risk levels in both Islamic and conventional banks in MENA. 
Insolvency risk was different, as Islamic banks reported higher risk levels compared 
to conventional banks. Z scores were higher in conventional banks indicating that 
insolvency risk in Islamic banks was higher. 
The study has found that efficiency levels in Islamic banks were also similar to 
efficiency levels in conventional banks. The Sharī‘ah’ compliance regulations did not 
affect the level of efficiency in Islamic banks performing in MENA.  
The study was able to explore different macro and micro-economic factors with 
potential effect on credit risk in both Islamic and conventional banks. The study 
found size, liquid assets, GDP per capita, domestic interest rate, capital assets ratio 
and liquidity to be impacting banking risk. 
The study was also able to provide a list of different macro and micro-economic 
factors with an effect on efficiency. The list included non-performing loans, loan 
intensity, size, Z score, GDP per capita, market concentration, Muslim shares and 
domestic interest rate. 
The study has investigated the impact of the global financial crisis on credit risk, 
insolvency risk and efficiency. The study found Islamic and conventional banks in 
MENA experienced an increase in credit risk. Both Islamic and conventional banks 
were less stable after the global financial with lower Z scores reported after the 
crisis. 
The study has also investigated the global financial crisis effects on efficiency. Banks 
in MENA were more efficient after the crisis. Efficiency scores were higher after the 
crisis compared to those reported before or during the crisis. 
Finally, the study has provided solid evidence to the researcher that Islamic finance 
is not properly implemented in MENA. The similar results among Islamic and 
conventional banks in MENA provide clear evidence that Sharī‘ah’ compliance 
regulations implemented by Islamic banks failed to provide the expected theoretical 
impact of Islamic finance on Islamic banks in MENA. 
    6.4. Contributions 
This study bridges a gap between the three broad strands related to existing body of 
literature on risk and efficiency (measures the levels of risk and efficiency; explores 
the determinants of risk and efficiency, and investigates the economic consequences 
of the recent global financial crisis on risk and efficiency). 
6.4.1. Theoretical & Empirical 
The study contributes to the work of (Alam, 2012) in an expansion manner as (Alam, 
2012) investigated efficiency determinants in the two banking systems (Islamic and 
Conventional). This study has used a larger sample, larger time-frame, different 
efficiency proxy and included some different efficiency determinants.  
(Alam, 2012) investigated efficiency and risk in Islamic banks only. Also, (Alam, 
2012) used the same potential independent variables on efficiency and risk. While in 
this study, different potential determinants in each investigation based on previous 
literature and real empirical needs.  
The last contribution to the work of (Alam, 2012) is that in this study, three different 
risk proxies were applied in order to provide two different risk types (credit and 
insolvency) and in order to offer more accurate results for efficiency and risk 
empirical research. 
The study also contributes to the work of (Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi, 2013). 
(Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi, 2013) investigated risk and its dererments in Islamic 
and conventional banks. However, the geographic difference in this study is crucial. 
With investigations in Islamic finance, countries with large Muslim populations are 
the main goals to test. Therefore, the geographic sample in this study adds to the 
empirical research in the field of Islamic finance as it covers the majority of countries 
with large Muslim shares in order to present reliable empirical results to the Islamic 
finance research. 
After the recent global financial crisis, many empirical researchers have reported that 
Islamic and conventional banking systems were not affected in the same manner 
and the level of impact was different between them. In this particular way, this study 
fills the gap in the work of (Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi, 2013) who did not 
investigate or report the impact of the global financial crisis on risk. The study has 
filled that gap by providing different risk levels before and after the crisis in order to 
contribute to empirical research associated with the global financial crisis and its 
impact on all banking systems in general and Islamic banking in specific. 
The study contributes to the work of (Abd Karim, Chan and Hassan, 2010) (Al-
Tamimi, 2002; Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007; Hassan, 2009) who investigated 
risk management practises in Islamic banking. Each work of these researchers has 
covered only one country, this fact opens a gap that results from the fact that each 
country could have its own macro and micro economic regulations and barriers and 
therefore, the overall results are not reliable to consider when Islamic banking is 
investigated. This gap is filled with this study’s sample which included ten different 
countries located in the heart of Islamic region. 
Another contribution to the work of (Abd Karim, Chan and Hassan, 2010) (Al-Tamimi, 
2002; Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007; Hassan, 2009) is added when we consider 
the method of research in this study. This study has used a quantitative method to 
investigate risk while the mentioned studies have used a qualitative method. Dealing 
with banking risk which is mainly calculated in numbers, would be better investigated 
through methodologies that use numbers to investigate. In such a way, the final 
outcomes will be better analysed and presented, the quantitative method used in this 
study has covered that gap. 
The study contributes to the work of (Garza-Garcia, 2010) and the work of 
(Sarmieuta and Galan, 2015) who investigated efficiency and its determinants in 
different countries. With only conventional banks covered in their work, the gap of 
providing results for Islamic banks is found as the tow banking systems are different 
and use different inputs in their regulations as discussed in previous chapters. This 
gap has been filled in this study by investigating Islamic banks along with 
conventional banks. 
Another contribution to the work of (Garza-Garcia, 2010) and (Sarmieuta and Galan, 
2015) is added by the fact that geographic, time-frame and regional differences have 
been considered. With most of the study’s sample are from countries with oil-
production countries like the GCC, high liquidity of course affects the financial market 
in general and banking sector in specific. All this in mind, adds a contribution to the 
empirical research in the field of efficiency. 
In short, and to conclude this part.  the study differs from all of the mentioned studies 
by the fact that it investigated both risk and efficiency at the same time. As (Garza- 
Garcia, 2010), Sarmieuta and E. Galan, 2015) and (Alam, 2012) examined efficiency 
only. While, Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi, 2013) (Abd Karim, Chan and Hassan, 
2010) (Al-Tamimi, 2002; Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei, 2007; Hassan, 2009) 
investigated risk only. 
6.4.2. Practical 
Banks can benefit from the fact that size can influence their level of risk as larger 
banks are reported with higher risk levels. Banks, especially large ones can take that 
into account in their risk management process in order to lower risk or to prevent 
potential size impact on risk. 
Banks should also consider the share of Muslims in which country they operate, as 
the level of Muslim shares is reported to have an effect on the level of risk. Further 
investigation and interpretation is required by banks in order to understand “Muslim 
share” within the market especially for Islamic banks or banks with Islamic windows. 
As liquid assets are reported to have an impact on risk, banks should consider 
working on matching their needs to balance higher capital requirements. Banks 
should consider the effect of liquid assets in their risk management process in order 
to first; minimise the potential rise in risk caused by liquid assets, and second; to 
meet their needs in their capital requirements. 
Macro-economic factors are also reported to affect the banking level of risk, this 
normal and expected as banking inputs and outputs are impacted by these factors. 
However, banks should consider how changes in these factors can affect their level 
of risk. GDP Per Capita and domestic rates are the two main macro-economic that 
were reported to have a direct impact on risk. Domestic interest rates in particular, 
should be very understood by banks especially conventional banks such a factor 
influence their interest-rate loans while Islamic banks should not be directly affected 
by domestic interest rates because of Sharī‘ah’ regulations that do not approve direct 
interest. 
Banks in MENA countries should also consider their capital assets ratio when they 
work on their risk management. Although previous empirical studies have reported 
that risk should be low when capital assets ratio is high, Banks in MENA countries 
have reported that risk is high when capital assets ratio is high. Furthermore, banks 
in MENA should consider the regional differences. 
Banks in MENA need to consider the level of risk that was associated with liquidity, 
especially banks in GCC for the fact that Liquidity is very high in such oil-production 
countries. As banks tend to have high liquidity along with higher risk they take. 
Banks need to balance their liquidity levels and their liquidity needs to cover their 
risk. Islamic banks need to take no different actions than conventional banks 
because no Sharī‘ah’ compliance regulations for liquidity by itself and therefore; the 
same outcome among Islamic and conventional banking is expected. 
Banks’ risk was reported to be affected by return on equity in different ways among 
Islamic and conventional banks. Islamic banks need further investigation to work on 
their equity on risk because Sharī‘ah’ compliance regulations are expected to be the 
cause behind such contradiction with conventional banks. 
The study reported that risk, presented as “non-performing loans” affected efficiency. 
The efficiency level was high when risk levels are high. Banks in the MENA area are 
advised to balance between their desired efficiency levels and their level of risk.  
Banks’ efficiency level was reported to be impacted by loans, banks in MENA 
especially conventional banks need to consider loan intensity elevating levels 
because high loan intensity was found with low efficiency. In Islamic banks, the 
prohibition of direct interest “riba” and the Sharī‘ah’ regulations might have played a 
part in the relationship as high efficiency levels was reported with high efficiency 
scores, therefore, Islamic banks are advised to take advantage of that relationship. 
Size of the bank also impacted efficiency levels especially for conventional banks. 
Larger banks need to take advantage of that relationship as efficiency levels are high 
with large banks. Islamic banks on the other hand do not benefit from that 
relationship and this can be a result of their low market portion compared with 
conventional banks. 
Insolvency risk, presented by Z score has also affected efficiency in both Islamic and 
conventional banks in MENA. As banks are reported to be riskier with high efficiency 
levels, banks need to balance between their desired efficiency levels and the 
acceptable level of insolvency risk they are willing to take. As Islamic and 
conventional banks experience the same impact, Islamic banks do not to take any 
different action from conventional banks in MENA. 
Efficiency was no different than risk in its relationship with macro-economic factors 
especially in Islamic banks. As Islamic banks reported high efficiency levels with high 
GDP Per Capita, Islamic banks are advised to consider the level of impact made by 
GDP Per Capita on their efficiency. 
Banks in MENA reported high efficiency levels with high market concentration. As a 
result of this report, banks in MENA need to put more market investigations in order 
to take advantage of market concentration increase to improve their efficiency levels. 
Banks efficiency was also affected by the share of Muslims in each county. Banks 
reported high efficiency levels with higher Muslim shares and Islamic banks reported 
low efficiency levels with higher Muslim shares. As banks in MENA are operating in 
countries with high Muslim shares in most countries, it is extremely important for 
banks especially Islamic banks in MENA to consider Muslim shares in the county 
where they operate and try to observe how to deal with Muslim shares level of 
impact to improve their efficiency scores. 
Domestic interest rate was another macro-economic factor to affect banking 
efficiency. Islamic banks reported that efficiency scores were high with high domestic 
interest rate, while conventional banks reported low efficiency levels with high 
domestic interest rate. As previously discussed that domestic interest rate deal 
directly with banking interest rate, and as Islamic Sharī‘ah’ regulations do not 
approve direct interest. It is clear how the level of impact is different between Islamic 
and conventional banks. Banks in MENA, especially conventional banks need to 
carefully consider changes in domestic interest when they try to improve their 
efficiency levels. Although direct interest is prohibited in Islamic banks, domestic 
interest rate still had an impact on efficiency, therefore; Islamic banks also need to 
investigate the impact of domestic interest rate on their efficiency scores. 
    6.5. Implications 
4.10.1. Theory  
This work provides a further extension of the work carried out by Alam (2012), which sought 
to examine the determinants of efficiency across the two banking systems, i.e. conventional 
and Islamic. This work further took a larger sample, greater period of time, various efficiency 
proxies, and actively ensured the inclusion of various efficiency-related determinants.  
Efficiency and risk was examined in the work of Alam (2012) specifically in consideration to 
Islamic banks, with the same possible independent variables on efficiency and risk. In contrast 
to this research effort, the present studies takes a number of possible determinants in each 
investigation in line with prior literature and actual empirical requirements. Furthermore, as a 
further contribution to this line of study, this present work will apply different risk proxies in 
an effort to consider different types of risk, namely credit and insolvency, in an effort to provide 
more credible and precise findings for efficiency and risk empirical studies.  
As a further contribution to this body of literature, this study extends the work carried out by 
Abedifar, Molyneux & Tarazi (2013), which sought to examine risk and its determinants across 
both conventional and Islamic banking systems. Nonetheless, in this work, the geographic 
differences are fundamental. In consideration to investigations in Islamic finance, those regions 
known to have significant numbers of Muslims are the key target for testing. Accordingly, in 
this study, the geographic sample adds values to the empirical research in the Islamic finance 
domain through encompassing most countries with large Muslim shares. This is done in order 
to provide the literature with reliable empirical findings that can go some way to enhancing 
research in the field of Islamic finance.  
Following the financial crisis that recently swept the globe, a number of different empirical 
researchers have directed their efforts towards examining conventional and Islamic banking 
systems, and accordingly found that there were differences from one system to the next in terms 
of how they were affected. In this way, the present work seeks to fill the gap identified in the 
study carried out by Abedifar, Molyneux & Tarazi (2013), which failed to examine or direct 
attention towards the effects of the global financial crisis in line with risk. Importantly, this gap 
is filled in this work by considering different levels of risk both prior to and following the crisis; 
this is done in mind of providing a conscious contribution to the empirical research associated 
with the global financial crisis and its overall effects across all banking systems, as well as 
Islamic banking in particular.  
Moreover, this work provides a contribution in line with that conducted by other scholars in 
the field (Abd Karim, Chan & Hassan, 2010; Al-Tamimi, 2002; Al-Tamimi & Al-Mazrooei, 
2007; Hassan, 2009), which sought to examine Islamic banking’s risk management approaches. 
These works focused on one country only, which creates an identifiable gap owing to the 
recognition that all regions have their own economic regulations and obstacles, meaning that 
the results garnered, as a whole, cannot be taken at face value when investigating Islamic 
banking. This gap is filled by the present work through the inclusion of ten different countries 
in the study sample, all of which are located at the core of the Islamic region.  
The present work further identifies a contribution to be made in regards the studies carried out 
by Abd Karim, Chan & Hassan (2010), Al-Tamimi (2002), Al-Tamimi & Al-Mazrooei (2007) 
and Hassan (2009) through consideration to the research strategy adopted in this work. The 
current research adopted a quantitative approach in mind of examining risk, whereas the 
aforementioned studies applied qualitative approaches. When considering banking risk, which 
is predominantly centred on numbers and figures, it is considered that a quantitative approach 
would be more valuable. In this regard, the final results could facilitate improved analysis and 
presentation. Thus, the approach applied in this work has been successful in filling this gap.  
This work also adds to those by Garza-Garcia (2010) as well as that of Sarmieuta & Galan 
(2015), which examined the determinants of efficiency and efficiency overall in different 
countries but with limited focus on conventional banking systems only; this therefore created 
a gap in terms of examining Islamic banking systems. This study provides a contribution in 
this regard through examining Islamic banking systems in line with more conventional 
frameworks.  
When considering the works of Garza-Garcia (2010) and Sarmieuta & Galan (2015), further 
contribution is made by this work when considering the regional, timescale-related and 
geographic differences. Owing to the fact that the majority of the sample came from oil-
production regions, as in the case of the GCC, it can be seen that high liquidity would have an 
influence on the financial market overall, as well as specifically in and across the banking 
sector. With this taken into consideration, a contribution is made to the empirical research in 
regards efficiency.  
To sum up, this work provides key differences when compared to other works detailed in the 
literature, predominantly in the fact that both efficiency and risk are taken into account in this 
work, whilst others (Garza-Garcia, 2010; Sarmieuta & Galan, 2015; Alam, 2012) have focused 
only on efficiency, with other scholars (Abedifar, Molyneux & Tarazi, 2013; Abd Karim, Chan 
& Hassan, 2010; Al-Tamimi, 2002; Al-Tamimi & Al-Mazrooei, 2007; Hassan, 2009) 
concerned only with risk. 
4.10.2. In Practice 
Size can affect risk levels amongst banks, which can prove to be beneficial to banks, where 
larger banks have higher risk levels but are positioned to consider this when applying a risk 
management strategy with the objective to decrease their levels of risk or otherwise entirely 
circumvent possible size impacts on risk. Furthermore, there is also the need to take into 
account the number of Muslims in any country in which banks are operating: the degree of 
Muslim share is recognised as influencing risk levels. Nonetheless, a greater scope of 
investigation and interpretation is necessary if Muslim share across the market—particularly 
that of Islamic banking—is to be fully understood.  
Owing to the fact that risk is known to be affected by liquid assets, there is a need for banking 
institutions to take into account how their needs can be aligned so as to ensure greater capital 
requirements are balanced. Furthermore, the effects of liquid assets on risk management first 
need to be considered if the possible rise in risk is to be minimised, as well as if capital 
requirement needs are to be fulfilled.   
In addition, levels of risk across banking institutions are seen to be influenced by macro-
economic factors; this is both commonplace and expected, with such factors affecting banking 
inputs and outputs. Nonetheless, there is a need for banks to consider how such factors and the 
way in which they change can influence risk levels. As an example, GDP Per Capita and 
domestic rates are identified as the two key macro-economic factors known to impact risk. 
Domestic interest rates, more specifically, require understanding and insight by banks—
particularly those operating on a conventional basis—as these aspects are able to affect interest-
rate loans whereas Islamic banks may not be influenced by domestic interest rates owing to the 
fact that direct interest is prohibited by Sharia.  
In MENA regions, banks are also required to take into account their capital assets ratio when 
working on risk management. Despite the fact that other empirical works have highlighted risk 
as low when there is a high capital assets ratio, nonetheless, banks operating in MENA regions 
highlight risk as being high in line with high capital assets ratio. In addition, banks in MENA 
also need to take into account any regional differences.  
The risk facing banks was recognised as being affected by return on equity in varying ways 
amongst both conventional and Islamic banks, with the former requiring more in-depth 
examination in line with their equity on risk owing to the fact that Sharia-compliance 
regulations are believed to underpin the causes behind such contradictions with conventional 
banking systems.  
It was found that risk, when viewed through the lens of ‘non-performing loans’, was seen to 
influence efficiency, with such levels found to be high in line with high risk levels. In the 
MENA region, banks are given the advice to ensure a balance is struck between the necessary 
efficiency levels and their risk levels. More specifically, in the MENA region, loans were found 
to have a notable impact on the overall efficiency of banks, particularly across conventional 
banks, with these institutions needing to take into account loan intensity, with greater loan 
intensity recognised as being aligned with low efficiency. In the case of Islamic banks, direct 
interest being prohibited could also play a role: greater efficiency levels were seen to be 
recognised with high efficiency scores, meaning Islamic banks should exploit this to the 
greatest possible extent.   
As can be seen when considering the influence of the Z score, which relates to insolvency risk, 
both conventional and Islamic banks operating in the MENA region are recognised as affected 
in terms of efficiency. Owing to the fact that banks are seen to be riskier when there are greater 
levels of efficiency, there is a need for acceptable levels of insolvency risk to be balanced out 
with efficiency. Owing to the fact that conventional and Islamic banks both come to face the 
same effect, no differing actions are taken by conventional and Islamic banks in MENA.  
When contrasting risk and efficiency in line with their relationship with macro-economic 
factors, particularly across Islamic banks, no difference could be seen. Islamic banks were 
found to demonstrate high levels of efficiency with high GDP Per Capita, meaning there is a 
need for them to take into account the level of impact by GDP Per Capita in line with banking 
efficiency. 
Furthermore, in the MENA region, banks were found to report greater efficiency levels with a 
greater degree of market concentration. Following on from this finding, MENA-based banks 
need to complete more thorough and wide-ranging investigations if they are to exploit and best 
utilise market concentration in mind of improving efficiency levels.  
Importantly, the efficiency of banks was influenced by Muslim share across each country. High 
efficiency levels were found amongst those banks with higher Muslim shares, whilst lower 
efficiency levels were found by Islamic banks with higher Muslim shares. Owing to the fact 
that MENA region-based banks face high Muslim shares in the majority of countries, there is 
a pressing need for banks, particularly those in the MENA region, to take into account the 
factor of Muslim share and to accordingly observe the way in which Muslim share levels can 
influence and be directed towards enhancing their overall efficiency.  
One further macro-economic factor seen to influence efficiency across banks is the domestic 
interest rate. Islamic banks demonstrated high efficiency scores in line with high domestic 
interest rates; conventional banking systems, on the other hand, demonstrated low efficiency 
with high interest rates. As has been considered in the past, domestic interest rates deal with 
banking interest rates; as Sharia prohibits direct interest, this then emphasises how the level of 
effect differs between banking systems. Those banks operating in the MENA region, 
particularly those adopting the conventional system, should direct careful consideration 
towards the ways in which their efficiency levels may be influenced by domestic interest. 
Despite the fact that direct interest is not permitted across Islamic banking institutions, it 
remains that domestic interest continues to influence efficiency; therefore, there is a need for 
Islamic banks to examine the effects of such interest rates on efficiency scores overall.  
 
    6.6. Limitations of the study 
This research widens our knowledge on “risk levels and its determinants” from one 
side, and “efficiency levels and its determinants” from the other side. Further, it 
increases the knowledge on the determinants and economic consequences of risk 
and efficiency. However, there is no research without any limitations, and this 
investigation is no exception.  
First, the study investigated only two types of risk, while other risk types like liquidity 
risk, interest rate risk, market risk and operational risk are as important. Second, 
efficiency is divided into different types. Cost efficiency and profit efficiency. We only 
used a single efficiency score which of course provide a level of efficiency but not as 
comprehensive as other efficiency types. Third, the global financial crisis would be 
better divided into three periods. “Before, during and after” the crisis. However, due 
to this thesis’ sample, it was not able to investigate the impact before, during and 
after the crisis.  
    6.7. Recommendations for future research 
In Islamic finance, a country like Malaysia is considered a pioneer in that field. 
However, Malaysia was not included in our sample. Of course, it would have added 
significant results. Other important risk types like liquidity risk, market risk, and 
interest rate risk are as important as credit and insolvency risk, therefore; further 
research on these risk types would provide more comprehensive risk investigation 
which will contribute to the field of risk and risk management. Different efficiency 
calculations’ approaches deliver more accurate efficiency scores; further research 
with consideration of those approaches will provide contributions to the field of 
banking efficiency.  
Countries like Egypt and Tunisia experienced political instability since 2011. 
Therefore, to control for these two countries would result interesting analysis that can 
be added to this sample. 
Other macro and micro economic aspects could be included to investigate further. 
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8. Appendix 
Table 1, Descriptive Analysis (All Banks) 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LLR1 1835 -4 9 4.23 2.007 
NP.L 1436 0 33 0.18 1.415 
Z Score 1918 -4 17 2.21 2.260 
EFF Scores 1853 0.80 1.96 0.910 0.079 
CAR 2198 -1 1 0.21 0.206 
Return on Equity ROE 
2189 -9 10 0.09 0.376 
Net Income 2185 -1303 2889 178.2 387.6 
Size 2200 2 12 7.83 1.854 
LAD 2112 0 2808 5.99 107.1 
Domestic Interest Rate % 
2014 1 23 7.51 6.684 
GDP PerCapita 2550 868.3 96732.4 17522.7 19853.6 
GDP PerCapita Growth % 
2550 -15.1 9.352 1.320 4.203 
Muslim Share 2550 0 1 0.76 0.429 
HHI 2200 0 1 0.01 0.026 
LGrowth 2056 -92931 27389 183.2 4564.5 
Agrowth 2135 -133614 43005 291.6 6540.9 
Valid N (listwise) 1025         
 
 








Table 2 Regression Results for Risk. Islamic Only, Loan Loss Reserves as dependent 
  
R 
Square F Sig. 
     
Collinearity Statistics 
 
.706 46.877 .000c 




   
-6.478 -8.227 .000 
  
    
CAR       -2.943 -3.684 .000 1 Negative .363 2.753 
Return on 
Equity ROE 
   




Net Income       .000 -1.000 .318   Negative .467 2.143 
Size 
   
1.327 14.106 .000 1 Positive .363 2.752 
LAD 
   
.441 2.980 .003 5 Positive .433 2.308 





   













Growth %       





   









  Negative 
.305 3.279 
Agrowth 




  Negative 
.288 3.477 
HHI 
   
7.644 1.139 .256 
 






Risk and Efficiency in Islamic Banking 2017 
 
Table 3 Regression Results for Risk. Conventional Only, Loan Loss Reserves as dependent 
  
R 
Square F Sig. 
     
Collinearity Statistics 
 
.734 267.690 .000c Beta t Sig. *** Sig Po/Ne Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
   
-3.247 -12.913 .000 
  
    
CAR 
   
-.331 -1.313 .189 
 
Negative .708 1.413 
Return on 
Equity ROE       











Size       .957 33.966 .000 1 Positive .351 2.850 
LAD 








Interest Rate %       











Growth %       
-.022 -3.021 .003 
5 Negative 
.769 1.300 
Muslim Share       .524 6.032 .000 1 Positive .670 1.492 
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LGrowth 















   
-1.574 -1.267 .206 
 





Table 4 Regression Results for Risk. Islamic Only, Non-Performing Loans as dependent 
  
R 
Square F Sig. 
     
Collinearity Statistics 
 
.555 21.719 .000c Beta t Sig. *** Sig Po/Ne Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
   
-2.734 -2.474 .014 
  
    
CAR       -4.641 -3.513 .001 5 Negative .372 2.692 
Return on Equity 
ROE       
-.153 -.339 .735 
  Negative 
.837 1.195 
Net Income       .000 -.586 .558   Negative .441 2.266 
Size 
   
.977 7.608 .000 1 Positive .340 2.944 
Risk and Efficiency in Islamic Banking 2017 
 
LAD 
   
.366 1.698 .091 10 Positive .428 2.338 
Domestic Interest 
Rate % 
   













   




Muslim Share       -.321 -1.687 .093 10 Negative .698 1.433 
LGrowth 




  Negative 
.324 3.084 
Agrowth 




  Negative 
.305 3.282 
HHI 
   





Table 5 Regression Results for Risk. Conventional Only, Non-Performing Loans as dependent 




Square F Sig. 
     
Collinearity Statistics 
 
.637 147.503 .000c Beta t Sig. *** Sig Po/Ne Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
   
-2.285 -7.373 .000 
  
    
CAR       -.255 -.821 .412   Negative .721 1.387 
Return on 
Equity ROE       












   
.858 24.833 .000 1 Positive .344 2.905 
LAD 









%       












Growth %       




   
.445 4.344 .000 1 Positive .677 1.476 
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LGrowth 



















Table 6 Regression Results for Risk. Islamic Only, Z Score as dependent 
  
R 
Square F Sig. 
     
Collinearity Statistics 
 
.290 8.831 .000c Beta t Sig. *** Sig Po/Ne Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
   
-.949 -.760 .448 
  
    




   
4.318 4.931 .000 
1 Positive 
.715 1.400 
Risk and Efficiency in Islamic Banking 2017 
 
Net 
Income       
.001 1.286 .200 
  Negative 
.432 2.313 
Size 
   
.201 1.336 .183 
 
Positive .339 2.954 
LAD 
   
.309 1.413 .159 
 




   
















   






   








  Negative 
.300 3.335 
Agrowth 




  Negative 
.283 3.539 
HHI       -25.667 -2.297 .023 10 Negative .620 1.612 
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Table 7 Regression Results for Risk. Conventional Only, Z Score as dependent 
  
R 
Square F Sig. 
     
Collinearity Statistics 
 
.195 22.080 .000c Beta t Sig. *** Sig Po/Ne Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
   
.467 .818 .413 
  
    




   





   




   
.120 1.851 .064 10 Positive .340 2.941 




   

















   





   








  Negative 
.296 3.376 
Agrowth 








   
2.471 .817 .414 
 





Table 8 Regression Results for Efficiency. Islamic Only, Efficiency as dependent 
  
R 
Square F Sig. 
     
Collinearity Statistics 
 
.129 3.360 .000c Beta t Sig. *** Sig Po/Ne Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
   
.979 16.663 .000 
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ROA 
   
.161 .557 .578 
 
Positive  .733 1.363 
Size       -.005 -.776 .439   Negative .472 2.120 
LAD       -.001 -.225 .822   Negative .857 1.167 
Domestic 
Interest Rate % 
   
.002 2.002 .047 
10 
Positive  .537 1.861 
GDP PerCapita 








   
.002 2.068 .040 
10 
Positive  .860 1.163 
Muslim Share       -.026 -2.198 .029 10 Negative .648 1.544 
HHI 
   
1.523 3.067 .002 5 Positive  .542 1.846 
LoanIntensity 
   
.027 .959 .339 
 
Positive  .783 1.277 
CRNPL 
   
.140 2.150 .033 10 Positive  .765 1.307 
NIE       -.625 -1.560 .121   Negative .643 1.554 
Z Score 
   




Table 9 Regression Results for Efficiency. Conventional Only, Efficiency as dependent 




Square F Sig. 




.328 36.427 .000c Beta t Sig. *** Sig Po/Ne Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 
   
.781 61.358 0.000 
  
    
ROA 
   
.100 1.391 .164 
 
Positive  .919 1.089 
Size 
   
.018 13.165 .000 1 Positive  .699 1.431 
LAD 








%       














   
.001 1.135 .257 
 
Positive  .777 1.287 
Muslim 
Share 
   
.015 2.508 .012 
10 
Positive  .659 1.518 
HHI 
   
.254 3.113 .002 5 Positive  .764 1.309 
LoanIntensity 
      -.076 -7.434 .000 1 Negative .808 1.238 
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CRNPL 
   
.004 3.430 .001 5 Positive  .886 1.128 
NIE 
   
.008 .962 .336 
 
Positive  .940 1.064 
Z Score 
   


















LLR1 415 -3 8 3.65 2.150 
LnNPL 261 -3 8 4.84 1.607 
Z Score 499 -3 14 1.73 1.745 




650 0 8 .56 .741 
Valid N 
(listwise) 








Table 11 Descriptive Results. Conventional Only 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
LLR1 1420 -4 9 4.40 1.961 
LnNPL 1168 -4 9 4.68 1.821 
Risk and Efficiency in Islamic Banking 2017 
 





























B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -6.478 .787   -8.227 .000     
CAR -2.943 .799 -.219 -3.684 .000 .363 2.753 
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Return on Equity ROE .029 .367 .003 .078 .938 .826 1.210 
Net Income .000 .000 -.052 -1.000 .318 .467 2.143 
Size 1.327 .094 .838 14.106 .000 .363 2.752 
LAD .441 .148 .162 2.980 .003 .433 2.308 
Domestic Interest 
Rate % 
.010 .015 .030 .672 .502 .638 1.568 
GDP PerCapita -1.679E-05 .000 -.244 -5.336 .000 .613 1.631 
GDP PerCapita 
Growth % 
-.025 .014 -.070 -1.763 .079 .802 1.246 
Muslim Share .232 .158 .063 1.470 .143 .690 1.449 
LGrowth -8.075E-06 .000 -.013 -.196 .845 .305 3.279 
Agrowth -1.698E-05 .000 -.038 -.563 .574 .288 3.477 
HHI 7.644 6.711 .052 1.139 .256 .613 1.631 
 
 







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
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1 (Constant) -3.247 .251   -12.913 .000     
CAR -.331 .252 -.024 -1.313 .189 .708 1.413 
Return on Equity ROE -.259 .076 -.053 -3.427 .001 .947 1.056 
Net Income 4.716E-05 .000 .011 .487 .626 .421 2.375 
Size .957 .028 .868 33.966 .000 .351 2.850 
LAD -1.810E-05 .000 -.001 -.078 .938 .994 1.006 
Domestic Interest Rate % -.042 .005 -.155 -8.322 .000 .665 1.504 
GDP PerCapita -1.224E-05 .000 -.135 -7.444 .000 .694 1.441 
GDP PerCapita Growth % -.022 .007 -.052 -3.021 .003 .769 1.300 
Muslim Share .524 .087 .112 6.032 .000 .670 1.492 
LGrowth 1.254E-05 .000 .031 1.128 .260 .309 3.233 
Agrowth -1.791E-05 .000 -.062 -2.239 .025 .303 3.306 
HHI -1.574 1.243 -.022 -1.267 .206 .733 1.364 
 
 







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
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1 (Constant) -2.734 1.105   -2.474 .014     
CAR -4.641 1.321 -.272 -3.513 .001 .372 2.692 
Return on Equity ROE -.153 .450 -.018 -.339 .735 .837 1.195 
Net Income .000 .000 -.042 -.586 .558 .441 2.266 
Size .977 .128 .617 7.608 .000 .340 2.944 
LAD .366 .216 .123 1.698 .091 .428 2.338 
Domestic Interest Rate % .011 .018 .037 .610 .543 .597 1.674 
GDP PerCapita -1.322E-05 .000 -.215 -3.471 .001 .581 1.722 
GDP PerCapita Growth % .009 .017 .027 .520 .604 .852 1.174 
Muslim Share -.321 .191 -.095 -1.687 .093 .698 1.433 
LGrowth -8.284E-06 .000 -.015 -.177 .859 .324 3.084 
Agrowth -6.986E-06 .000 -.017 -.204 .839 .305 3.282 
HHI 26.182 7.819 .208 3.349 .001 .580 1.725 
 
 







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
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1 (Constant) -2.285 .310   -7.373 .000     
CAR -.255 .311 -.018 -.821 .412 .721 1.387 
Return on Equity ROE -.261 .092 -.056 -2.824 .005 .936 1.069 
Net Income 5.501E-05 .000 .014 .482 .630 .405 2.470 
Size .858 .035 .806 24.833 .000 .344 2.905 
LAD 3.401E-05 .000 .002 .129 .897 .994 1.006 
Domestic Interest Rate % -.042 .006 -.167 -6.937 .000 .629 1.590 
GDP PerCapita -1.301E-05 .000 -.153 -6.752 .000 .703 1.422 
GDP PerCapita Growth % -.024 .009 -.061 -2.828 .005 .776 1.288 
Muslim Share .445 .103 .100 4.344 .000 .677 1.476 
LGrowth 9.294E-06 .000 .025 .731 .465 .306 3.268 
Agrowth -1.818E-05 .000 -.069 -1.979 .048 .299 3.344 
HHI -1.802 1.432 -.028 -1.258 .209 .738 1.354 
 
 







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
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1 (Constant) -.949 1.249   -.760 .448     
CAR -1.599 1.193 -.138 -1.341 .181 .293 3.410 
Return on Equity ROE 4.318 .876 .324 4.931 .000 .715 1.400 
Net Income .001 .000 .109 1.286 .200 .432 2.313 
Size .201 .151 .128 1.336 .183 .339 2.954 
LAD .309 .219 .129 1.413 .159 .368 2.719 
Domestic Interest Rate % .027 .026 .073 1.021 .308 .609 1.643 
GDP PerCapita 5.433E-06 .000 .070 1.001 .318 .637 1.570 
GDP PerCapita Growth % .004 .024 .010 .156 .876 .822 1.217 
Muslim Share .761 .262 .204 2.898 .004 .623 1.606 
LGrowth -1.239E-06 .000 -.002 -.018 .986 .300 3.335 
Agrowth -1.820E-05 .000 -.037 -.356 .722 .283 3.539 
HHI -25.667 11.173 -.162 -2.297 .023 .620 1.612 
 







B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .467 .571   .818 .413     
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CAR -1.027 .559 -.062 -1.837 .066 .682 1.466 
Return on Equity ROE .888 .193 .132 4.610 .000 .937 1.067 
Net Income .001 .000 .220 5.145 .000 .422 2.372 
Size .120 .065 .088 1.851 .064 .340 2.941 
LAD -.001 .001 -.033 -1.197 .232 .995 1.005 
Domestic Interest Rate % .006 .012 .019 .537 .591 .617 1.621 
GDP PerCapita 2.492E-05 .000 .208 6.222 .000 .690 1.449 
GDP PerCapita Growth % .034 .017 .064 2.007 .045 .771 1.298 
Muslim Share .540 .200 .094 2.703 .007 .640 1.562 
LGrowth -2.173E-05 .000 -.042 -.817 .414 .296 3.376 
Agrowth 8.367E-06 .000 .022 .434 .664 .290 3.449 











B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
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1 (Constant) .979 .059   16.663 .000     
ROA .161 .289 .044 .557 .578 .733 1.363 
Size -.005 .007 -.076 -.776 .439 .472 2.120 
LAD -.001 .006 -.016 -.225 .822 .857 1.167 
Domestic Interest Rate % .002 .001 .184 2.002 .047 .537 1.861 
GDP PerCapita -3.426E-07 .000 -.124 -1.489 .138 .656 1.523 
GDP PerCapita Growth % .002 .001 .151 2.068 .040 .860 1.163 
Muslim Share -.026 .012 -.184 -2.198 .029 .648 1.544 
HHI 1.523 .497 .281 3.067 .002 .542 1.846 
LoanIntensity .027 .028 .073 .959 .339 .783 1.277 
CRNPL .140 .065 .166 2.150 .033 .765 1.307 
NIE -.625 .401 -.131 -1.560 .121 .643 1.554 




Table 19 Coefficients results for Efficiency. Conventional Only, Efficiency as dependent 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
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B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .781 .013   61.358 0.000     
ROA .100 .072 .040 1.391 .164 .919 1.089 
Size .018 .001 .438 13.165 .000 .699 1.431 
LAD -1.391E-05 .000 -.027 -.957 .339 .993 1.007 
Domestic Interest Rate % -.001 .000 -.067 -1.797 .073 .563 1.776 
GDP PerCapita 4.719E-08 .000 .014 .412 .681 .691 1.448 
GDP PerCapita Growth % .001 .000 .036 1.135 .257 .777 1.287 
Muslim Share .015 .006 .086 2.508 .012 .659 1.518 
HHI .254 .081 .099 3.113 .002 .764 1.309 
LoanIntensity -.076 .010 -.230 -7.434 .000 .808 1.238 
CRNPL .004 .001 .101 3.430 .001 .886 1.128 
NIE .008 .008 .028 .962 .336 .940 1.064 
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Efficiency Scores, All banks 





National Commercial Bank (The) 2015 SA 0 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2014 SA 1 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2013 SA 1 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2012 SA 1 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2011 SA 1 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2010 SA 1 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2009 SA 1 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2008 SA 1 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2007 SA 1 
National Commercial Bank (The) 2006 SA 0.876556 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2015 SA 0 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2014 SA 1 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2013 SA 0.988411 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2012 SA 0.99087 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2011 SA 0.996938 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2010 SA 1 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2009 SA 1 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2008 SA 1 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2007 SA 1 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investm 2006 SA 1 
Samba Financial Group 2015 SA 0 
Samba Financial Group 2014 SA 0.839409 
Samba Financial Group 2013 SA 0.865222 
Samba Financial Group 2012 SA 0.904016 
Samba Financial Group 2011 SA 0.944335 
Samba Financial Group 2010 SA 0.983502 
Samba Financial Group 2009 SA 1 
Samba Financial Group 2008 SA 0.873274 
Samba Financial Group 2007 SA 0.854503 
Samba Financial Group 2006 SA 0.876633 
Riyad Bank 2015 SA 0 
Riyad Bank 2014 SA 0.790894 
Riyad Bank 2013 SA 0.792738 
Riyad Bank 2012 SA 0.803562 
Riyad Bank 2011 SA 0.829007 
Riyad Bank 2010 SA 0.877721 
Riyad Bank 2009 SA 0.899598 
Riyad Bank 2008 SA 0.828067 
Riyad Bank 2007 SA 0.957831 
Riyad Bank 2006 SA 0.947151 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2015 SA 0 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2014 SA 0.836296 
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Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2013 SA 0.818316 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2012 SA 0.812522 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2011 SA 0.865474 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2010 SA 0.798037 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2009 SA 0.842154 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2008 SA 0.787088 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2007 SA 0.840375 
Banque Saudi Fransi JSC 2006 SA 0.816068 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2015 SA 0 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2014 SA 0.850669 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2013 SA 0.883332 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2012 SA 0.887365 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2011 SA 0.89377 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2010 SA 0.860076 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2009 SA 0.880811 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2008 SA 0.85633 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2007 SA 0.877499 
Saudi British Bank JSC (The) 2006 SA 0.836215 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2015 SA 0 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2014 SA 0.896174 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2013 SA 0.865691 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2012 SA 0.901588 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2011 SA 0.858364 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2010 SA 0.874823 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2009 SA 0.885138 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2008 SA 0.87117 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2007 SA 0.818045 
Arab National Bank Public Joint Stock Company 2006 SA 0.816219 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2015 SA 0 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2014 SA 0.777769 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2013 SA 0.746864 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2012 SA 0.740273 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2011 SA 0.735645 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2010 SA 0.74553 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2009 SA 0.777457 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2008 SA 0.776854 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2007 SA 0.876774 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 2006 SA 0.866438 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2015 SA 0 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2014 SA 0.787156 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2013 SA 0.849036 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2012 SA 0.828286 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2011 SA 0.857007 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2010 SA 0.830214 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2009 SA 0.835035 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2008 SA 0.83405 
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Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2007 SA 0.847154 
Saudi Investment Bank (The) 2006 SA 0.84206 
Islamic Development Bank 2015 SA 0 
Islamic Development Bank 2014 SA 0 
Islamic Development Bank 2013 SA 0 
Islamic Development Bank 2012 SA 0 
Islamic Development Bank 2011 SA 0 
Islamic Development Bank 2010 SA 0 
Islamic Development Bank 2009 SA 0.361194 
Islamic Development Bank 2008 SA 0 
Islamic Development Bank 2007 SA 0.398172 
Islamic Development Bank 2006 SA 0 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2015 SA 0 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2014 SA 0.858057 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2013 SA 0.810141 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2012 SA 0.873719 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2011 SA 0.97308 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2010 SA 0.978476 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2009 SA 1 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2008 SA 0 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2007 SA 0 
Alinma Bank Public joint stock company 2006 SA 0 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2015 SA 0 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2014 SA 0.910071 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2013 SA 0.896226 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2012 SA 0.892816 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2011 SA 0.85935 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2010 SA 0.89404 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2009 SA 0.938998 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2008 SA 0.852175 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2007 SA 0.906823 
Bank AlJazira JSC 2006 SA 1 
Bank AlBilad 2015 SA 0 
Bank AlBilad 2014 SA 1 
Bank AlBilad 2013 SA 0.942418 
Bank AlBilad 2012 SA 0.926819 
Bank AlBilad 2011 SA 1 
Bank AlBilad 2010 SA 0.845993 
Bank AlBilad 2009 SA 0.834613 
Bank AlBilad 2008 SA 0.879063 
Bank AlBilad 2007 SA 0 
Bank AlBilad 2006 SA 0 
Qatar National Bank 2015 QA 1 
Qatar National Bank 2014 QA 1 
Qatar National Bank 2013 QA 1 
Qatar National Bank 2012 QA 1 
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Qatar National Bank 2011 QA 1 
Qatar National Bank 2010 QA 1 
Qatar National Bank 2009 QA 0.870646 
Qatar National Bank 2008 QA 1 
Qatar National Bank 2007 QA 1 
Qatar National Bank 2006 QA 0 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2015 QA 0.823018 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2014 QA 0.889353 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2013 QA 0.937049 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2012 QA 1 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2011 QA 0.856584 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2010 QA 0.966276 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2009 QA 0.905628 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2008 QA 0.841151 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2007 QA 0.859314 
Qatar Islamic Bank SAQ 2006 QA 0 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2015 QA 1 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2014 QA 1 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2013 QA 1 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2012 QA 0.990946 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2011 QA 0.943243 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2010 QA 0.993204 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2009 QA 1 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2008 QA 1 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2007 QA 0.905319 
The Commercial Bank (QSC) 2006 QA 0 
Doha Bank 2015 QA 0.844139 
Doha Bank 2014 QA 0.980486 
Doha Bank 2013 QA 0.898908 
Doha Bank 2012 QA 1 
Doha Bank 2011 QA 1 
Doha Bank 2010 QA 1 
Doha Bank 2009 QA 1 
Doha Bank 2008 QA 0.947206 
Doha Bank 2007 QA 0.87962 
Doha Bank 2006 QA 0 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2015 QA 0.587909 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2014 QA 0.667836 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2013 QA 0.618889 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2012 QA 0.666768 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2011 QA 0.903944 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2010 QA 0.903041 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2009 QA 0.688997 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2008 QA 0.624955 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2007 QA 0 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 2006 QA 0 
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Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2015 QA 0.694371 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2014 QA 0.778329 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2013 QA 0.782326 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2012 QA 1 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2011 QA 0.927398 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2010 QA 1 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2009 QA 0.933157 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2008 QA 1 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2007 QA 0 
Al Khalij Commercial Bank 2006 QA 0 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2015 QA 0.839863 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2014 QA 0.831906 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2013 QA 0.796431 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2012 QA 0.762114 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2011 QA 0.923623 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2010 QA 0.97752 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2009 QA 1 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2008 QA 0 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2007 QA 0 
Qatar International Islamic Bank 2006 QA 0 
Barwa Bank 2015 QA 0.896844 
Barwa Bank 2014 QA 0.954094 
Barwa Bank 2013 QA 0.789768 
Barwa Bank 2012 QA 0.835239 
Barwa Bank 2011 QA 1 
Barwa Bank 2010 QA 1 
Barwa Bank 2009 QA 0 
Barwa Bank 2008 QA 0 
Barwa Bank 2007 QA 0 
Barwa Bank 2006 QA 0 
Ahli Bank QSC 2015 QA 0.615911 
Ahli Bank QSC 2014 QA 0.666065 
Ahli Bank QSC 2013 QA 0.674179 
Ahli Bank QSC 2012 QA 0.657756 
Ahli Bank QSC 2011 QA 0.730779 
Ahli Bank QSC 2010 QA 0.794104 
Ahli Bank QSC 2009 QA 1 
Ahli Bank QSC 2008 QA 1 
Ahli Bank QSC 2007 QA 0.85182 
Ahli Bank QSC 2006 QA 0 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2015 QA 0.805222 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2014 QA 0.706638 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2013 QA 0.791963 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2012 QA 0.762569 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2011 QA 0.905611 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2010 QA 1 
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International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2009 QA 0.947113 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2008 QA 0 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2007 QA 0 
International Bank of Qatar Q.S.C. 2006 QA 0 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2015 QA 0.921184 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2014 QA 0.975826 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2013 QA 0.9933 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2012 QA 0 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2011 QA 0 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2010 QA 0 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2009 QA 0 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2008 QA 0 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2007 QA 0 
HSBC Bank Middle East Limited 2006 QA 0 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2015 QA 0.834106 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2014 QA 0.873621 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2013 QA 1 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2012 QA 0 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2011 QA 0.95239 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2010 QA 1 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2009 QA 0.95963 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2008 QA 1 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2007 QA 1 
Qatar Development Bank Q.S.C.C. 2006 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2015 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2014 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2013 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2012 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2011 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2010 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2009 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2008 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2007 QA 0 
Qatar First Bank LLC 2006 QA 0 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2015 UAE 1 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2014 UAE 1 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2013 UAE 0.987245 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2012 UAE 1 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2011 UAE 0.92684 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2010 UAE 0.96552 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2009 UAE 0.982455 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2008 UAE 0.927205 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2007 UAE 1 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi 2006 UAE 0.97007 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2015 UAE 1 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2014 UAE 1 
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Emirates NBD PJSC 2013 UAE 1 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2012 UAE 1 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2011 UAE 1 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2010 UAE 0.976398 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2009 UAE 0.897031 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2008 UAE 1 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2007 UAE 0.921622 
Emirates NBD PJSC 2006 UAE 0.738167 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2015 UAE 0.796863 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2014 UAE 0.781748 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2013 UAE 0.74608 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2012 UAE 0.758879 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2011 UAE 0.731641 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2010 UAE 0.720178 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2009 UAE 0.625792 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2008 UAE 0.68824 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2007 UAE 0.689136 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank 2006 UAE 0.678065 
First Gulf Bank 2015 UAE 0.839466 
First Gulf Bank 2014 UAE 0.874445 
First Gulf Bank 2013 UAE 0.799007 
First Gulf Bank 2012 UAE 0.874035 
First Gulf Bank 2011 UAE 0.802634 
First Gulf Bank 2010 UAE 0.751361 
First Gulf Bank 2009 UAE 0.697704 
First Gulf Bank 2008 UAE 1 
First Gulf Bank 2007 UAE 0.966312 
First Gulf Bank 2006 UAE 0.887702 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2015 UAE 0.848713 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2014 UAE 0.885461 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2013 UAE 0.912089 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2012 UAE 0.967302 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2011 UAE 0.86236 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2010 UAE 0.806893 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2009 UAE 0.849094 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2008 UAE 0.85245 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2007 UAE 1 
Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 2006 UAE 1 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2015 UAE 0.954166 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2014 UAE 0.934616 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2013 UAE 0.994608 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2012 UAE 0.95974 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2011 UAE 1 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2010 UAE 1 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2009 UAE 1 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2008 UAE 0.924522 
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Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2007 UAE 1 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank - Public Joint Stock Co. 2006 UAE 0.960915 
Mashreqbank PSC 2015 UAE 1 
Mashreqbank PSC 2014 UAE 0.961516 
Mashreqbank PSC 2013 UAE 1 
Mashreqbank PSC 2012 UAE 0.975156 
Mashreqbank PSC 2011 UAE 1 
Mashreqbank PSC 2010 UAE 1 
Mashreqbank PSC 2009 UAE 0.975704 
Mashreqbank PSC 2008 UAE 0.853984 
Mashreqbank PSC 2007 UAE 0.999677 
Mashreqbank PSC 2006 UAE 0.870477 
Union National Bank 2015 UAE 0.779462 
Union National Bank 2014 UAE 0.764952 
Union National Bank 2013 UAE 0.793002 
Union National Bank 2012 UAE 0.84171 
Union National Bank 2011 UAE 0.841427 
Union National Bank 2010 UAE 0.904039 
Union National Bank 2009 UAE 0.831848 
Union National Bank 2008 UAE 0.793411 
Union National Bank 2007 UAE 0.835511 
Union National Bank 2006 UAE 0.782244 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2015 UAE 0.759428 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2014 UAE 0.727883 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2013 UAE 0.694976 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2012 UAE 0.755996 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2011 UAE 0.759463 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2010 UAE 0.77392 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2009 UAE 0.731189 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2008 UAE 0.724085 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2007 UAE 0.787909 
Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. 2006 UAE 0.750957 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2015 UAE 0.819345 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2014 UAE 0.889412 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2013 UAE 0.87947 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2012 UAE 0.963433 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2011 UAE 1 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2010 UAE 0.737803 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2009 UAE 0.741636 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2008 UAE 0.846797 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2007 UAE 0.785598 
Emirates Islamic Bank PJSC 2006 UAE 0.711724 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2015 UAE 1 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2014 UAE 1 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2013 UAE 0.953818 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2012 UAE 0.973592 
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Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2011 UAE 0.960871 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2010 UAE 0.877376 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2009 UAE 1 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2008 UAE 0 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2007 UAE 0 
Al Hilal Bank PJSC 2006 UAE 0 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2015 UAE 0.975155 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2014 UAE 1 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2013 UAE 1 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2012 UAE 1 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2011 UAE 0.897464 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2010 UAE 0.944669 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2009 UAE 1 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2008 UAE 0 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2007 UAE 0 
National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah (P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK 2006 UAE 0 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2015 UAE 0.84551 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2014 UAE 0.89633 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2013 UAE 0.80086 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2012 UAE 0.840891 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2011 UAE 0.733857 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2010 UAE 0.693433 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2009 UAE 0.685362 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2008 UAE 0.656124 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2007 UAE 0.7602 
National Bank of Fujairah PJSC 2006 UAE 0.665499 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2015 UAE 0.856582 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2014 UAE 0.828159 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2013 UAE 0.825265 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2012 UAE 0.788474 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2011 UAE 0.801939 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2010 UAE 0.852708 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2009 UAE 0.78485 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2008 UAE 0.736813 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2007 UAE 0.762759 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 2006 UAE 0.641051 
Noor Bank 2015 UAE 0.879286 
Noor Bank 2014 UAE 0.897632 
Noor Bank 2013 UAE 0.868784 
Noor Bank 2012 UAE 0.920829 
Noor Bank 2011 UAE 0.886333 
Noor Bank 2010 UAE 0.839375 
Noor Bank 2009 UAE 0 
Noor Bank 2008 UAE 0 
Noor Bank 2007 UAE 0 
Noor Bank 2006 UAE 0 
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Bank of Sharjah 2015 UAE 0.86308 
Bank of Sharjah 2014 UAE 0.892783 
Bank of Sharjah 2013 UAE 0.799252 
Bank of Sharjah 2012 UAE 0.878665 
Bank of Sharjah 2011 UAE 0.765344 
Bank of Sharjah 2010 UAE 0.685884 
Bank of Sharjah 2009 UAE 0.634876 
Bank of Sharjah 2008 UAE 0.674728 
Bank of Sharjah 2007 UAE 0.622419 
Bank of Sharjah 2006 UAE 0.656568 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2015 UAE 0.780077 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2014 UAE 0.724579 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2013 UAE 0.702172 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2012 UAE 0.70359 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2011 UAE 0.692874 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2010 UAE 0 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2009 UAE 0 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2008 UAE 0 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2007 UAE 0 
United Arab Bank PJSC 2006 UAE 0 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2015 UAE 0.860787 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2014 UAE 0.766179 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2013 UAE 0.793281 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2012 UAE 0.695478 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2011 UAE 0.724874 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2010 UAE 0.792564 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2009 UAE 0.785756 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2008 UAE 0.729604 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2007 UAE 0.7637 
Commercial Bank International P.S.C. 2006 UAE 0.683084 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2015 UAE 0.678687 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2014 UAE 0.661995 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2013 UAE 0.634265 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2012 UAE 0.650243 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2011 UAE 0.608559 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2010 UAE 0.632503 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2009 UAE 0.736012 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2008 UAE 0.654277 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2007 UAE 0.620378 
Invest Bank P.S.C. 2006 UAE 0.450805 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2015 UAE 0.876433 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2014 UAE 1 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2013 UAE 0.989144 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2012 UAE 1 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2011 UAE 1 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2010 UAE 1 
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Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2009 UAE 1 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2008 UAE 1 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2007 UAE 1 
Arab Bank for Investment & Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 2006 UAE 0.8358 
Ajman Bank 2015 UAE 0.725263 
Ajman Bank 2014 UAE 0.728735 
Ajman Bank 2013 UAE 0.617289 
Ajman Bank 2012 UAE 0.627426 
Ajman Bank 2011 UAE 0 
Ajman Bank 2010 UAE 0 
Ajman Bank 2009 UAE 0 
Ajman Bank 2008 UAE 0 
Ajman Bank 2007 UAE 0 
Ajman Bank 2006 UAE 0 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2015 UAE 0.611395 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2014 UAE 0.589437 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2013 UAE 0.614048 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2012 UAE 0.617587 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2011 UAE 0.609676 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2010 UAE 0.633514 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2009 UAE 0.659464 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2008 UAE 0.614434 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2007 UAE 0.736368 
National Bank of Umm Al-Qaiwain PSC 2006 UAE 0.355943 
Bank Melli Iran 2015 UAE 1 
Bank Melli Iran 2014 UAE 0.919013 
Bank Melli Iran 2013 UAE 0.915095 
Bank Melli Iran 2012 UAE 1 
Bank Melli Iran 2011 UAE 0 
Bank Melli Iran 2010 UAE 0 
Bank Melli Iran 2009 UAE 0 
Bank Melli Iran 2008 UAE 0 
Bank Melli Iran 2007 UAE 0 
Bank Melli Iran 2006 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2015 UAE 0.820891 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2014 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2013 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2012 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2011 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2010 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2009 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2008 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2007 UAE 0 
Bank of China Middle East (Dubai) Limited 2006 UAE 0 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2015 BAH 1 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2014 BAH 1 
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Ahli United Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0.964098 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2012 BAH 1 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0.998475 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0.998227 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0.956968 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0.975626 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0.914955 
Ahli United Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0.954803 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2015 BAH 0.955245 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2014 BAH 1 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2013 BAH 1 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2012 BAH 0.946966 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2011 BAH 1 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2010 BAH 0.994924 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2009 BAH 0.95744 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2008 BAH 1 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2007 BAH 1 
Arab Banking Corporation BSC-Bank ABC 2006 BAH 0.924783 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2015 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2014 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2013 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2012 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2011 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2010 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2009 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2008 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2007 BAH 1 
Albaraka Banking Group B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0.861112 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2015 BAH 1 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0.929266 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0.817329 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0.954716 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0.76634 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0.679759 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0.721865 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2008 BAH 1 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0.966112 
Gulf International Bank BSC 2006 BAH 1 
BBK B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0.776331 
BBK B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0.768794 
BBK B.S.C. 2013 BAH 0.749677 
BBK B.S.C. 2012 BAH 0.76518 
BBK B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0.738121 
BBK B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0.704557 
BBK B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0.734425 
BBK B.S.C. 2008 BAH 0.678144 
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BBK B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0.634083 
BBK B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0.590625 
National Bank of Bahrain 2015 BAH 0.9866 
National Bank of Bahrain 2014 BAH 1 
National Bank of Bahrain 2013 BAH 0.90557 
National Bank of Bahrain 2012 BAH 1 
National Bank of Bahrain 2011 BAH 0.865895 
National Bank of Bahrain 2010 BAH 0.841445 
National Bank of Bahrain 2009 BAH 0.741384 
National Bank of Bahrain 2008 BAH 0.80774 
National Bank of Bahrain 2007 BAH 0.82219 
National Bank of Bahrain 2006 BAH 0.752669 
Awal Bank 2015 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2014 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2013 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2012 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2011 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2010 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2009 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2008 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2007 BAH 0 
Awal Bank 2006 BAH 0 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0.885848 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0.876669 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2013 BAH 0 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2012 BAH 0 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2008 BAH 0 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0 
Ithmaar Bank B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0.978616 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2014 BAH 1 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2013 BAH 0.709691 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2012 BAH 1 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0.756685 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0.786804 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0.661333 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2008 BAH 0.657763 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0 
Al-Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0 
Kuwait Finance House 2015 BAH 0.664493 
Kuwait Finance House 2014 BAH 0.652666 
Kuwait Finance House 2013 BAH 0.593031 
Kuwait Finance House 2012 BAH 0.652409 
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Kuwait Finance House 2011 BAH 0.582058 
Kuwait Finance House 2010 BAH 0.562105 
Kuwait Finance House 2009 BAH 0.367179 
Kuwait Finance House 2008 BAH 0.474055 
Kuwait Finance House 2007 BAH 0.550452 
Kuwait Finance House 2006 BAH 0.529396 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2015 BAH 0.582714 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2014 BAH 0.501759 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2013 BAH 0.58198 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2012 BAH 0.438995 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2011 BAH 0 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2010 BAH 0 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2009 BAH 0 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2008 BAH 0 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2007 BAH 0 
International Banking Corporation BSC 2006 BAH 0 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0.584066 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0.561566 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2013 BAH 1 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2012 BAH 0.804706 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2011 BAH 1 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0.868413 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2008 BAH 0 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2015 BAH 0.522295 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2014 BAH 0.568284 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2013 BAH 0.804843 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2012 BAH 1 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2011 BAH 0.438806 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2010 BAH 0.641693 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2009 BAH 0.888189 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2008 BAH 1 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2007 BAH 0.578145 
United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC 2006 BAH 0.610486 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0.666566 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0.67468 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2013 BAH 0.749082 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2012 BAH 0.761675 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2008 BAH 0 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0 
Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0 
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Investcorp Bank BSC 2015 BAH 0.809541 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0.679568 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0.732548 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0.461991 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0.70702 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0.646147 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0.750009 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0.902992 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2007 BAH 1 
Investcorp Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0.826163 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2015 BAH 0.888489 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0.958061 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0.370767 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2012 BAH 1 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0.333037 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Albaraka Islamic Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2015 BAH 0.621126 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2014 BAH 0.62565 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2013 BAH 0.485656 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2012 BAH 0.59557 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2011 BAH 0.47597 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2010 BAH 0.445868 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2009 BAH 0.518154 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2008 BAH 0.561791 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2007 BAH 0.323027 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 2006 BAH 0.527208 
Eskan Bank BSC 2015 BAH 1 
Eskan Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0.714696 
Eskan Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0.799756 
Eskan Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0.997275 
Eskan Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0 
Eskan Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Eskan Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Eskan Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0 
Eskan Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Eskan Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0.704045 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0.844388 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2013 BAH 0.677688 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2012 BAH 0.856515 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0.656478 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0.92067 
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Future Bank B.S.C. 2009 BAH 1 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2008 BAH 1 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0.962297 
Future Bank B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2015 BAH 0.75739 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2014 BAH 0.541387 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2013 BAH 0.550223 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2012 BAH 0.68707 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2011 BAH 0.821143 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2010 BAH 1 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2009 BAH 1 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2008 BAH 0.852437 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2007 BAH 0.0434726 
Alubaf Arab International Bank 2006 BAH 0 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2015 BAH 0.0664504 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2014 BAH 0.175022 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2013 BAH 0.100112 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2012 BAH 0.0731461 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2011 BAH 0.0816959 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2010 BAH 0.106864 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2009 BAH 0.0990925 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2008 BAH 0.0761289 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2007 BAH 0.0805775 
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.) 2006 BAH 0.150981 
BMI Bank BSC 2015 BAH 0.792724 
BMI Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0.651098 
BMI Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0.605053 
BMI Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0.743968 
BMI Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0.868493 
BMI Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0.870435 
BMI Bank BSC 2009 BAH 1 
BMI Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0.742323 
BMI Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0.555317 
BMI Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0.590622 
First energy bank 2015 BAH 0.150827 
First energy bank 2014 BAH 0.28078 
First energy bank 2013 BAH 0 
First energy bank 2012 BAH 0 
First energy bank 2011 BAH 0.14135 
First energy bank 2010 BAH 0.241156 
First energy bank 2009 BAH 0.346353 
First energy bank 2008 BAH 1 
First energy bank 2007 BAH 0 
First energy bank 2006 BAH 0 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2015 BAH 1 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2014 BAH 0.723808 
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Bank Alkhair BSC 2013 BAH 0.380179 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2012 BAH 0.406274 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2011 BAH 0.624486 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2008 BAH 1 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Bank Alkhair BSC 2006 BAH 0 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0.870179 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0.942824 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2013 BAH 0.897452 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2012 BAH 1 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0.696435 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2008 BAH 0 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0 
Bahrain Development Bank B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2015 BAH 0.248314 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0.305221 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0.874375 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Ibdar Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2015 BAH 0.293219 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2014 BAH 0.309434 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2013 BAH 0 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2012 BAH 0.464376 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2011 BAH 0 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2010 BAH 0 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2009 BAH 0 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2008 BAH 0 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2007 BAH 1 
Venture Capital Bank BSC (c)-VCBank 2006 BAH 0.801583 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2015 BAH 0 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2014 BAH 0.0111217 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2013 BAH 0 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2012 BAH 0 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2011 BAH 0 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2010 BAH 0 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2009 BAH 0 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2008 BAH 0 
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International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2007 BAH 0 
International Investment Bank B.S.C.-IIB 2006 BAH 0 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2015 BAH 0.455872 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0.17712 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0.47596 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Seera Investment Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2015 BAH 1 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0.916646 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2013 BAH 1 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2012 BAH 1 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0.93582 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2010 BAH 1 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0.902118 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2008 BAH 0.610296 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0.703713 
TAIB Bank B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0.50879 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0.694376 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0.54388 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2013 BAH 0.421793 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2012 BAH 0.389376 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0.340149 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0.937392 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0.945681 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2008 BAH 1 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0.920342 
BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain Middle East Bank B.S.C. 2006 BAH 1 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2015 BAH 0 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2014 BAH 0 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2013 BAH 0 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2012 BAH 0 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2011 BAH 0 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2010 BAH 0 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2009 BAH 0.95946 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2008 BAH 0 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2007 BAH 0 
Oasis Capital Bank B.S.C. 2006 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2015 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0 
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Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Capinnova Investment Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2015 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2014 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2013 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2012 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2011 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2008 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Global Banking Corporation BSC 2006 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2015 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2014 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2013 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2012 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2011 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2008 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Gulf One investment bank BSC 2006 BAH 0 
Investors Bank BSC 2015 BAH 0 
Investors Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0 
Investors Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0 
Investors Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0 
Investors Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0 
Investors Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Investors Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0.193516 
Investors Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0.118703 
Investors Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0.197776 
Investors Bank BSC 2006 BAH 1 
Addax Bank BSC 2015 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2014 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2013 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2012 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2011 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2010 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2009 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2008 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2007 BAH 0 
Addax Bank BSC 2006 BAH 0 
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Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2015 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2014 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2013 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2012 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2011 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2010 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2009 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2008 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2007 BAH 0 
Citi Islamic Investment Bank EC 2006 BAH 0 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2015 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2014 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2013 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2012 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2011 JOR 0.977988 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2010 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2009 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2008 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2007 JOR 0.931076 
Arab Bank Group (Combined) 2006 JOR 0.955276 
Arab Bank Plc 2015 JOR 0.977088 
Arab Bank Plc 2014 JOR 0.998995 
Arab Bank Plc 2013 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Plc 2012 JOR 0.98337 
Arab Bank Plc 2011 JOR 1 
Arab Bank Plc 2010 JOR 0.981476 
Arab Bank Plc 2009 JOR 0.951923 
Arab Bank Plc 2008 JOR 0.932118 
Arab Bank Plc 2007 JOR 0.957507 
Arab Bank Plc 2006 JOR 1 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2015 JOR 1 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2014 JOR 0.977046 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2013 JOR 0.991784 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2012 JOR 0.948468 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2011 JOR 1 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2010 JOR 0.979717 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2009 JOR 0.909042 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2008 JOR 0.945349 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2007 JOR 0.865096 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance (The) 2006 JOR 0.894842 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2015 JOR 1 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2014 JOR 1 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2013 JOR 1 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2012 JOR 0.885879 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2011 JOR 0.925031 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2010 JOR 0.839024 
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Jordan Islamic Bank 2009 JOR 0.755337 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2008 JOR 0.733261 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2007 JOR 0.763941 
Jordan Islamic Bank 2006 JOR 0.844637 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2015 JOR 0.704613 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2014 JOR 0.718216 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2013 JOR 0.69576 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2012 JOR 0.621496 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2011 JOR 0.647584 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2010 JOR 0.657866 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2009 JOR 0 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2008 JOR 0 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2007 JOR 0 
Jordan Kuwait Bank 2006 JOR 0 
Cairo Amman Bank 2015 JOR 1 
Cairo Amman Bank 2014 JOR 0.986382 
Cairo Amman Bank 2013 JOR 0.937564 
Cairo Amman Bank 2012 JOR 0.876232 
Cairo Amman Bank 2011 JOR 0.909575 
Cairo Amman Bank 2010 JOR 0.956054 
Cairo Amman Bank 2009 JOR 0.981769 
Cairo Amman Bank 2008 JOR 1 
Cairo Amman Bank 2007 JOR 0.905271 
Cairo Amman Bank 2006 JOR 0.977531 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2015 JOR 1 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2014 JOR 0.971992 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2013 JOR 0.882335 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2012 JOR 0.863505 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2011 JOR 0.971268 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2010 JOR 1 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2009 JOR 0.979759 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2008 JOR 1 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2007 JOR 1 
Jordan Ahli Bank Plc 2006 JOR 1 
Bank al Etihad 2015 JOR 0.635051 
Bank al Etihad 2014 JOR 0.630775 
Bank al Etihad 2013 JOR 0.646183 
Bank al Etihad 2012 JOR 0.683861 
Bank al Etihad 2011 JOR 0.660426 
Bank al Etihad 2010 JOR 0.636969 
Bank al Etihad 2009 JOR 0.517508 
Bank al Etihad 2008 JOR 0.581676 
Bank al Etihad 2007 JOR 0.56271 
Bank al Etihad 2006 JOR 0.555986 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2015 JOR 0.868905 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2014 JOR 0.80146 
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Bank of Jordan Plc 2013 JOR 0.812122 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2012 JOR 0.794288 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2011 JOR 0.781187 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2010 JOR 0.842942 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2009 JOR 0.810935 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2008 JOR 0.742411 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2007 JOR 0.722407 
Bank of Jordan Plc 2006 JOR 0.747511 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2015 JOR 0.784264 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2014 JOR 0.813615 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2013 JOR 0.651661 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2012 JOR 0.764687 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2011 JOR 0.578365 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2010 JOR 0.564416 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2009 JOR 0.469991 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2008 JOR 0.409595 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2007 JOR 0.385314 
Capital Bank of Jordan 2006 JOR 0.423235 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2015 JOR 1 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2014 JOR 0.915775 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2013 JOR 0.842862 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2012 JOR 1 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2011 JOR 0.870381 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2010 JOR 0.815012 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2009 JOR 0.817827 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2008 JOR 0.712543 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2007 JOR 0.762722 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank 2006 JOR 1 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2015 JOR 1 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2014 JOR 1 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2013 JOR 0.856416 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2012 JOR 0.728072 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2011 JOR 0.569797 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2010 JOR 0.420069 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2009 JOR 0.423251 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2008 JOR 0.48555 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2007 JOR 0.643193 
Islamic International Arab Bank 2006 JOR 0.765907 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2015 JOR 0.711223 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2014 JOR 0.674443 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2013 JOR 0.578676 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2012 JOR 0.626268 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2011 JOR 0.570317 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2010 JOR 0.577449 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2009 JOR 0.485951 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2008 JOR 0.522813 
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Jordan Commercial Bank 2007 JOR 0.53577 
Jordan Commercial Bank 2006 JOR 0.705015 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2015 JOR 0.642684 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2014 JOR 0.672228 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2013 JOR 0.587624 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2012 JOR 0.600633 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2011 JOR 0.628358 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2010 JOR 0.740247 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2009 JOR 0.75515 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2008 JOR 0.78169 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2007 JOR 0.74329 
Arab Banking Corporation (Jordan) 2006 JOR 0.684228 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2015 JOR 0.815694 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2014 JOR 0.855414 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2013 JOR 1 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2012 JOR 0.987745 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2011 JOR 0.97642 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2010 JOR 0.730797 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2009 JOR 0.619922 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2008 JOR 0.693161 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2007 JOR 1 
Société générale de Banque-Jordanie 2006 JOR 1 
Invest Bank 2015 JOR 0.574802 
Invest Bank 2014 JOR 0.616675 
Invest Bank 2013 JOR 0.878659 
Invest Bank 2012 JOR 0.603327 
Invest Bank 2011 JOR 0.754996 
Invest Bank 2010 JOR 0.680436 
Invest Bank 2009 JOR 0.695281 
Invest Bank 2008 JOR 0.70714 
Invest Bank 2007 JOR 0.821194 
Invest Bank 2006 JOR 1 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2015 JOR 1 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2014 JOR 1 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2013 JOR 1 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2012 JOR 0.719399 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2011 JOR 0 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2010 JOR 0 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2009 JOR 0 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2008 JOR 0 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2007 JOR 0 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank 2006 JOR 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2015 JOR 1 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2014 JOR 0.947825 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2013 JOR 0.830917 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2012 JOR 0.793674 
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Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2011 JOR 0.773106 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2010 JOR 0.70618 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2009 JOR 0.627334 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2008 JOR 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2007 JOR 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2006 JOR 0 
National Bank of Egypt 2015 EGY 1 
National Bank of Egypt 2014 EGY 1 
National Bank of Egypt 2013 EGY 1 
National Bank of Egypt 2012 EGY 1 
National Bank of Egypt 2011 EGY 1 
National Bank of Egypt 2010 EGY 1 
National Bank of Egypt 2009 EGY 0 
National Bank of Egypt 2008 EGY 0 
National Bank of Egypt 2007 EGY 0 
National Bank of Egypt 2006 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2015 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2014 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2013 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2012 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2011 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2010 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2009 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2008 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Banque Misr SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2015 EGY 0.893408 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2014 EGY 0.860538 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2013 EGY 0.783487 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2012 EGY 1 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2011 EGY 1 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2010 EGY 0.913999 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2009 EGY 1 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2008 EGY 0 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2007 EGY 0 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 2006 EGY 0 
QNB Al Ahli 2015 EGY 0.901494 
QNB Al Ahli 2014 EGY 0.974622 
QNB Al Ahli 2013 EGY 0.991817 
QNB Al Ahli 2012 EGY 1 
QNB Al Ahli 2011 EGY 1 
QNB Al Ahli 2010 EGY 0 
QNB Al Ahli 2009 EGY 0 
QNB Al Ahli 2008 EGY 0 
QNB Al Ahli 2007 EGY 0 
QNB Al Ahli 2006 EGY 0 
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Arab African International Bank 2015 EGY 0.794439 
Arab African International Bank 2014 EGY 0.83094 
Arab African International Bank 2013 EGY 0.7595 
Arab African International Bank 2012 EGY 1 
Arab African International Bank 2011 EGY 1 
Arab African International Bank 2010 EGY 0.896383 
Arab African International Bank 2009 EGY 0 
Arab African International Bank 2008 EGY 0 
Arab African International Bank 2007 EGY 0 
Arab African International Bank 2006 EGY 0 
Banque du Caire SAE 2015 EGY 1 
Banque du Caire SAE 2014 EGY 1 
Banque du Caire SAE 2013 EGY 1 
Banque du Caire SAE 2012 EGY 0.984792 
Banque du Caire SAE 2011 EGY 0.907357 
Banque du Caire SAE 2010 EGY 0 
Banque du Caire SAE 2009 EGY 0 
Banque du Caire SAE 2008 EGY 0 
Banque du Caire SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Banque du Caire SAE 2006 EGY 0 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2015 EGY 0.975301 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2014 EGY 1 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2013 EGY 0.846199 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2012 EGY 0.94981 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2011 EGY 0.99747 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2010 EGY 0.982005 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2009 EGY 0 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2008 EGY 0 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2007 EGY 0 
HSBC Bank Egypt S A E 2006 EGY 0 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2015 EGY 1 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2014 EGY 1 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2013 EGY 1 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2012 EGY 1 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2011 EGY 1 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2010 EGY 0 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2009 EGY 0 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2008 EGY 0 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2007 EGY 0 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 2006 EGY 0 
Bank of Alexandria 2015 EGY 1 
Bank of Alexandria 2014 EGY 1 
Bank of Alexandria 2013 EGY 0.979008 
Bank of Alexandria 2012 EGY 0.956086 
Bank of Alexandria 2011 EGY 0.994247 
Bank of Alexandria 2010 EGY 0.93702 
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Bank of Alexandria 2009 EGY 0 
Bank of Alexandria 2008 EGY 0 
Bank of Alexandria 2007 EGY 0 
Bank of Alexandria 2006 EGY 0 
Bank Audi SAE 2015 EGY 0 
Bank Audi SAE 2014 EGY 0.71933 
Bank Audi SAE 2013 EGY 0.622121 
Bank Audi SAE 2012 EGY 0.721565 
Bank Audi SAE 2011 EGY 0.720804 
Bank Audi SAE 2010 EGY 0.862628 
Bank Audi SAE 2009 EGY 0.826353 
Bank Audi SAE 2008 EGY 0 
Bank Audi SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Bank Audi SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2015 EGY 0.657883 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2014 EGY 0.632121 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2013 EGY 0.610598 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2012 EGY 0.663078 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2011 EGY 0.548709 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2010 EGY 0.571022 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2009 EGY 0 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2008 EGY 0 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2007 EGY 0 
Société Arabe Internationale de Banque-SAIB 2006 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2015 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2014 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2013 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2012 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2011 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2010 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2009 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2008 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2007 EGY 0 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 2006 EGY 0 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2015 EGY 0.744346 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2014 EGY 0.629616 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2013 EGY 0.568867 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2012 EGY 0.629785 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2011 EGY 0.617632 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2010 EGY 0.593833 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2009 EGY 0 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2008 EGY 0 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2007 EGY 0 
The National Bank of Kuwait - Egypt SAE-NBK 2006 EGY 0 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2015 EGY 0.713682 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2014 EGY 0.663653 
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Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2013 EGY 0.610924 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2012 EGY 0.744456 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2011 EGY 0.578488 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2010 EGY 0 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2009 EGY 0 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2008 EGY 0 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Ahli United Bank (Egypt) SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2015 EGY 0 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2014 EGY 0.956386 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2013 EGY 1 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2012 EGY 0 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2011 EGY 1 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2010 EGY 0.87406 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2009 EGY 0.906648 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2008 EGY 0 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Emirates National Bank of Dubai SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Arab International Bank 2015 EGY 0.646287 
Arab International Bank 2014 EGY 0.687219 
Arab International Bank 2013 EGY 0.769394 
Arab International Bank 2012 EGY 0.642795 
Arab International Bank 2011 EGY 0.901611 
Arab International Bank 2010 EGY 1 
Arab International Bank 2009 EGY 0.937825 
Arab International Bank 2008 EGY 0.899135 
Arab International Bank 2007 EGY 0 
Arab International Bank 2006 EGY 0 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2015 EGY 0.662009 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2014 EGY 0.595817 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2013 EGY 0.546313 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2012 EGY 0.616899 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2011 EGY 0.802509 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2010 EGY 0.752382 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2009 EGY 0 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2008 EGY 0 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2015 EGY 1 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2014 EGY 0.994055 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2013 EGY 1 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2012 EGY 0.998393 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2011 EGY 1 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2010 EGY 0 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2009 EGY 0 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2008 EGY 0 
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Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2007 EGY 0 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 2006 EGY 0 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2015 EGY 0.735615 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2014 EGY 0.492849 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2013 EGY 0.508857 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2012 EGY 0.544741 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2011 EGY 0.575084 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2010 EGY 0.49784 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2009 EGY 0 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2008 EGY 0 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Egyptian Gulf Bank SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Suez Canal Bank 2015 EGY 0.926631 
Suez Canal Bank 2014 EGY 0.897387 
Suez Canal Bank 2013 EGY 0.9072 
Suez Canal Bank 2012 EGY 0.939793 
Suez Canal Bank 2011 EGY 0.760526 
Suez Canal Bank 2010 EGY 0 
Suez Canal Bank 2009 EGY 0 
Suez Canal Bank 2008 EGY 0 
Suez Canal Bank 2007 EGY 0 
Suez Canal Bank 2006 EGY 0 
United Bank (The) 2015 EGY 1 
United Bank (The) 2014 EGY 1 
United Bank (The) 2013 EGY 0.953658 
United Bank (The) 2012 EGY 0.714144 
United Bank (The) 2011 EGY 0.889706 
United Bank (The) 2010 EGY 0 
United Bank (The) 2009 EGY 0 
United Bank (The) 2008 EGY 0 
United Bank (The) 2007 EGY 0 
United Bank (The) 2006 EGY 0 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2015 EGY 0.682839 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2014 EGY 0.636508 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2013 EGY 0.664123 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2012 EGY 0.652748 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2011 EGY 0.618381 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2010 EGY 0.710704 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2009 EGY 0 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2008 EGY 0 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2007 EGY 0 
Barclays Bank - Egypt S.A.E. 2006 EGY 0 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2015 EGY 0.679354 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2014 EGY 0.678864 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2013 EGY 0.853386 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2012 EGY 0.766603 
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BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2011 EGY 0.697745 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2010 EGY 0.756326 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2009 EGY 0.977033 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2008 EGY 0 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2007 EGY 0 
BLOM Bank Egypt SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2015 EGY 0.548351 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2014 EGY 0.561366 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2013 EGY 0.639155 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2012 EGY 0.649857 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2011 EGY 0.857478 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2010 EGY 1 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2009 EGY 1 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2008 EGY 1 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Union National Bank - Egypt SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Nasser Social Bank 2015 EGY 0.486064 
Nasser Social Bank 2014 EGY 0.509234 
Nasser Social Bank 2013 EGY 1 
Nasser Social Bank 2012 EGY 0 
Nasser Social Bank 2011 EGY 0 
Nasser Social Bank 2010 EGY 0 
Nasser Social Bank 2009 EGY 0 
Nasser Social Bank 2008 EGY 0 
Nasser Social Bank 2007 EGY 0 
Nasser Social Bank 2006 EGY 0 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2015 EGY 0.724813 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2014 EGY 0.948585 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2013 EGY 1 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2012 EGY 0.908889 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2011 EGY 1 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2010 EGY 0.8862 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2009 EGY 0.686227 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2008 EGY 0.720972 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2007 EGY 0 
Piraeus Bank Egypt SAE 2006 EGY 0 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2015 EGY 0.865079 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2014 EGY 1 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2013 EGY 1 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2012 EGY 0.687179 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2011 EGY 1 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2010 EGY 0.820591 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2009 EGY 0 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2008 EGY 0 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2007 EGY 0 
Arab Banking Corporation - Egypt (SAE) 2006 EGY 0 
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Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2015 EGY 1 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2014 EGY 0.934937 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2013 EGY 0.760345 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2012 EGY 0.730188 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2011 EGY 1 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2010 EGY 0 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2009 EGY 0 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2008 EGY 0 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2007 EGY 0 
Arab Investment Bank-Federal Arab Bank for Development 
and Investment 2006 EGY 0 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2015 SU 0.361916 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2014 SU 0.295009 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2013 SU 0.194197 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2012 SU 0.322788 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2011 SU 0.219351 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2010 SU 0.220921 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2009 SU 0.22893 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2008 SU 0.203459 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2007 SU 1 
Omdurman National Bank Public Limited Company 2006 SU 0.546084 
Bank of Khartoum 2015 SU 0.629212 
Bank of Khartoum 2014 SU 0.609639 
Bank of Khartoum 2013 SU 0.903264 
Bank of Khartoum 2012 SU 0.571345 
Bank of Khartoum 2011 SU 0.88769 
Bank of Khartoum 2010 SU 0 
Bank of Khartoum 2009 SU 0 
Bank of Khartoum 2008 SU 0 
Bank of Khartoum 2007 SU 0 
Bank of Khartoum 2006 SU 0 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2015 SU 1 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2014 SU 0.774751 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2013 SU 0.464838 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2012 SU 0.760332 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2011 SU 0.319613 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2010 SU 0.345397 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2009 SU 0.446643 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2008 SU 0.411179 
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Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2007 SU 0.672144 
Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) 2006 SU 0.496077 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2015 SU 0.48338 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2014 SU 0.695724 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2013 SU 0 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2012 SU 0 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2011 SU 0 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2010 SU 0 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2009 SU 0 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2008 SU 0 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2007 SU 0 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 2006 SU 0 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2015 SU 0.5392 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2014 SU 0.895257 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2013 SU 0.829782 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2012 SU 0.739298 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2011 SU 1 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2010 SU 1 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2009 SU 0.48069 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2008 SU 0.447216 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2007 SU 0.417192 
Tadamon Islamic Bank 2006 SU 0.34005 
Elnilein  Bank 2015 SU 0 
Elnilein  Bank 2014 SU 0 
Elnilein  Bank 2013 SU 0 
Elnilein  Bank 2012 SU 0 
Elnilein  Bank 2011 SU 0 
Elnilein  Bank 2010 SU 0.424067 
Elnilein  Bank 2009 SU 0.39254 
Elnilein  Bank 2008 SU 0.314899 
Elnilein  Bank 2007 SU 0.36939 
Elnilein  Bank 2006 SU 0.537288 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2015 SU 0.631088 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2014 SU 0.784603 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2013 SU 0.847755 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2012 SU 0.790396 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2011 SU 0.726931 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2010 SU 0.738 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2009 SU 0.782834 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2008 SU 0.773807 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2007 SU 0.833907 
Sudanese French Bank Public Limited Company (The) 2006 SU 1 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2015 SU 0 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2014 SU 0 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2013 SU 0 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2012 SU 0 
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AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2011 SU 0 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2010 SU 0 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2009 SU 0.739281 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2008 SU 0.619983 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2007 SU 0.80159 
AlNile Bank for Commerce & Development 2006 SU 1 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2015 SU 0.389771 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2014 SU 0.501198 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2013 SU 0.49782 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2012 SU 0 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2011 SU 0.495898 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2010 SU 0.634795 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2009 SU 0.598088 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2008 SU 1 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2007 SU 1 
Farmers Commercial Bank 2006 SU 1 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2015 SU 0.553058 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2014 SU 0.511179 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2013 SU 0.763402 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2012 SU 0.655093 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2011 SU 0.823324 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2010 SU 0.830333 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2009 SU 0.737793 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2008 SU 0.971002 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2007 SU 1 
Al Baraka Bank Sudan Public Limited Company 2006 SU 1 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2015 SU 1 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2014 SU 0.870271 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2013 SU 1 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2012 SU 0.777282 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2011 SU 1 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2010 SU 0.84079 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2009 SU 0.572664 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2008 SU 1 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2007 SU 0 
Blue Nile Mashreq Bank Ltd 2006 SU 0.643375 
Al Salam Bank 2015 SU 0.314022 
Al Salam Bank 2014 SU 0.339485 
Al Salam Bank 2013 SU 0.287127 
Al Salam Bank 2012 SU 0.432861 
Al Salam Bank 2011 SU 0.223132 
Al Salam Bank 2010 SU 0.214812 
Al Salam Bank 2009 SU 0.239252 
Al Salam Bank 2008 SU 0.210269 
Al Salam Bank 2007 SU 0.258014 
Al Salam Bank 2006 SU 0 
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United Capital Bank 2015 SU 0.244598 
United Capital Bank 2014 SU 0.251842 
United Capital Bank 2013 SU 0.319933 
United Capital Bank 2012 SU 0.269885 
United Capital Bank 2011 SU 0.328283 
United Capital Bank 2010 SU 0.29486 
United Capital Bank 2009 SU 0.229824 
United Capital Bank 2008 SU 0 
United Capital Bank 2007 SU 0 
United Capital Bank 2006 SU 0 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2015 SU 0.569129 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2014 SU 0.652048 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2013 SU 0.55718 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2012 SU 0.672677 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2011 SU 0.537842 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2010 SU 0 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2009 SU 0 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2008 SU 0 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2007 SU 0 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 2006 SU 0 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2015 SU 0.651623 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2014 SU 0.538238 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2013 SU 0.548222 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2012 SU 0.692395 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2011 SU 0.457306 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2010 SU 0.373402 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2009 SU 0.34223 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2008 SU 0.318493 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2007 SU 1 
Al Shamal Islamic Bank 2006 SU 1 
Animal Resources Bank 2015 SU 0 
Animal Resources Bank 2014 SU 0 
Animal Resources Bank 2013 SU 0.32235 
Animal Resources Bank 2012 SU 0.298267 
Animal Resources Bank 2011 SU 0.359026 
Animal Resources Bank 2010 SU 0.413072 
Animal Resources Bank 2009 SU 0.514325 
Animal Resources Bank 2008 SU 0 
Animal Resources Bank 2007 SU 0 
Animal Resources Bank 2006 SU 0 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2015 SU 0.568503 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2014 SU 0.539156 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2013 SU 0.591935 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2012 SU 0.652575 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2011 SU 1 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2010 SU 0.868366 
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Saudi Sudanese Bank 2009 SU 0.762178 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2008 SU 0.587029 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2007 SU 0.653963 
Saudi Sudanese Bank 2006 SU 0.467855 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2015 SU 0 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2014 SU 0 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2013 SU 0 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2012 SU 0 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2011 SU 0 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2010 SU 0 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2009 SU 1 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2008 SU 0.801948 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2007 SU 1 
Byblos Bank Africa Ltd 2006 SU 0 
Industrial Development Bank 2015 SU 0.321257 
Industrial Development Bank 2014 SU 0.291967 
Industrial Development Bank 2013 SU 0.628454 
Industrial Development Bank 2012 SU 0.342719 
Industrial Development Bank 2011 SU 0.654112 
Industrial Development Bank 2010 SU 0 
Industrial Development Bank 2009 SU 0 
Industrial Development Bank 2008 SU 0 
Industrial Development Bank 2007 SU 0 
Industrial Development Bank 2006 SU 0 
National Bank of Sudan 2015 SU 0.23568 
National Bank of Sudan 2014 SU 0.295357 
National Bank of Sudan 2013 SU 0.323256 
National Bank of Sudan 2012 SU 0.287267 
National Bank of Sudan 2011 SU 0.578943 
National Bank of Sudan 2010 SU 0.421928 
National Bank of Sudan 2009 SU 0.615354 
National Bank of Sudan 2008 SU 0 
National Bank of Sudan 2007 SU 0 
National Bank of Sudan 2006 SU 0 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2015 SU 0.729947 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2014 SU 0.722206 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2013 SU 0.546352 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2012 SU 0.617268 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2011 SU 0.481238 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2010 SU 0.532513 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2009 SU 0.816599 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2008 SU 0.808768 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2007 SU 0 
Savings & Social Development Bank 2006 SU 0 
Export Development Bank 2015 SU 0.454891 
Export Development Bank 2014 SU 0.447846 
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Export Development Bank 2013 SU 0 
Export Development Bank 2012 SU 0.566346 
Export Development Bank 2011 SU 0.403359 
Export Development Bank 2010 SU 0.448299 
Export Development Bank 2009 SU 0.412377 
Export Development Bank 2008 SU 0.444021 
Export Development Bank 2007 SU 0.489405 
Export Development Bank 2006 SU 0.405292 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2015 SU 0.596588 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2014 SU 0.644122 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2013 SU 1 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2012 SU 0.490004 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2011 SU 0.822773 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2010 SU 0.798825 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2009 SU 1 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2008 SU 0 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2007 SU 0 
Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank 2006 SU 0 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2015 SU 0.469046 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2014 SU 0.487959 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2013 SU 0.624776 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2012 SU 0.605579 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2011 SU 0.456868 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2010 SU 0.479839 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2009 SU 0.51734 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2008 SU 0.530738 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2007 SU 0 
Sudanese Egyptian Bank 2006 SU 1 
Workers' National Bank 2015 SU 0.365392 
Workers' National Bank 2014 SU 0.298359 
Workers' National Bank 2013 SU 0.306872 
Workers' National Bank 2012 SU 0.345835 
Workers' National Bank 2011 SU 0.738087 
Workers' National Bank 2010 SU 1 
Workers' National Bank 2009 SU 1 
Workers' National Bank 2008 SU 1 
Workers' National Bank 2007 SU 0 
Workers' National Bank 2006 SU 0 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2015 SU 0.625114 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2014 SU 0 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2013 SU 0 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2012 SU 0 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2011 SU 0 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2010 SU 0 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2009 SU 0 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2008 SU 0 
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Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2007 SU 0 
Arab Sudanese Bank Co Ltd 2006 SU 0 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2015 SU 0.36712 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2014 SU 0.269185 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2013 SU 0 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2012 SU 0 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2011 SU 0 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2010 SU 0 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2009 SU 0 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2008 SU 0 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2007 SU 0 
Banque Sahelo-Saharienne pour L'Investissement et le 
Commerce-Soudan 2006 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2015 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2014 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2013 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2012 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2011 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2010 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2009 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2008 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2007 SU 0 
Real Estate Commercial Bank 2006 SU 0 
Turkiye is Bankasi A.S. - ISBANK 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 1 
 2013 TUR 1 
 2012 TUR 1 
 2011 TUR 0.92731 
 2010 TUR 1 
 2009 TUR 1 
 2008 TUR 0.979958 
 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 1 
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S. 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 1 
 2013 TUR 1 
 2012 TUR 0.973948 
 2011 TUR 0.939571 
 2010 TUR 1 
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 2009 TUR 1 
 2008 TUR 1 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. 2015 TUR 0.96286 
 2014 TUR 0.950533 
 2013 TUR 0.972816 
 2012 TUR 0.918658 
 2011 TUR 0.927854 
 2010 TUR 0.871661 
 2009 TUR 0.864981 
 2008 TUR 0.902489 
 2007 TUR 0.943551 
 2006 TUR 0.884302 
Haci Omer Sabanci Holding AS 2015 TUR 0.973478 
 2014 TUR 0.982125 
 2013 TUR 1 
 2012 TUR 0.93075 
 2011 TUR 1 
 2010 TUR 1 
 2009 TUR 1 
 2008 TUR 0.978767 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Akbank T.A.S. 2015 TUR 0.863352 
 2014 TUR 0.913468 
 2013 TUR 0.925258 
 2012 TUR 0.865291 
 2011 TUR 0.824627 
 2010 TUR 0.785272 
 2009 TUR 0.821762 
 2008 TUR 0.880682 
 2007 TUR 0.755973 
 2006 TUR 0.812525 
Yapi Ve Kredi Bankasi A.S. 2015 TUR 0.949508 
 2014 TUR 1 
 2013 TUR 0.9607 
 2012 TUR 0.958677 
 2011 TUR 0.935221 
 2010 TUR 0.92303 
 2009 TUR 0.930577 
 2008 TUR 0.99525 
 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 1 
Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 1 
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 2013 TUR 0.95239 
 2012 TUR 0.971245 
 2011 TUR 0.925347 
 2010 TUR 0.885097 
 2009 TUR 1 
 2008 TUR 0.947945 
 2007 TUR 0.926456 
 2006 TUR 1 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 0.975311 
 2013 TUR 0.961587 
 2012 TUR 0.982472 
 2011 TUR 0.927119 
 2010 TUR 0.906002 
 2009 TUR 0.891631 
 2008 TUR 0.92524 
 2007 TUR 0.935347 
 2006 TUR 1 
Koç Financial Services-KOC Finansal Hizmetler AS 2015 TUR 0.992511 
 2014 TUR 0 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Denizbank A.S. 2015 TUR 0.985997 
 2014 TUR 1 
 2013 TUR 0.97935 
 2012 TUR 0.951 
 2011 TUR 0.875418 
 2010 TUR 0.820934 
 2009 TUR 0.83585 
 2008 TUR 0.845317 
 2007 TUR 0.862338 
 2006 TUR 0.960804 
Finansbank A.S. 2015 TUR 0.885847 
 2014 TUR 0.954556 
 2013 TUR 0.874043 
 2012 TUR 0.882488 
 2011 TUR 0.829294 
 2010 TUR 0.834377 
 2009 TUR 0.856649 
 2008 TUR 0.808461 
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 2007 TUR 0.870561 
 2006 TUR 0.787365 
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S. 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 1 
 2013 TUR 0.986175 
 2012 TUR 0.927309 
 2011 TUR 0.854047 
 2010 TUR 0.818155 
 2009 TUR 0.947852 
 2008 TUR 1 
 2007 TUR 0.975148 
 2006 TUR 0.846716 
ING Bank A.S. 2015 TUR 0.666881 
 2014 TUR 0.817895 
 2013 TUR 0.771629 
 2012 TUR 0.875385 
 2011 TUR 0.743356 
 2010 TUR 0.784207 
 2009 TUR 0.802787 
 2008 TUR 0.764727 
 2007 TUR 0.827286 
 2006 TUR 0 
Fiba Holding AS 2015 TUR 0.841222 
 2014 TUR 0.862864 
 2013 TUR 0.957001 
 2012 TUR 0.914324 
 2011 TUR 0.869008 
 2010 TUR 0.910866 
 2009 TUR 0.992672 
 2008 TUR 0.850859 
 2007 TUR 0.72737 
 2006 TUR 0.619298 
Kuveyt Turk Katilim Bankasi A.S.-Kuwait Turkish Participation 
Bank Inc 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 0.993102 
 2013 TUR 0.917379 
 2012 TUR 1 
 2011 TUR 1 
 2010 TUR 1 
 2009 TUR 0.984038 
 2008 TUR 1 
 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 0.933357 
Turkiye Ihracat Kredi Bankasi - Turk Eximbank-Export Credit 
Bank of Turkey 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 0.783653 
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 2013 TUR 0.342268 
 2012 TUR 0.46822 
 2011 TUR 0.197999 
 2010 TUR 0.264199 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0.173795 
 2006 TUR 0.147546 
Turkiye Finans Katilim Bankasi AS 2015 TUR 0.860319 
 2014 TUR 0.808896 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Odea Bank AS 2015 TUR 0.950605 
 2014 TUR 0.764913 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
HSBC Bank A.S. 2015 TUR 0.720683 
 2014 TUR 0.831192 
 2013 TUR 0.805756 
 2012 TUR 0.910473 
 2011 TUR 0.827046 
 2010 TUR 0.950585 
 2009 TUR 1 
 2008 TUR 1 
 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 0 
Albaraka Turk Participation Bank-Albaraka Turk Katilim 
Bankasi AS 2015 TUR 0.866039 
 2014 TUR 0.910006 
 2013 TUR 0.917871 
 2012 TUR 0.957972 
 2011 TUR 0.929118 
 2010 TUR 0.8808 
 2009 TUR 0.855064 
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 2008 TUR 0.877037 
 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 0 
Sekerbank T.A.S. 2015 TUR 0.897858 
 2014 TUR 1 
 2013 TUR 0.8508 
 2012 TUR 0.892522 
 2011 TUR 0.765581 
 2010 TUR 0.814191 
 2009 TUR 0.845168 
 2008 TUR 0.890644 
 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 1 
Turkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi A.S.-Industrial Development 
Bank of Turkey 2015 TUR 0 
 2014 TUR 0.139842 
 2013 TUR 0.130919 
 2012 TUR 0.142241 
 2011 TUR 0.136795 
 2010 TUR 0.179198 
 2009 TUR 0.181135 
 2008 TUR 0.178372 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Iller Bankasi A.S. 2015 TUR 0 
 2014 TUR 0 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Asya Katilim Bankasi AS-Bank Asya 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 0.96672 
 2013 TUR 1 
 2012 TUR 0.910508 
 2011 TUR 1 
 2010 TUR 1 
 2009 TUR 1 
 2008 TUR 0.928776 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Anadolubank A.S. 2015 TUR 0.743627 
 2014 TUR 0.715314 
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 2013 TUR 0.691833 
 2012 TUR 0.649883 
 2011 TUR 0.647953 
 2010 TUR 0.629413 
 2009 TUR 0.642061 
 2008 TUR 0.72226 
 2007 TUR 0.604923 
 2006 TUR 0.576418 
Alternatifbank A.S. 2015 TUR 0.531545 
 2014 TUR 0.557074 
 2013 TUR 0.5948 
 2012 TUR 0.583793 
 2011 TUR 0.586702 
 2010 TUR 0.605668 
 2009 TUR 0.672638 
 2008 TUR 0.635699 
 2007 TUR 0.499403 
 2006 TUR 0.418584 
Burgan Bank AS 2015 TUR 0.531998 
 2014 TUR 0.535 
 2013 TUR 0.542947 
 2012 TUR 0.553831 
 2011 TUR 0.516766 
 2010 TUR 0.614998 
 2009 TUR 0.596984 
 2008 TUR 0.554055 
 2007 TUR 0.418842 
 2006 TUR 0.448202 
Fibabanka As 2015 TUR 0.686067 
 2014 TUR 0.644738 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Citibank A.S. 2015 TUR 0.634814 
 2014 TUR 0.652933 
 2013 TUR 0.632332 
 2012 TUR 0.794952 
 2011 TUR 0.901536 
 2010 TUR 0.84733 
 2009 TUR 0.845441 
 2008 TUR 1 
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 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 0 
Aktif Yatirim Bankasi AS 2015 TUR 0.749015 
 2014 TUR 0.638649 
 2013 TUR 0.544062 
 2012 TUR 0.207874 
 2011 TUR 0.401118 
 2010 TUR 0.450414 
 2009 TUR 0.285957 
 2008 TUR 0.186358 
 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 0.692994 
Mercedes-Benz Finansman Turk AS 2015 TUR 0 
 2014 TUR 0 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Yapi Kredi Finansal Kiralama A.O. 2015 TUR 0.248209 
 2014 TUR 0.209215 
 2013 TUR 0.530719 
 2012 TUR 0.966326 
 2011 TUR 0.374977 
 2010 TUR 0.236385 
 2009 TUR 0.177669 
 2008 TUR 1 
 2007 TUR 0.376189 
 2006 TUR 0.181514 
Takasbank 2015 TUR 0.739381 
 2014 TUR 0.760737 
 2013 TUR 0.906745 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 1 
 2010 TUR 1 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Garanti Finansal Kiralama 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 1 
 2013 TUR 1 
 2012 TUR 1 
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 2011 TUR 1 
 2010 TUR 0.606029 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Is Yatirim Menkul Degerler AS-Is Investment 2015 TUR 0.858096 
 2014 TUR 0.969109 
 2013 TUR 1 
 2012 TUR 0.997677 
 2011 TUR 0.945073 
 2010 TUR 0.85947 
 2009 TUR 0.5613 
 2008 TUR 0.918608 
 2007 TUR 0.826241 
 2006 TUR 0.517362 
Turkland Bank AS-T- Bank 2015 TUR 0.568337 
 2014 TUR 0.537285 
 2013 TUR 0.449756 
 2012 TUR 0.47379 
 2011 TUR 0.478021 
 2010 TUR 0.629134 
 2009 TUR 0.399077 
 2008 TUR 0.285513 
 2007 TUR 0.265307 
 2006 TUR 0.289243 
Is Finansal Kiralama AS 2015 TUR 0.446057 
 2014 TUR 0.313692 
 2013 TUR 0.450743 
 2012 TUR 0.263924 
 2011 TUR 0.367169 
 2010 TUR 0.53411 
 2009 TUR 0.434771 
 2008 TUR 0.438714 
 2007 TUR 0.311759 
 2006 TUR 0.283873 
Volkswagen Dogus Finansmani AS 2015 TUR 0 
 2014 TUR 0 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0.79255 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0.622741 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
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GSD Holding Anonim Sirketi 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 0.58558 
 2013 TUR 0.672412 
 2012 TUR 0.672986 
 2011 TUR 0.637295 
 2010 TUR 0.740265 
 2009 TUR 0.821169 
 2008 TUR 0.70128 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
AK Finansal Kiralama AS 2015 TUR 0.153819 
 2014 TUR 0.413399 
 2013 TUR 0.298435 
 2012 TUR 0.576971 
 2011 TUR 0.860373 
 2010 TUR 0.885622 
 2009 TUR 0.919919 
 2008 TUR 1 
 2007 TUR 1 
 2006 TUR 0.20368 
Development Bank of Turkey Inc-Turkiye Kalkinma Bankasi 
A.S. 2015 TUR 0.326726 
 2014 TUR 0.328747 
 2013 TUR 0.348977 
 2012 TUR 0.414672 
 2011 TUR 0.337147 
 2010 TUR 0.469617 
 2009 TUR 0.526909 
 2008 TUR 0.559159 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
ICBC Turkey Bank A S. 2015 TUR 0.549604 
 2014 TUR 0.554393 
 2013 TUR 0.658414 
 2012 TUR 0.679078 
 2011 TUR 0.659587 
 2010 TUR 0.665804 
 2009 TUR 0.816889 
 2008 TUR 0.719905 
 2007 TUR 0.690882 
 2006 TUR 0.746904 
Arab Turkish Bank-Arap Turk Bankasi 2015 TUR 0.606258 
 2014 TUR 0.65779 
 2013 TUR 0.692872 
 2012 TUR 0.508923 
 2011 TUR 0.615752 
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 2010 TUR 0.416452 
 2009 TUR 0.34849 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Yapi Kredi Yatirim Menkul Degerler A.S. 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 0.986963 
 2013 TUR 0.749505 
 2012 TUR 0.711867 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Turkey A.S. 2015 TUR 1 
 2014 TUR 0 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Yapi Kredi Factoring AS 2015 TUR 0.823211 
 2014 TUR 0.503341 
 2013 TUR 0.390904 
 2012 TUR 0.406204 
 2011 TUR 0.478905 
 2010 TUR 0.419627 
 2009 TUR 0.384033 
 2008 TUR 0.337839 
 2007 TUR 0.362381 
 2006 TUR 0.245837 
Koc Tuketici Finansmani A.S. 2015 TUR 0.29853 
 2014 TUR 0.268577 
 2013 TUR 0.281128 
 2012 TUR 0.399977 
 2011 TUR 0.275718 
 2010 TUR 0.442446 
 2009 TUR 0.76119 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Deutsche Bank AS 2015 TUR 0.423337 
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 2014 TUR 0.421782 
 2013 TUR 0.289432 
 2012 TUR 0.401161 
 2011 TUR 0.453391 
 2010 TUR 1 
 2009 TUR 1 
 2008 TUR 0.525199 
 2007 TUR 0.89387 
 2006 TUR 0.449514 
Garanti Faktoring A.S 2015 TUR 0.226643 
 2014 TUR 0.240797 
 2013 TUR 1 
 2012 TUR 0.379364 
 2011 TUR 0.536116 
 2010 TUR 0.593877 
 2009 TUR 0.555459 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Deniz Leasing AS-Deniz Finansal Kiralama AS 2015 TUR 0.904365 
 2014 TUR 0.680684 
 2013 TUR 0.808475 
 2012 TUR 0.607174 
 2011 TUR 0.716484 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Birlesik fon Bankasi AS 2015 TUR 0.841679 
 2014 TUR 1 
 2013 TUR 1 
 2012 TUR 1 
 2011 TUR 1 
 2010 TUR 0.864554 
 2009 TUR 0.856759 
 2008 TUR 1 
 2007 TUR 0.975751 
 2006 TUR 0 
Ziraat Finansal Kiralama AS 2015 TUR 0 
 2014 TUR 0 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
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 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
Bankpozitif Kredi ve Kalkinma Bankasi AS-C Bank 2015 TUR 0.388966 
 2014 TUR 0.29084 
 2013 TUR 0.276013 
 2012 TUR 0.325429 
 2011 TUR 0.39163 
 2010 TUR 0.409551 
 2009 TUR 0.522198 
 2008 TUR 0.35351 
 2007 TUR 0.366712 
 2006 TUR 0.280264 
Rabobank A.S. 2015 TUR 0.260957 
 2014 TUR 0 
 2013 TUR 0 
 2012 TUR 0 
 2011 TUR 0 
 2010 TUR 0 
 2009 TUR 0 
 2008 TUR 0 
 2007 TUR 0 
 2006 TUR 0 
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. 2015 KU 1 
 2014 KU 1 
 2013 KU 0.882188 
 2012 KU 0.954025 
 2011 KU 0.855664 
 2010 KU 0.837231 
 2009 KU 0.872394 
 2008 KU 0.913613 
 2007 KU 1 
 2006 KU 0.946862 
Kuwait Finance House 2015 KU 0.977825 
 2014 KU 1 
 2013 KU 1 
 2012 KU 0.979229 
 2011 KU 0.997026 
 2010 KU 1 
 2009 KU 0.908146 
 2008 KU 0.933196 
 2007 KU 0.840801 
 2006 KU 1 
Burgan Bank SAK 2015 KU 0.887239 
 2014 KU 0.942015 
 2013 KU 0.976323 
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 2012 KU 0.911036 
 2011 KU 0.925214 
 2010 KU 0.889932 
 2009 KU 0.889858 
 2008 KU 1 
 2007 KU 0 
 2006 KU 0 
Gulf Bank KSC (The) 2015 KU 0.816464 
 2014 KU 0.79611 
 2013 KU 0.770087 
 2012 KU 0.789389 
 2011 KU 0.754344 
 2010 KU 0.758385 
 2009 KU 0.763489 
 2008 KU 0.839528 
 2007 KU 0.805124 
 2006 KU 0.80756 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 2015 KU 0 
 2014 KU 0 
 2013 KU 0 
 2012 KU 0 
 2011 KU 0 
 2010 KU 0 
 2009 KU 0 
 2008 KU 0 
 2007 KU 0 
 2006 KU 0 
Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait (KSC) 2015 KU 0.726924 
 2014 KU 0.694811 
 2013 KU 0.700966 
 2012 KU 0.694483 
 2011 KU 0.71602 
 2010 KU 0.703351 
 2009 KU 0.751671 
 2008 KU 0.736695 
 2007 KU 0.79961 
 2006 KU 0.794568 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait K.P.S.C. (The) 2015 KU 0.8486 
 2014 KU 0.904119 
 2013 KU 0.843403 
 2012 KU 0.840607 
 2011 KU 0.849832 
 2010 KU 0.771104 
 2009 KU 0.759771 
 2008 KU 0.927386 
 2007 KU 0.984837 
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 2006 KU 0.872981 
Ahli United Bank KSC 2015 KU 0.997681 
 2014 KU 0.933088 
 2013 KU 0.929028 
 2012 KU 1 
 2011 KU 1 
 2010 KU 1 
 2009 KU 0.739568 
 2008 KU 0.741197 
 2007 KU 0.841457 
 2006 KU 0.914356 
Boubyan Bank KSCP 2015 KU 0.818708 
 2014 KU 0.799887 
 2013 KU 0.839769 
 2012 KU 0.799467 
 2011 KU 0.754527 
 2010 KU 0.706068 
 2009 KU 0.750627 
 2008 KU 0.760744 
 2007 KU 1 
 2006 KU 1 
Kuwait International Bank 2015 KU 0.905736 
 2014 KU 0.912981 
 2013 KU 1 
 2012 KU 0.840312 
 2011 KU 0 
 2010 KU 0 
 2009 KU 0 
 2008 KU 0 
 2007 KU 0 
 2006 KU 0 
Warba Bank 2015 KU 0.711733 
 2014 KU 0.706787 
 2013 KU 0.85318 
 2012 KU 0.905549 
 2011 KU 1 
 2010 KU 0 
 2009 KU 0 
 2008 KU 0 
 2007 KU 0 
 2006 KU 0 
Industrial Bank of Kuwait K.S.C. 2015 KU 0.599844 
 2014 KU 0.644941 
 2013 KU 0.522979 
 2012 KU 0.485729 
 2011 KU 0.501449 
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 2010 KU 0.430601 
 2009 KU 0.411909 
 2008 KU 0.441943 
 2007 KU 0.533737 
 2006 KU 0.455878 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2015 TUN 0.971913 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2014 TUN 1 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2013 TUN 1 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2012 TUN 0.996969 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2011 TUN 1 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2010 TUN 1 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2009 TUN 1 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2008 TUN 0.951212 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2007 TUN 0.884931 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie - BIAT 2006 TUN 0.878312 
Banque Nationale Agricole 2015 TUN 0.996334 
 2014 TUN 0.989689 
 2013 TUN 0.905006 
 2012 TUN 0.915879 
 2011 TUN 0.854509 
 2010 TUN 0.92423 
 2009 TUN 0.763415 
 2008 TUN 0.788851 
 2007 TUN 0.785389 
 2006 TUN 0.824394 
Société Tunisienne de Banque 2015 TUN 1 
 2014 TUN 1 
 2013 TUN 0.982919 
 2012 TUN 1 
 2011 TUN 1 
 2010 TUN 0.989984 
 2009 TUN 1 
 2008 TUN 1 
 2007 TUN 1 
 2006 TUN 0.980145 
Amen Bank 2015 TUN 0.870595 
 2014 TUN 0.90375 
 2013 TUN 0.856504 
 2012 TUN 0.945892 
 2011 TUN 0.777486 
 2010 TUN 0.793175 
 2009 TUN 0.775151 
 2008 TUN 0.77748 
 2007 TUN 0.758547 
 2006 TUN 0.725715 
Banque de l'Habitat 2015 TUN 0.69849 
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 2014 TUN 0.755951 
 2013 TUN 0.957687 
 2012 TUN 0.892935 
 2011 TUN 0.867728 
 2010 TUN 0.957296 
 2009 TUN 0.747008 
 2008 TUN 0.761781 
 2007 TUN 0.688911 
 2006 TUN 0.646006 
Attijari Bank 2015 TUN 0.869839 
 2014 TUN 1 
 2013 TUN 0.99237 
 2012 TUN 0.952178 
 2011 TUN 0.969811 
 2010 TUN 1 
 2009 TUN 0.967143 
 2008 TUN 0.817214 
 2007 TUN 0.823345 
 2006 TUN 0.791924 
Arab Tunisian Bank 2015 TUN 0.787545 
 2014 TUN 0.873139 
 2013 TUN 0.882722 
 2012 TUN 0.889636 
 2011 TUN 0.872326 
 2010 TUN 1 
 2009 TUN 0.966279 
 2008 TUN 0.963027 
 2007 TUN 0.821151 
 2006 TUN 0.781413 
Banque de Tunisie 2015 TUN 0.683156 
 2014 TUN 0.732292 
 2013 TUN 0.703715 
 2012 TUN 0.764349 
 2011 TUN 0.575937 
 2010 TUN 0.512695 
 2009 TUN 0.575387 
 2008 TUN 0.498322 
 2007 TUN 0.449027 
 2006 TUN 0 
Union Internationale de Banques 2015 TUN 0.925251 
 2014 TUN 1 
 2013 TUN 1 
 2012 TUN 0.959199 
 2011 TUN 0.982265 
 2010 TUN 1 
 2009 TUN 1 
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 2008 TUN 1 
 2007 TUN 0.852413 
 2006 TUN 0.807752 
Union Bancaire pour le Commerce et l'Industrie SA UBCI 2015 TUN 0.89055 
 2014 TUN 0.890783 
 2013 TUN 0.866107 
 2012 TUN 0.78406 
 2011 TUN 0.944473 
 2010 TUN 0.980512 
 2009 TUN 0.905654 
 2008 TUN 0.89454 
 2007 TUN 0.860126 
 2006 TUN 0.810254 
Banque Tuniso - Koweitienne-BTK 2015 TUN 0.508514 
 2014 TUN 0.489917 
 2013 TUN 0.580325 
 2012 TUN 0.641489 
 2011 TUN 0.589247 
 2010 TUN 0.550319 
 2009 TUN 0.494398 
 2008 TUN 0.392025 
 2007 TUN 0.423324 
 2006 TUN 0.403225 
Albaraka Bank Tunisia 2015 TUN 0.705607 
 2014 TUN 0.781823 
 2013 TUN 0 
 2012 TUN 0 
 2011 TUN 0 
 2010 TUN 0 
 2009 TUN 0 
 2008 TUN 0 
 2007 TUN 0 
 2006 TUN 0 
Banque Zitouna 2015 TUN 1 
 2014 TUN 1 
 2013 TUN 1 
 2012 TUN 0.917716 
 2011 TUN 1 
 2010 TUN 0 
 2009 TUN 0 
 2008 TUN 0 
 2007 TUN 0 
 2006 TUN 0 
Tunis International Bank 2015 TUN 0.882214 
 2014 TUN 0.852621 
 2013 TUN 0.838836 
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 2012 TUN 0.900052 
 2011 TUN 0.797773 
 2010 TUN 0.786996 
 2009 TUN 0.718995 
 2008 TUN 0.73608 
 2007 TUN 0.671171 
 2006 TUN 0 
Qatar National Bank Tunisia 2015 TUN 0.655266 
 2014 TUN 0.588235 
 2013 TUN 0.463774 
 2012 TUN 0.651414 
 2011 TUN 0.455693 
 2010 TUN 0.462001 
 2009 TUN 0.430582 
 2008 TUN 0.45839 
 2007 TUN 0.441899 
 2006 TUN 0.395871 
Tunisie Leasing 2015 TUN 0.466331 
 2014 TUN 0.473014 
 2013 TUN 0.436265 
 2012 TUN 0.454514 
 2011 TUN 0.385327 
 2010 TUN 0.369545 
 2009 TUN 0.336405 
 2008 TUN 0.311964 
 2007 TUN 0.283733 
 2006 TUN 0.222613 
North Africa International Bank - NAIB 2015 TUN 0.928885 
 2014 TUN 0.657434 
 2013 TUN 0.483048 
 2012 TUN 0 
 2011 TUN 1 
 2010 TUN 0.716723 
 2009 TUN 1 
 2008 TUN 1 
 2007 TUN 1 
 2006 TUN 0.885414 
Caisse de prêts et de soutien des collectivités locales-CPSCL 2015 TUN 0 
 2014 TUN 0 
 2013 TUN 0 
 2012 TUN 0 
 2011 TUN 0 
 2010 TUN 0.948345 
 2009 TUN 0.923955 
 2008 TUN 1 
 2007 TUN 1 
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 2006 TUN 0.14309 
Alubaf International Bank 2015 TUN 0 
 2014 TUN 0 
 2013 TUN 0 
 2012 TUN 0 
 2011 TUN 0 
 2010 TUN 0 
 2009 TUN 0 
 2008 TUN 0 
 2007 TUN 0 
 2006 TUN 0 
STUSID Bank 2015 TUN 0.553228 
 2014 TUN 0.488029 
 2013 TUN 0.503773 
 2012 TUN 0.404443 
 2011 TUN 0 
 2010 TUN 0 
 2009 TUN 0 
 2008 TUN 0 
 2007 TUN 0 
 2006 TUN 0 
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirats SA 2015 TUN 0.528745 
 2014 TUN 0.521562 
 2013 TUN 0.458988 
 2012 TUN 0.455075 
 2011 TUN 0.371632 
 2010 TUN 0.387704 
 2009 TUN 0.33592 
 2008 TUN 0.297107 
 2007 TUN 0.248573 
 2006 TUN 0.201254 
Banque Tunisienne de Solidarité 2015 TUN 0.499816 
 2014 TUN 0.567611 
 2013 TUN 0.485684 
 2012 TUN 0.420753 
 2011 TUN 0.371226 
 2010 TUN 0 
 2009 TUN 0 
 2008 TUN 1 
 2007 TUN 0 
 2006 TUN 0 
Banque Tuniso-Libyenne 2015 TUN 0.670682 
 2014 TUN 0.54395 
 2013 TUN 0.52401 
 2012 TUN 0.497628 
 2011 TUN 0.452363 
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 2010 TUN 0.552431 
 2009 TUN 0.489927 
 2008 TUN 0.504483 
 2007 TUN 0.445856 
 2006 TUN 0.39532 
Arab Banking Corporation - Tunisie 2015 TUN 0.67189 
 2014 TUN 0.635668 
 2013 TUN 1 
 2012 TUN 1 
 2011 TUN 1 
 2010 TUN 1 
 2009 TUN 0.716059 
 2008 TUN 0.742287 
 2007 TUN 0.626533 
 2006 TUN 1 
Citibank NA 2015 TUN 0.469216 
 2014 TUN 0.449169 
 2013 TUN 0 
 2012 TUN 0 
 2011 TUN 0 
 2010 TUN 0 
 2009 TUN 0 
 2008 TUN 0 
 2007 TUN 0 
 2006 TUN 0 
Wifack International Bank 2015 TUN 0.222252 
 2014 TUN 0.201777 
 2013 TUN 0.208349 
 2012 TUN 0.169474 
 2011 TUN 0.155238 
 2010 TUN 0.162009 
 2009 TUN 0.14095 
 2008 TUN 0.139049 
 2007 TUN 0.319103 
 2006 TUN 0 
Banque Franco-Tunisienne 2015 TUN 0.988546 
 2014 TUN 0.854565 
 2013 TUN 0.880637 
 2012 TUN 0.948121 
 2011 TUN 0.537877 
 2010 TUN 0.553017 
 2009 TUN 0.672024 
 2008 TUN 0.652188 
 2007 TUN 0.636225 
 2006 TUN 0.620659 
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